The effects on intra-Community competition of export subsidies to third countries.  The case of export credits, export insurance and official development assistance by Abraham, Filip
THE EFFECTS ON INTRA-COMMUNITY COMPETITION 
OF EXPORT SUBSIDIES TO THIRD COUNTRIES 
The case of export credits, export insurance and 
official development assistance 
•*• 
*  * 
*  * 
*  *  *•* 
COMMISSION 
OF THE EUROPEAN 
COMMUNITIES This  document  has  been  prepared  for  use  within  the  Commission.  It  does  not 
necessarily represent the Commission's official position. 
Cataloguing data can be found at the end of this publication. 
Luxembourg:  Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1990 
ISBN  92-826-0352-0 
Catalogue number: CM-59-90-281-EN-C 
©  ECSC-EEC-EAEC, Brussels •  Luxembourg, 1990 
Reproduction is authorized, except for commercial purposes,  provided the source is 
acknowledged. 
Printed in Belgium Commission  of  the  European  Communities 
THE  EFFECTS  ON  INTRA-COMMUNITY  COMPETITION  OF 
EXPORT  SUBSIDIES  TO  THIRD  COUNTRIES  : 
THE  CASE  OF  EXPORT  CREDITS,  EXPORT  INSURANCE 
AND  OFFICIAL  DEVELOPMENT  ASSISTANCE 
by 
Document This  document  has  been  prepared  for  use  within  the  Commission.  It  does  not 
necessarily  represent  the  Commission•s  official position. 
Copyright  ECSC-EEC-EAEC,  Brussel  - Luxembourg,  1990 
Reproduction  is  authorized,  except  for  commercial  purposes,  provided  the 
source  is  acknowledged. PREFACE 
This  work  forms  part  of  a  programme  of  studies  on  the  functioning  of 
the  competitive  process  in  the  economy  of the  European  Community. 
Various  national  institutes  and  experts  have  been  appointed  by  the 
Commission  to  carry out  the  study  programme. 
In  view  of  the  specific  and  general  interest  of  these studies  and  the 
undertakings  given  by  the  Commission  to  the  European  Parliament,  they 
are  published  in  full  in  their original version. 
The  Commission  refrains  from  commenting,  except  to  say  that 
responsibility_  for  the  data  and  views  set  out  in  each  study  lies 
entirely with  the  institute or  expert  who  produced  it. 
The  other  studies  in  the  same  series  will  be  published  by  the 
Commission  as  soon  as  possible. .  I This  report  would  not  have  been  written without  the  support  of  many. 
First  of  all,  I  would  like  to  thank  the  Directorate-General  for 
Competition of  the EC  Commission  for  financing  this research.  Several 
people of  DGI  and DGIV  made  helpful  suggestions,  including P.  Martinez 
and  F.  Rawlinson.  Special  thanks  go  to  J.P.  De  Laet  who  coordinated 
the relations between our  research  team and  the Commission. 
The  efforts  of  the  Belgian Nationale  Delcredere  Dienst  of  Belgium  to 
provide  us  with  the  required  data  were  very  much  appreciated.  In 
particular,  we  are  thankful  to  Mr  Baele,  Mr  ~oes,  Mrs  Dubois  and  Mr 
Knaepen. 
The  academic  world  contributed  considerably  to  this  report.  We  are 
grateful  to  Robert  Stern  and  John  Jackson  of  the  University  of 
Michigan,  Theo  Peeters at  the University of  Leuven,  as well  to Bernard 
Hoekman,  now  at GATT.  Many  interesting suggestions  were  also  made  in 
the  Workshop  in  international  economics  of  the  KU  Leuven.  Data  on 
exports were  made  available by  INCAP. 
Evidently,  the  author  is  responsible  for  any  remaining  errors.  Nor 
should  this  report  be  considered  as  the  official  view  of  any  of  the 
people or  institutions mentioned above. TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 
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GENERAL  INTRODUCfiON 
In view  of  the  internal  market  liberalisation of  1992.  various  forms 
of  subsidies.  as  documented  in  the  Commission's  first  survey on state 
aids  (Commission  of  the  European  Communi ties.  1989).  have  attracted 
renewed  attention.  This  revived  interest  is  consistent  with  the 
Commission  • s  long-dating  concern  for  undistorted  competition  in  the 
EC.  The  creation of  an  internal  market  adds  a  new  dimension  to  this 
concern.  It is feared  that national  governments  may  increasingly rely 
on  state  aids  in  response  to  the  fiercer  competition  in  a  unified 
market. 
There are  many  forms  of  state aids as  the  Commission's  survey clearly 
indicates.  This  report analyzes  export  financing  support  programs  of 
Belgium.  Germany.  France,  and  the  United  Kingdom  in  greater  detail. 
Export  financing  support by EC  member  states is most  often directed at 
exports  to  non-EC  countries  although  official  export  insurance 
agencies  regularly insure export contracts  to EC  countries as well. 
Export  financing  takes  the  form  of  either  export  credits.  export 
credit  insurance.  or  official  development  assistance.  An  export 
credit arises whenever  a  foreign buyer  of  exported goods  is allowed  to 
defer  payment  and  takes  the  form  of  interest  subsidies.  It  is given 
by  the  government  either  to  its  exporters  or  commercial  financial 
institutions (supplier credits)  or  to  foreign  importers  (buyer credit) 
(OECD.  1987,  p  7).  Official  export  credit  insurance.  which  we  will 
henceforth  call  export  insurance.  is  provided  by  national  insurance 
agencies  and  covers  export  transactions.  which  themselves  may  or  may 
not be  financed by export credits.  The  insurance represents an export 
subsidy  if  the  premium  rate  lies  below  the  going  market  rate. 
Finally.  official  development  assistance  consists  of  governmental 
loans at subsidized interest rates. - 2  -
This  report consists of  three chapters.  In chapter  I.  we  discuss  the 
legal  aspects  of  export  financing.  Export  financing  is  subject  to 
regulations  and  agreements  in  the  context  of  GATT.  the  OECD.  and  the 
•  .» 
European  Community.  A  detailed  review  of  the  existing  rules  is 
essential  since  they  profoundly  affect  the  opportunities  for 
subsidization through export  financing programs. 
The  second  chapter  provides  estimates  for  the  subsidies  implied  in 
export  credits,  export  insurance  and  official  developments.  In  the 
first part  of  this  chapter.  a  definition of  subsidies  is given  and  a 
method  is developed  to measure  subsidy-equivalents.  Subsequently ..  the 
methodology  is  applied  to  export  financing  programs  in  the  four 
countries studied in this report.  Insofar as possible,  a  regional  and 
sectoral disaggregation supplements  the  total  subsidy estimates. 
In  the  third chapter.  we  link export  finance  subsidization  to  intra-EC 
export  performance  on  third  markets.  For  this  purpose,  we  develop  a 
theoretical  model  which  isolates  the  factors  that  determine  the 
success  of  export  financing  subsidies  in  enhancing  market  shares. 
Some  empirical  evidence  on  these determinants  is given.  Finally,  the 
last part of chapter III  is a  first  tentative  investigation of  whether 
marked  changes  in  export  performance  occurred  in  subsidized  markets 
and  industries. - 3  -
Chapter  I 
LEGAL  OONSTRAINTS  ON  EXPORT  FINANCING 
FOR  EC  MEMBER  OOUNTRIES 
I.  INTRODUCfiON 
In  post-war  history.  tariff  reductions  through  GATT  and  internal 
liberalization  within  the  European  Community  have  significantly 
reduced  tariff barriers  of  EC  member  states.  At  the  same  time,  the 
slowdown  in the growth of  international  trade  in  the  '70 and early  '80 
revived  protectionist  sentiments  in  many  industrialised  countries. 
Among  other  non tariff  barriers,  export  subsidies  became  an 
increasingly attractive  instrument  to  defend  and  enhance  market  share 
in a  stagnating world market. 
International  institutions  were  quick  to  recognize  the  dangers  of  an 
escalation  of  this  renewed  interest  to  a  full-fledged  export  subsidy 
war.  In  the  GATT  Tokyo  round  and  within  the  OECD,  efforts  were 
undertaken  to  restrict  the  use  of  subsidies  in  international  trade. 
Part of  these  initiatives were  directed  towards  the  control  of  export 
financing.  In  this paper,  we  focus  on  the  contents  of  the agreements 
that  were  ultimately reached as  well  as  on  the  EC  legislation  in  this 
area. 
As  wi 11  become  clear  in  this  paper,  international  restrictions  on 
export  financing  leave  considerable  room  for  export  subsidization  in 
the  economic  interpretation  of  the  concept.  Economically  speaking, 
export  financing agencies  provide  a  subsidy  whenever  exporters  obtain 
more  favorable credit  terms  or cheaper  insurance  than available on  the 
commercial  market.  However,  international  agreements  only  prohibit 
export  financing which entails a  charge on  the public account. - 4  -
Generally.  government  borrowing  costs are below  what  a  representative 
exporter  would  pay.  By  providing  export  financing  at  or  slightly 
above  its  own  costs  but  well  below  commercial  rates,  governments  are 
therefore able  to  subsidize  exporters  without  breaching  international 
rules. 
The  rest of  this chapter  is structured as  follows.  First,  we  discuss 
the  EC  legislation  on  export  subsidies.  Subsequently,  Section  III 
analyzes  the  OECD  "Consensus"  and  the  various  sectoral  understandings 
on  export  credits.  In  Section  IV,  we  focus  on  GATT  regulations 
concerning  export  subsidies.  Finally,  Section  V contains  some 
concluding comments. 
II.  <DMMUNI1Y  LEGISLATION 
In accordance with Article 92  of  the  EEC  Treaty,  any aid granted by  a 
member  state or  through  state resources  in any  form  whatsoever,  which 
distort  competition  by  favouring  certain  undertakings  or  the 
production  of  certain goods,  is  incompatible  with  the  common  market. 
Article  92  forms  part  of  the  Community's  internal  rules  on 
competition.  It  rules  out  export  credits  and  export  insurance  that 
distort competition among  member  states insofar as a  government  agency 
is  involved  or  state  resources  are  used.  Article  93  {2)  provides 
that  it is  the  Commission's  task  to  assess  whether  a  particular  form 
of  state aid is contrary  to Article 92. 
The  application  of  the  Treaty articles  on  competition  throughout  the 
years.  has  led  to  a  consistent  approach  towards  state  aids.  Export 
financing  support  is usually granted by agencies partially or entirely 
funded  by  the  government.  The  basic  principle  of  the  Commission  in 
establishing  whether  a  subscription  of  capital  is  a  state  aid  is  to 
determine  to  what  extent  the  export  financing  agency  would  be  able  to 
obtain the capital  on  the private capital markets.  In particular,  the 
test is whether  in similar circumstances a  private shareholder,  having - 5  -
regard  to  the  foreseeability  of  obtaining  a  return and  leaving aside 
all  social,  regional-policy  and  sectoral  considerations,  would  have 
provided  the  capital  in  question  (European  Court  Reports,l985,  p 
2263-2264).  This  principle  is  explained  into  more  detai  1  in  a 
Conunission  paper  on  public  authorities'  holdings  in  company  capital 
(Bulletin  of  the  EC,  1984,  93-95).  The  Conunission  regards  public 
holdings  as  constituting  state aids  when  private  investors  would  not 
have acted in the  same  way. 
The  Conunission's  distrust  of  state  aids  is  reflected  in  the  broad 
definition  of  public  holdings.  They  include  all  direct  holdings  of 
central,  regional  or  local  government,  or  a  direct  holding  of 
financial  institutions  or  other  national,  regional  or  industrial 
agencies,  which are funded  from state resources or over which central, 
regional  or  local  government  exercises  a  dominant  influence.  It  is 
clear  that  all  exporting  financing  agencies  are  covered  by  this 
definition. 
In addition,  the Conunission  requires  that any  capital  provided by  the 
state  should  earn  a  return,  comparable  to  the  return  of  a  private 
investor under normal  market conditions.  This  rules out any  sustained 
losses  of  export  insurance  or  export  credit  agencies.  It  also 
indicates  that a  positive return on capital provided by  the state does 
not suffice if  the  return is below normal  market  conditions. 
Finally,  exceptions  for  particular  countries are  rarely made.  In  the 
area  of  export  credits,  Greece  was  the  only  country  who  successfully 
justified the use of  export credits as a  means  of  restoring balance of 
payments disequilibria. 
Nevertheless,  it  is  not  an  easy  task  to  determine  whether  export 
financing distorts competition between member  states on  third markets. 
The  standard  EC  injury  criteria  are  based  on  the  concepts  of 
competitive  distortions  and  affectation  of  trade.  Increased  import 
shares or  import  price differentiation on  the  market  of  the  importing 
country- are  used  as  indicators.  Often,  these  indicators  do  not - 6  -
suffice  in this case because  the  importing country  is not part of  the 
EC.  Indeed.  one also has  to establish that  the  increased penetration 
on  third markets has harmed other EC  producers. 
A  Policy  Coordination  Committee  for  Credit  Insurance.  Guarantees  and 
Financial  Credits was  set up  to keep  the  export  financing policies  of 
the EC  member  states under  review.  Also.  a  consultation procedure  for 
export  credits  exists.  under  which  any  proposed  derogations  from 
Community  rules must  be notified  to  the  Policy Coordination Committee 
for  consideration.  This  procedure  permits  member  countries  to  remain 
competitive  by  matching  the  terms  of  credits  offered  by  third 
countries  in  support  of  exports  to  the  Community  or  markets  outside 
the  Community  (Ray.  1986,  p  299}.  Under  this  procedure,  member 
countries  may  request  further  information  or  a  consul tat  ion  if  they 
have questions  on a  proposed action. 
I I I. OFill AGREEMENTS  ON  EXPORT  CREDITS 
In addition  to  EC  legislation.  EC  member  countries  also  participate 
in  international  agreements  on  export  subsidies. 
discuss  how  agreements  within  the  OECD  affect 
countries  to provide export credits. 
3. 1 .  The  OECD  "Consensus"  1 
In  this  section,  we 
the  opportunity  of 
The  Arrangement  on Guidelines  for  Officially Supported Export  Credits 
(more  commonly  called  the  Consensus}  became  effective  on  April  1, 
1978.  It  is  an  arrangement  all  OECD  countries  except  Turkey  and 
Iceland.  All  EC  member  states are  included.  However,  it  is  not  an 
act  of  the  OECD  counci 1  and  thus  not  in  a  formal  sense  a  legal 
instrument of  the  OECD.  The  main purpose of  the Consensus  is  to 
lThis section follows  Ray  (1986,  299-301}  and  OECD  (1987,  7-9} - 7  -
/ 
prevent an export credit race  in which countries  compete  on  the basis 
of  who  grants  the  most  favorable  financing  terms.  It  covers  all 
sectors  except  for  agriculture,  nuclear  power  plants.  aircraft.  ships 
and military goods. 
In  the  Agreement  a  clear  distinction  is  made  between  {i)  pure  cover 
which  is  limited  to  guarantees  and  insurance  and  {ii)  official 
financing  support.  which  includes  credits  that  are  given directly  by 
the  export  credit  agency  or  that  are  subsidized  by  the  government. 
The  COnsensus  does  only  apply  for  the  latter  category  and  thus  does 
not cover export  insurance. 
The  COnsensus  deals  with  actions  and  policies  of  official  export 
credit  agencies.  It  sets  limits  on  the  terms  and  conditions  for 
export  credits  with  a  duration  of  two  years  or  more.  Within  these 
limits.  certain  derogations  from  the  rules  and  some  deviations  from 
what  is  considered  normal  practice  are  possible.  These  must  be 
notified  to all other participants  in  the COnsensus  who  can  then match 
the deviation or derogation. 
The  COnsensus  allows  tied or partially untied aid financing  :  that  is 
to  say.  credits  or  grants  that  are  wholly  or  partly  {in  the  latter 
case  they  are  known  as  mixed  credits)  from  public  funds  for 
development  purposes and  that are  tied to purchases  from  the donor  or. 
in  the  case  of  partially untied  aid.  to  purchases  from  the  donor  as 
well  as  from  developing  and  some  other  countries.  Their  conditions 
may  be  more  favorable  than  those  discussed  below  if  the  overall 
concessiona.lity  level  is  at  least  35%  and  if  the  tied  or  partially 
untied financing  is duly notified.  The  concessionality  level  measures 
the  grant  element  in  the  aid  package  and  is  computed  by  using  a 
discount  factor based on  'commercial  interest reference rates'  {CIRR). 
which  are  adjusted  monthly  to  reflect  market  rates.  Export  credits 
with  a  concessiona.l  i ty  level  below  35%  are  judged  to  be  for  the 
purpose  of  improving  the  competitive  standing  of  what  is  basically  a 
commercial  transaction  so  that  the  same  conditions  as  in  the  case  of 
commercial - 8  -
export credits should apply.  When  the concessionality  level  is  larger 
than  or  equal  to  35%.  export  credits  are  considered  to  be 
aid-motivated  and  therefore  free  from  Consensus-discipline.  As  is 
easily  understood.  this  provides  an  incentive  to  expand  the  use  of 
development aid for  competitive purposes. 
The  most  important  restrictions  the  Consensus  imposes  on  export 
credits are as  follows: 
a)  At  least  15%  of  the contract  is  to be  covered by cash payments 
b)  The  maximum  repayment  term  is  8~ years.  This  may  be  extended  to  10 
years  for  relatively poor  and  for  some  intermediate countries. 
c)  Minimum  rates  of  interest are  set  for  periods  of  up  to 5,  up  to  8~ 
and  up  to  10  years  (see  Table  1}.  These  minima,  lmown  as  the 
'matrix',  are subject  to  change  every January and  July according  to an 
automatic mechanism which  ties changes  in  the matrix  to  changes  in  the 
weighted  average  of  government  bond  yields  for  the  five  currencies 
making  up  the  Internatiqnal  Monetary  Fund's  special  drawing  rights 
(SDR).  The  matrix rates vary according  to  the  group of countries  for 
which  the  export credits are destined.  It should  be  noted  that,  from 
July  1988  onwards,  the  group  of  relatively  rich  countries  is  not 
eligible any  longer  for  subsidized  export  credits.  Moreover,  the  EC 
Council directive on aid  to  shipbuilding of  January 26,  1987  rules out 
aid by  EC  member  states  to  non-developing non-EC countries. 
d)  If commercial  interest  rates  for  the  currency of  a  participant fall 
below  these  minima,  any  participant  may  lend  in  that  currency at  the 
earli~r mentioned  'commercial  interest  reference  rates  (CIRR)'.  This 
opportunity  to  deviate  from  'matrix'  rates  rules  out  the  possibility 
that  credit  market  financing  in  countr~es  with  low  interest  rates 
becomes  more attractive  than official export  financing.  The  provision 
that  all  participating  countries  can  offer  export  credits  in  the - 9  -
Table  1  OECD  COnsensus  Arrangement Matrix of  Interest Rate Minima 
1976-1986  (per cent) 
Credits for 2-5 years 
July  1976 
July  1980 
November  1981 
July  1982 
October  1983 
July  1984 
January  1985 
January  1986 
July  1986 
Credits for 5-8.5 years 
July 1976 
July  1980 
November  1981 
July  1982 
October  1983 
July  1984 
January  1985 
January  1986 
July  1986 
Credits for 8.5-10 years 
July  1976 
July  1980 
November  1981 
July  1982 
October  1983 
July  1984 
January  1985 
January  1986 
July  1986 
Source  :  OECD  (1987,  p.  8). 
I  II  III 
Relatively  Intermediate  Relatively 
rich countries  countries  poor countries 
7.75 
8.50 
11.00 
12.15 
12.15 
13.35 
12.00 
10.95 
9.55 
8.00 
8.75 
11.25 
12.40 
12.40 
13.60 
12.25 
11.20 
9.80 
7.25 
8.00 
10.50 
10.85 
10.35 
11.55 
10.70 
9.65 
8.25 
•7.75 
8.50 
11.00 
11.35 
10.70 
11.90 
11.20 
10.15 
8.75 
11.35  (*} 
10.70  (*) 
11.90  (*) 
11.20  (*} 
10.15  (*} 
8.75  (*} 
7.25 
7.50 
10.00 
10.00 
9.50 
10.70 
9.85 
8.80 
7.40 
7.50 
7.75 
10.00 
10.00 
9.50 
10.70 
9.85 
8.80 
7.40 
7.50 
7.75 
10.00 
10.00 
9.50 
10.70 
9.85 
8.80 
7.40 
(*}  Available only for countries  that were classified in Category  III be-
fore 6th July  1982. - 10  -
currency with the  lower  interest rate is aimed at avoiding distortions 
among  signatories.  However,  the  mixture  into  one  system  of  'matrix' 
and  'market'  interest  rate  currencies  has  created  many  problems.  It 
also has  proven very difficult  to  devise  CIRR  that were acceptable  to 
all participants. 
From  the conditions above.  it becomes  clear  that  the COnsensus  defines 
export credits as subsidies when  they are  financed at an interest rate 
below  the  borrowing  costs  of  the  governments  whose  countries' 
currencies  constitute  the  SDR.  The  Consensus  therefore allows  export 
subsidies  in  the  economic  definition  to  the  extent  that  the  market 
interest  rate.  which  would  be  paid  in  absence  of  export  credits,  is 
above  the COnsensus  minimum  rate. 
Table  2  gives  the  evolution of  commercial  bank  lending  rates  to  prime 
borrowers  in Belgium,  Germany,  the  U.K.  and France.  Evidently.  only a 
1 imi ted  amount  of  exporters  are  able  to  obtain  financing  at  prime 
rates  so  that.  particularly  for  countries  with  intermediate  and  low 
GNP  levels,  the  interest differential  between  Table  2  and  the  matrix 
rates  in  Table  1  represents  a  lower  bound  to  the  actual  export 
subsidy.  Even  so.  we  find  the  prime  rates generally  to be well  above 
the  matrix  rates  in  the  period  1980-1983,  which  shows  there  was 
considerable scope  for  export subsidization under  the Consensus.  From 
1984  on,  market  interest  rates  have  been  decreasing  so  that 
subsidizing exports  becomes  more difficult. 
Another  important  feature  of  the  Consensus  is  that  the  maximum 
interest subsidy allowed  is higher  for  export  firms  in countries  with 
high  market  interest  rates.  In  other  words,  the  current  system 
discriminates against countries with  low  interest rates.  This  becomes 
clear  in  Table  2  when  the  low  German  interest  rates  are  compared  to 
the  interests rates of  the other countries.  The  German  interest rate 
was  below  the  matrix  rate  in  most  years.  This  obliged  the  German 
export  credit  agency  to  finance  exporters  at  the  (X;IR,  reflecting - 11  -
Table 2  Conunercial  Bank  Lending Rates  to Prime Borrowers  for Selected 
Countries 
December  Belgium  France  Germany  U.K. 
1976  11.75  11.65  6.50  15.50 
1980  15.75  12.25  11.50  15.00 
1981  18.00  14.00  13.50  14.50 
1982  15.50  12.25  8.75  10.00 
1983  13.75  12.25  7.75  9.00 
1984  14.00  12.00  7.75  9.50 
1985  11.50  10.60  7.25  11.50 
1986  9.75  9.45  6.75  11.00 
1987  8.75  9.60  6.25  8.50 
Source  World Financial Markets 
Morgan Guaranty Trust Company  of  NY - 12  -
market  conditions.  As  a  result.  the  scope  for  export  subsidization 
was  limited significantly. 
The  benefits  of  the  Consensus  for  exporters  in  economies  with  high 
interest  rates  are  reinforced  by  the  opportunity  for  export  credit 
agencies  to  lend  in other  currencies.  When  the  differential  between 
the  CIRR  of  a  low  interest  rate  currency and  the  rate  charged  by  the 
domestic  export credit agency  exceeds  the  costs  of  forward  cover,  the 
interest  subsidy  to  exporters  can  be  increased  by  contracting  in 
another currency  (Taylor,  1984,  p  31-32).  Nevertheless,  the  length of 
the  average  export  contract  may  seriously  hamper  the  availability  of 
affordable  forward  cover. 
In  addition,  the  possible  competitive  advantage  for  high  interest 
countries  is  influenced  by  the  budgetary  cost  of  export  subsidies  for 
government  agencies.  When  the  government  pays  a  higher  interest rate 
than  the  matrix  rates,  export  subsidies  at  or  close  to  Consensus 
minimum  rates  are  costly.  Table  3  presents  information  about  the 
average yields of government  bonds  in Belgium,  France,  Germany  and  the 
U.K.  Comparing  these  figures  with  Table  1.  we  find  that,  in  the 
period  1980-1983,  government  bonds  yields were well  above matrix rates 
in  France,  Belgium  and  the  U.K.  This  is  exactly  the  period  when  the 
Consensus  permitted  large  interest  subsidies  to  exporters.  We 
conclude  that  the  budgetary cost  of  an export  subsidy policy  may  have 
been  large. 
Finally,  the  current  system  facilitates  macroeconomic  policies  which 
rely  on  high  interest  rates  to  correct  current  account  deficits  or 
maintain  a  fixed  exchange  rate  (Melitz  and  Messerlin,  1987).  By 
driving up  interest rates,  the government  increases  the  maximum  export 
subsidy allowed under  the Consensus.·  This widens  the  scope  for  export 
subsidization and  may  help  to  restore current account  equilibrium. - 13  -
Table 3  Government  Bond  Yields  for Selected Countries  (average yields 
to maturity in percent per annum) 
Year  Belgium  France  Germany  U.K. 
1976  9.05  9.49  7.80  14.43 
1980  12.04  12.99  8.50  13.79 
1981  13.71  15.66  10.38  14.74 
1982  13.56  15.69  8.95  12.88 
1983  11.86  13.63  7.89  10.81 
1984  11.98  12.54  7.78  10.69 
1985  10.61  10.94  6.87  10.62 
1986  7.93  8.44  5.92  9.87 
1987  7.83  9.49  5.84  9.48 
Source  IMF  Financial Statistics - 14  -
3.2.  Sectoral Understandings  on Export Credits 
In  addition  to  the  COnsensus,  sectoral  understandings  on  export 
credits  for  (i)  Ships  and  (ii}  Nuclear  Power  Plants  (iii}  Civil 
Aircraft  were  concluded  in  the  OECD.  An  earlier  sectoral 
understanding  for  Ground  Satellite  Communications  Stations  has  been 
included  in  the general  agreement. 
i)  The  Understanding  on  Export  Credits  for  Ships  went  into effect at 
the  beginning of  1971  and  thus  precedes  the  COnsensus.  Fourteen OECD 
countries  and  the  COmmission  of  the  European  COmmunity  participate. 
The  Understanding  continues  today  as  a  separate  OECD  agreement  and, 
unlike  the  Consensus,  has  been  formally  accepted by  the  OECD  council. 
Its  content  deviates  from  the  Consensus  on  two  essential  points. 
First,  the  minimum  cash  payment  by  delivery  is  20%  instead  of  15%. 
Secondly,  export  financing  at  less  than  8%  is  not  allowed,  implying 
that  more  (less)  attractive  credit  terms  can  be  provided  than  in  the 
Consensus  whenever  'matrix'  rates  are  above  (below)  8%.  The 
Understanding  only  covers  sea-going  ships. 
subject  to  the conditions of  the Consensus. 
All  other  ships  are 
The  other  sectoral  understandings  complement  the  Consensus  in  the 
sense  that,  at  present,  they  do  not  constitute  a  separate  OECD 
agreement  and  that  the  conditions  of  the  Consensus  apply  except  for 
the provisions  specified otherwise. 
ii)  The  1984 Sector  Understanding  on  Export  Credits  for  Nuclear  Power 
Plants  extends  the  maximum  repayment  term  to  15  years  and  adopts  the 
'matrix'  rates  for  credits  of  8.5-10  years,  augmented  by  a  100  basis 
point$. 
iii) The Sector Understanding  on Export Credits  for Civil Aircraft was 
signed  in  1986  by  OECD  producer  countries  of  civil  aircraft.  A 
distinction  is  made  between  'large'  and  'other'  commercial  aircraft. - 15  -
The  provisions  for  other  aircraft  are  similar  to  Consensus 
conditions,  except  that  tied  aid  is  prohibited  and  that  shorter 
maximum  repayment  terms are specified for  some  types of aircraft.  The 
agreement  for  large  aircraft  deviates  quite  substantially  from  the 
'-
Consensus.  It  not  only  extends  the  maximum  repayment  term  to  12 
years,  but also adopts a  different way  of calculating minimum  interest 
rates.  More  specifically,  export  financing  in  US  dollars,  in  a 
currency  basket  of  the  DM.  FF.  and  £.  or  in  ECU  are  considered 
separately with minimum  interest rates based on government bond yields 
of  the respective currencies plus a  common  fixed margin. 
IV.  GATI  REGULATIONS  ON  EXPORT  CREDITS  AND  EXPORT  INSURANrn 
Member  countries of  the  EC  are  subject  to  Article XVI  of  the  GATT  and 
the  GATT  code  on  Subsidies  and  Countervailing  Duties  which  rule  out 
the  use  of  export  subsidies  on  products  other  than  primary  products. 
Specifically,  the  Illustrative  List  of  Export  Subsidies  attached  to 
the Subsidies Code  prohibits: 
- The  prov1s1on by governments  {or  special  institutions controlled 
by  governments)  of  export  credit  guarantees  or  insurance  programmes 
against  increases  in  the  costs  of  exported  products  or  of  exchange 
risk programmes,  at premium  rates,  which are manifestly  inadequate 
to  cover  the  long-term operating costs and  losses of  the programmes. 
- The  grant  by  governments  {or  special  institutions  controlled  by 
and/or acting under  the authority of  governments)  of  export credits 
at rates below  those which  they actually have  to  pay  for  the  funds 
so  employed  {or  would  have  to  pay  if  they  borrowed  on  international 
capital  markets  in  order  to  obtain  funds  of  the  same  maturity  and 
denominated  in  the  same  currency as  the export credit),  or  the pay-
ment  by  them  of  all  or  part  of  the  costs  incurred  by  exporters  or 
financial  institutions  in obtaining credits,  insofar as  they are 
used  to  secure  a  material  advantage  in  the  field  of  export  credit 
terms. - 16  -
The  following  paragraph  establishes  the  link  between  the  OECD 
Consensus  and GATT  regulations.  without mentioning  the  former 
by  name. 
- Provided,  however,  that if a  signatory is party  to an internatio-
nal  undertaking on official export credits  to which at  least  12 
signatories  to  this agreement are parties as of  1  January  1979 
(or  a  successor undertaking which has been adopted by  those original 
signatories),  or if in practice a  signatory applies  the  interest rate 
provisions  of  the  relevant  undertaking,  an  export  credit  practice 
which  is in conformity with  those provisions shall not be considered 
as an export  subsidy prohibited by  this agreement. 
The  GATT  subsidy  code  condones  export  credits  that are  allowed  by  the 
OECD  Consensus.  Yet,  export  insurance  is  not  covered  by  the 
Consensus,  but  is  explicitly  mentioned  in  the  Illustrative  list  of 
export  subsidies which are prohibited by  the  GATT  subsidy code. 
Upon  more  careful  examination,  the  description  in  the  GATT  code  only 
mentions  insurance  against  exchange  risk  and  cost  escalation.  As 
subsidies  are  never  defined  precisely  in  the  GATT,  (Beseler  and 
Williams,  1986,  p  120),  it is  unclear  whether  the  restrictions  apply 
to  insurance  of  other  risk.  More  importantly,  only  export  insurance 
programs  are  forbidden  of  which  the  premium  rates  charged  are 
manifestly  inadequate  to  cover  the  long-term  operating  costs  and 
losses of  the  system.  This  requires  the difficult distinction between 
long-term and  temporary  losses.  Are  sustained  losses  over  a  decade  to 
be  cons ide  red  as  an  export  subsidy  or,  as  the  government  insurance 
agency  wi 11  usually  argue, 
claims? 
as  an  unusual  temporary  accumulation  of 
Even  if  a  case against  export  credits or  export  insurance  is believed 
to  exist,  GATT  procedures  may  discourage any  further action.  This  is 
particularly  true  for  governments  seeking  action  against  export 
subsidies  to  third  markets,  because  then  Track  I  of  the  GATT  Code  on 
Subsidies  does  not  apply.  Track  I  allows  for  the  autonomous - 17  -
imposition  of  countervailing  duties  by  a  signatory  if  it  is 
established  that  subidization  causes  material  injury  to  a  domestic 
industry  on  the  home  market.  In  order  to  follow  Track  I,  country  A 
would  have  to  convince  country  B  to  impose  countervai  1 ing  duties  on 
subsidized  exports  from  country  C  to  country  B.  As  country  B 
generally  benefits  from  the  export  financing  provided  by  country  C. 
this  is not  likely  to happen. 
This  leaves  open Track II procedure which does not necessarily require 
injury  to  be  caused  on  the  domestic  market  of  the  importing  country. 
In  fact,  serious  prejudice  to  country  interests,  or  nullification of 
the  benefits  a  country  derives  from  GATT  are  sufficient  reasons  for 
seeking  the  authorisation  of  countermeasures.  and  these  could  arise 
even  though  the  effect  of  the  subsidization occurred  in  the  market  of 
a  third  country.  or  within  the  subsidising  country  itself.  But  the 
authorization  of  countermeasures  can  only  be  granted  by  the 
contracting  parties  of  GATT.  or  where  the  country  is  a  signatory  of 
the  Code  on  Subsidies,  by  the  Committee  on  Subsidies  and 
Countervailing  measures  (Beseler  and  Williams,  p  118-119).  This 
requires  lengthy  consultation,  conciliation  and  dispute  settlement 
procedures  within  GATT  instead  of  the  autonomous  implementation  of 
countervailing measures  under  Track  I.  This  may  explain  why  Track  II 
is  seldom used. 
Economically  speaking,  GATT  regulations  on  export  credits  and  export 
insurance  permit  significant  subsidies  to  exporters  because  no 
reference  is  made  to  the  ability  of  an  exporter  to  secure  funds  at 
favorable  rates  (DeKieffer,  1985,  p  17-4).  More  explicitly even  than 
the  OECD  consensus,  GATT  refers  to  the  cost  to  the  government  as  the 
main  criterion for  export  subsidies.  Government  agencies  can  provide 
export  insurance  at· lower  premium  rates  than  the  market  if  no  long 
term operating  losses are  incurred.  Likewise,  governments are allowed 
to  grant  export  credits  at  the  government  borrowing  rate,  which  is 
highly attractive  to any commercial  borrower. - 18  -
V.  <DNU..USION 
This  paper  discussed  the  legal  constraints  facing  export  credit  and 
export  insurance  agencies  of  EC  member  states.  We  found  that,  while 
international  agreements  and  Community  legislation  impose  important 
limits  on export  financing,  they  leave  room  for  export  subsidization. 
Restrictions  on  export  credits  are  more  comprehensive  than  those  on 
export  insurance.  In principle,  the  EC  Treaty  rules  out  credits  for 
exports  to  other  EC  countries.  Export  credits  to  third  markets  are 
allowed when  they do not distort competition between EC  states or  when 
they  match  subidies  from  non-EC  suppliers  and  are  approved  by  the 
Commission.  In  addition,  the  OECD  consensus  specifies  minimum 
financing  rates and  maximum  repayment  terms  for  most  export credits. 
Nevertheless,  exporters  may  benefit  from  interest  subsidies  to  the 
extent  that  market  rates  exceed  Consensus  matrix  rates.  When 
borrowing  costs  for  the  government  are  above  matrix  rates,  this  form 
of  export  subidization can be very costly. 
Both  EC  and  GATT  regulations  refer  to  the  use  of  public  funds  in 
defining  inadmissa~le forms  of  export  insurance.  Article 92  of  the  EC 
Treaty  rules  out  any  involvement  of  government  agencies  or  state 
resources  in export  insurance  insofar as  it would  distort  competition 
between  Community  members.  Community  also  regulations  specify  that 
capital  of  export  financing agencies.  when  provided by  the  government. 
should  earn  a  normal  return  comparable  to  the  private  market.  The 
GATT  Code  on Subsidies.  which  is  seldom  invoked  in practice.  does  not 
oppose  involvement  of  official  government  agencies  as  long  as  the 
long-term  operation  of  private  and  official  export  insurance  systems 
are covered by  insurance  premiums. I.  INTRODUCfiON 
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Olapter II 
EXPORT  FINANCING  SUBSIDIFS  IN  BELGIUM. 
FRANCE.  GERMANY  AND  TilE UNITED  KINGOOM 
In  this  chapter,  estimates  of  the  subsidy  equivalents  implied  in  the 
export  financing  programs  of  France,  the  United  Kingdom  and  Belgium 
are presented.  The  export  financing  programs  considered here  include 
export  insurance,  export credits and Official Development Assistance. 
It  is  not  an  easy  task  to  arrive  at  a  consistent  definition  of 
subsidies  for  the various  forms  of  export support  programs. 
In  section  II,  we  therefore  analyze  the  different  definitions  of 
subsidies  that  appear  in  the  literature  and  make  a  clear  difference 
between  cost  saving  and  revenue  increasing  export  subsidies.  In 
effect,  export  insurance  and  supplier  export  credits  reduce  the  costs 
of  exporting  firms  whereas  Official  Development  Assistance  and 
subsidized buyer  export credits increase  firm  revenue.  This difference 
is  important  since  another  estimation  method  is  required  in  both 
cases. 
Section  III  develops  estimation  methods  that  allow  us  to  practically 
apply  the  definition  of  subsidies.  We  first  present  the  Cost 
Difference  Method  and  the  Net  Present  Value  {NPV}-Method.  In  the 
literature,  these  methods  are  mostly  used  to  estimate  cost  saving 
export  subsidies  but  we  show  that  they  also  can  be  adjusted  to 
estimate  revenue  increasing export  subsidies. - 20  -
Section  IV contains an analysis of  the  subsidy equivalents  for  France, 
the  United  Kingdom,  Belgium  and  Germany.  For  France  and  the  United 
Kingdom.  the  estimates  are  based  on  studies  by  Messerlin  (1986)  and 
Melitz  and  Messerlin  (  1987a  and  1987b)  as  well  as  on  our  own  work. 
Subsidy  equivalents  of  export  credits  and  export  insurance  are 
presented and analysed on an aggregate and an  industry basis. 
The  estimates  for  Belgium  refer  to  export  credits,  export  insurance 
and Official Development Assistance.  They are based on Feyaerts(1985) 
and  our  own  calculations.  A  regional  breakdown  is  provided  for 
Official  Development  Assistance  and  export  insurance  subsidies. 
Finally.  we  also  present  some  estimates  of  German  export  financing 
subsidies. 
For  all  countries  of  the  sample,  both absolute  figures  and  so-called 
rates  of  subsidization  are  presented.  The  rate  of  subsidization 
relates  subsidy  equivalents  to  total  exports  eligible  for 
subsidization.  As  will  become  clear.  this  facilitates  the  comparison 
of  subsidy  levels across countries. 
II.  DEFINITION  OF  EXPORT  FINANCING  SUBSIDIES 
In  the  literature no  generally accepted definition of  export  subsidies 
is  found.  The  subsidy  implied in a  governmental  export  support  program 
can either be  defined as  the benefits  for  the  exporter or alternative-
ly  as  the  cost  incurred  by  the  government.  These  two  definitions  do 
not necessarily come  to  the  same  estimates of  the  subsidy equivalents. 
The  aim  of  the  study  and  data  avai labi  1 i ty  determine  the  choice  be-
tween  the  two  concepts.  Measuring  the  cost  to  the  government  facili-
tates data gathering and  is appropriate  when  the  budgetary  consequen-
ces  of  a  governmental  export  support  program  form  the  main  concern  of 
the  study.  When  analyzing  the  effect of  an  export  support  program  on 
the  competitiveness  of  the  firms.  the use  of  the  other definition ap-
pears  more  appropriate.  In. this  study,  a  subsidy  will  be  defined  as - 21  -
the  benefit  for  the  firms  that  results  from  a  governmental  export 
support program.  Based upon  this definition,  we  analyze  the different 
estimation methods  that appear  in the  literature. 
A benefit  for  a  firm  implies an increase  in profits which results  from 
a  cost  reduction  or  a  rise  in  total  revenue.  The  various  forms  of 
export  financing  programs  have  a  different  impact  on  either  costs  or 
revenues.  More  specifically,  subsidized  export  insurance  and 
subsidized  supplier  credits  lower  the  cost  for  the  firms  while 
subsidized buyer  credits and  Official  Development  Assistance  increase 
total  revenue.  This  becomes  clear  from  the  following  formal  treatment. 
We  analyze export  insurance first.  COnsider an exporter operating in a 
riskless  world  with  a  constant  marginal  and  average  cost  c.  He 
determines an export price  p  that maximises his profits rr  :  z 
IT  = p  X  - CX  z 
Whereby  x  are total  exports 
Confron.ted  with  risk.  the  exporter  insures  his  exports  and  pays  an 
insurance  premium.  At  the  same  time,  he  increases  his  export  price 
with X.  The  magnitude  of  A depends  on  the  market  conditions.  His  new 
contract price becomes 
P  = (l+X)P 
c  z 
and his profits will  be 
IT  = P  X  -ex - vP  X  c  c 
In  this  equation,  v  is  the  %  insurance  premium  per  ECU  of  export 
contract.  When  export  insurance  is  subsidized,  the  cost  of  the 
exporter  decreases.  The  new  insurance  premium  becomes  9  =  v  - s. 
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whereby  s.  represents  the% subsidy per ECU  of  export contract. 
1 
Profits  rr  can  then be written as  : 
rr  = p  X  - ex - (v  - s. )P  X  c  1  c 
= p  X  - ex - ep  X 
c  c 
= [P  (1  - e)  - c]x  c 
Next.  consider  supplier  export  credits.  Exporting  firms  receive  an 
interest  subsidy  based  on  the  value  of  the  export  contract.  As  a 
consequence,  the  firm·s  export  financing costs are  reduced. 
We  redefine  v  as  the  %  export  financing  cost  per  ECU  of  export 
contract.  so  that it includes both  the  insurance and  the credit costs. 
With  this  definition,  a  subsidized  supplier  credit  increases  s  and 
therefore  lowers e. 
Subsidized  buyer  credits  and  Official  Development  Assistance  provide 
favourable  financing  conditions  to  the  importer  instead  of  to  the 
exporting  firm.  This  induces  the  importer  to  demand  more  of  the 
exporting  firms  products.  As  a  result,  total  revenue  of  the  exporter 
goes  up. 
It  is  worthwhile  to  discuss  this  transmission  into  more  detail. 
Suppose  that  the  importer  is  confronted  with  a  contract  price  P  and 
c 
an offered payment  condition j.  Taking  into account  both elements,  he 
computes  P  ..  the price used by  the  importers  to  compare  the  offers of 
mJ 
different suppliers.This price determines  the  importers  demand  for  do-
mestic products.  P  .  can be written as  follows  : 
mJ 
p  .  = 'Y.  * p 
mJ  Jm  C 
1.  reflects  the  preference of  importer  m  for  payment  condition  j  and 
Jm 
is  equal  to  the  net  present  value  (NPV}  of  1  ECU  repaid  at  payment 
condition j.  The  smaller  -r.  the  greater  the  importers  preference  for 
Jffi 3) 
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payment  condition  j.  If  'Y.  =  1  (P  =  P  } ,  the  importer  wi 11  be 
Jm  c  m 
indifferent  between  a  cash  payment  and  accepting  the  offered  payment 
condition  j.  If  'Y.  > 1  (P  > P}  he  will  prefer  a  cash  payment 
Jm  m  c 
because  the  importer  judges  that  the  offered  financing  scheme  raises 
the  import  price.  Finally, 
payment  condition j. 
if  'Y.  < 1  (P  < P  }.  he  will  accept 
Jm  m  c 
Which  factors  determine  the  importer's  evaluation  of  the  various 
export  financing  schemes  ?  The  Appendix  shows  that  the  interest  rate 
paid  by  the  importer  and  his  subjective  discount  rate  play  an 
important  role.  A  higher  interest  rate  makes  export  financing  less 
attractive  to  the  importer.  Alternatively,  importers  with  a  high 
discount  rate  have  a  strong  preference  for  present  consumption  and · 
will accept a  loan which allows  them  to  spread payments  over  time. 
Subsidized  buyer  credits  and  official  development  assistance  improve 
the  payment  conditions  for  the  importers.  They  lower  'Y  and  in  this 
way  P  . 
m 
the  effective  price  paid  by  the  importer. 
price  P 
m 
increases  demand  for  domestic 
decreasing  the  contract  price  P 
c  for  the 
domestic exporters will  rise in consequence. 
III.  FSfiMATION  MElliOOO 
export 
firm. 
In  turn,  a  lower 
products  without 
The  revenues  of 
In  the  literature,  the  benefits  of  export  subsidies  for  exporting 
firms  are  measured  by  the  observed  cost  savings  such  subsidies 
produce.  This  implies  that  no  comparison  is  made  between  profits  of 
the  firm  before  and  after  subsidization.  Nor  is  there  any  special 
consideration  for  subsidies  that  increase  revenue  instead  of  reducing 
costs. 
In  this  section,  we  first discuss  how  to  measure  cost  savings  for  the 
firm  resulting  from  subsidized  supplier credits and  subsidized  export 
insurance.  A  comparison  is  made  between  the  Cost  Difference  and  the - 24  -
Net  Present  Value  (NPV)  Method.  Subsequently,  we  analyse  how 
measurement  methods  of  cost  savings  can  be  applied  to  revenue 
increasing  support  programs  such  as  Official  Development  Assistance 
and  subsidized buyer credits. 
The  Cost  Difference  Method  measures  for  a  particular  year.  the  cost 
savings  that  occur  in  that  year  in  consequence  of  the  export  support 
granted  in  the  past.  On  the  other  hand,  the  NPV-method  measures  in 
any  particular  year  the  NPV  of  future  cost  savings  that  will  result 
from  the  support  programs  from  that  specific  year.  We  explain  the 
difference by  means  of an example. 
Imagine  a  credit granted by  the  government  in  the  year  1990.  The  re-
payment  term  is  10  years  and  the  interest rate  is  significantly below 
the  interest rate  that would have been asked  in  the private market. 
The  Cost Difference Method  then measures  for  the years  1991  until  2000 
the yearly  interest savings  for  the  firms  as  a  result  of  this  favoura-
ble  loan and  considers  these yearly savings as  the  subsidies  for  these 
years. 
Alternatively,  the  NPV-Method  calculates  the  NPV  of  this  cost  saving 
and  allocates  this  NPV  as  the  subsidy  for  the  year  1990.  In  both 
cases  the  same  cost  savings are measured.  The  difference  lies  in  the 
time  period  to  which  the  subsidies are conferred. 
This difference  is not without  consequences.  In effect,  the  NPV-Method 
is  most  appropriate  when  analyzing  the  effects  of  export  support  on 
competitiveness  because  it measures  the  discounted  total  cost  savings 
entailed  by  the  export  support  programs  initiated  in  one  year.  It  is 
this  discounted  value  that  determines  the  price  setting  strategy  of 
the  firm  and  therefore  demand  decisions  ._by  the  importer.  Conversely, 
the Cost Difference Method  is more  convenient  for  bookkeeping purposes 
because  it  measures  the  yearly  financial  implications  of  support 
programs earlier granted  . - 25  -
3.1.  MEASUREMENT  OF  SUBSIDY  EQUIVALENTS  OF  COST  REDUCING  EXPORT 
CREDITS 
3.1.1.  Cost Difference Method 
How  does  one  apply  the principle of  the Cost  Difference  Method  to  the 
empirical  analysis  of  subsidized  supplier  credits  ?  One  first  takes 
the  difference  between  the  subsidized  interest  rate  and  the  rate  the 
exporting  firms  would  have paid in  the private market.  This difference 
is  then  multiplied  by  the  loans  still  outstanding  to  obtain  the 
implicit subsidy  in supplier credits. 
Assume  that  the  exporter.  in  absence  of  the  governmental  support 
program,  would  have  borrowed  at  an  adjustable  interest  rate  on  the 
private  market.  In  that  case,  the  total  subsi.dy  for  the  year  K 
becomes 
K 
L:  U (rK  - r  ) 
t=T  t  t 
(2.1} 
whereby 
Ut  total credits authorized  in  t  and still outstanding inK 
rt  officially supported  interest rate on  loans authorized  in  t 
T  year during  which  the oldest  still outstanding  loans  were 
authorized 
rK  market  interest rate charged  in K 
Consider  the  following  example.  There are  three  subsidized credits still 
outstanding  in  the year  1988,  amounting  to  1.000,  2.000 and  3.000 ECU 
respectively.  The  first credit is authorized  in  1985,  the  second  in  1986 and 
the  third  in  1987. 
The  interest rates,  rt.  paid by  the exporters are  respectively 6,  5.5 and 
7  %.  The  comparable  market  interest rate of  1988,rkis  12.6 %.  If  the 
borrower  would  have  borrowed at an adjustable  interest rate we  use  (2.1)  to 
compute  the  subsidy  for  the year  1988  : - 26  -
1.000{0.12-0.06}  +  2.000(0.12-0.055)  +  3.000(0.12-0.07) = 340 ECU 
A similar case whereby  ,in absence of  the governmental  support  program,  the 
exporter would  have been able  to obtain a  fixed rate  loan is presented in  the 
Appendix. 
3.1.2.  Net  Present Value  Method 
The  NPV  Method defines  the  implicit subsidy  in export credits as  the 
difference between  the value of  the  loan and  the  NPV  of  the  repayments 
discounted at  the  market  interest rate 
Z-K 
SK  = U - ~ 
t=1 
Rt 
----
t 
(1+rK) 
whereby  : 
total value of  loans authorized in K 
total  repayment  in  'payment-year't  on 
loans authorized  in K. 
This  includes capital and  interest payments. 
market  interest rate in year  K 
last year  of  repayments  on  loans authorized  in K 
(2.2) 
Suppose  that a  ten year  export credit of  1.500 ECU  was  granted  in  1988 
at  a  subsidized  interest  rate  of  5  %,  while  the  market  interest  rate 
was  at 8  %.  For  1988,  the  export  subsidy  then  becomes  : 
s1988 = 1.5oo -
=  185  ECU 
10 
~ 
t-1 
150  +  1.500-[{t-1)150] 0.05 
(  1+0.08)t - 27  -
3. 2.  EXPORT  INSURANCE  SUBSIDIES 
When  the government  supports  or organizes an export  insurance  scheme, 
the  cost  saving  to  the  firm  amounts  to  the  difference  between  the 
actual  insurance  contributions  and  the  insurance  premia  that  would 
have been paid  in the private market.  It should be noted  that  the COst 
Difference  and  the  NPV  Method  yield  the  same  estimates  because 
insurance  premia  are  paid  in  the  year  the  insurance  contract  is 
concluded. 
In effect.  the  subsidy  in year  K  is defined as 
(2.3} 
whereby  : 
AK  value  of  insured contracts  in year  K 
vK  pure  insurance  premium  in year  K  {in percentage  terms) 
eK  subsidized  insurance premium  in year  K  {in percentage  terms} 
When  putting equation  {2.3)  to  practical  use  one  first has  to  measure 
the  true market  premium.  v. 
In  insurance  theory.  the pure premium  on a  contract is defined as  (see 
Hogg  and  Klugman,  1984,  p  235): 
pure  premium = total  expected claims 
value of  the  insured contract  (2.4) 
The  pure  premium  thus  guarantees  that  the  premium  income  exactly 
offsets  the  expected  losses  from  the  insurance contract. 
The  market  premium  exceeds  the  pure  premium  because  the  insurance 
company  has  to  be  compensated  for  the  expenses  of  doing  business  and 
taking  on  risk.  As  official  export  insurance  companies  do  not 
systematically  charge  a  fixed  percentage  of  the  insured  amounts  as - 28  -
administration costs  or/and  risk charge,  we  will  ignore  both elements 
in  our  own  calculations.  By  doing  this,  we  may  underestimate  the 
market  premium  and  hence  also  the  subsidies  implicit  in  export 
insurance. 
The  practical  application  of  this  general  insurance  principle  to  the 
case of  export credit  insurance poses  three major  problems: 
a)  On  the  moment  contracts are  signed  and  premiums  are  paid,  one  can 
at  best  guess  future  expected  claims.  In  this  chapter,  we 
distinguish  between  an  ex  post  and  ex  ante  approach  to  measuring 
expected claims. 
In  the  ex-post  approach,  we  assume  that  the  insurance  agency  forms 
rational  expectations  about  the  future  claims  on  the  insurance 
contracts  concluded  in any particular year.  A  fair  premium  is charged 
when  premium  income  covers  expected  claims.  The  accumulation  over 
time  of  sustained  losses  (claims  minus  premia)  by  the  insurance agency 
is  then  interpreted  as  an  indicator  of  export  subsidization.  A 
short-time  mismatch  between  claims  and  premia  is  not  necessarily  a 
subsidy  because  the  insurance  agency  cannot  foresee  an  unanticipated 
shock  such as  the  breakdown  in relations with  Iran.  On  the  contrary, 
sustained  losses cannot be explained by expectational  errors and hence 
point  to  a  deliberate policy of  subsidization. 
The  ex-ante  approach  attempts  to  derive  subsidy-equivalents  on  a 
yearly  basis  by  more  explicitly  modeling  expectation  formation  by  an 
insurance  agency.  More  specifically,  one  first  estimates  the  pure 
premium  which,  based  on  the  available  information,  the  insurance 
agency  must  charge  to  maintain  equality  between  premia  and  claims. 
The  information  set  is  based  on  available  data  on  past  claims  and 
insurance  contracts.  In  our  work,  the  expected  pure  premium  of  any 
particular year,  te.  is  computed,  for  the  three  most  recent  years.  as 
i 
an average of  the claims as a  percentage of  insured contracts,  namely: t~  = 
1 
whereby 
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Tj-1  + 
Vj- 1 
Tj-2 
Yj-2 
+ !L:.J. 
Yj-3 
3 
Ti -j  :  ( j  =  1.  . . . .  3) 
the actual  claims  in year  i-j.  These  claims 
can be gross or net  (=  less recuperations) 
Yi-j  :  (j  =  1 ..... 3) 
(2.5) 
value of  the outstanding  insurance contracts  in year  i-j 
As  a  second step.  the expected pure premium  is multiplied by  the value 
of  the newly  insured contracts of  a  particular year  to obtain expected 
future  claims.  Consistent with equation (2.3).  the  subsidy granted  in 
a  year  is  the difference between  the  premium  income necessary  to  cover 
expected  future  claims.  AKvK.  and  the  actually  paid  premium  income 
Again.  an  example  helps  to  understand  this  procedure.  If  two  export 
contracts are  insured  in  1988  for  1.500 and 2.000 ECU  and  the expected 
pure  insurance premium  is  1%  than one  expects  future  claims  of  35 ECU. 
Assume  that  the  official  government  agency  charges  a  subsidized 
insurance  premium  of  0. 7  %  so  that  it  receives  24.5  ECU  in  premium 
income.  Hence  the  subsidy amounts  to 35-24.5 = 10.5 ECU. 
b)  A  second  major  problem  concerns  the  timing  of  premia  and  loss 
payments  and  is  directly  relevant  for  the  measurement  of  the  pure 
premium  in equation  (3.5).  Usually.  export  insurance  companies  do  not 
have  appropriately  matched  data  on  premiums.  claims  (&  recuperations) 
and  total  insured constracts.  Due  to  this  lack of  information.  it is 
not  possible  to  compare  the  premia  and  the  claims  on  contracts  of  a 
particular year.  This  is unfortunate because claims  take  some  time  to - 30  -
materialise,  and  recuperations  may  continue  long  after  claims  have 
been  paid2.  To  solve  this  problem,  information  is  needed  on  which 
part  of  the  claims  and  recuperations  of  a  year  are  due  to  contracts 
concluded in  in previous years.  Such  information is not available  to 
us.  In  equation  (2.5),  we  therefore  divide  claims  paid  in  any 
particular  year  by  the  value  of  insured  contracts  outstanding  in  the 
same  year.  This  does  not  only  mix  stock  (outstanding  contracts)  and 
flow  concepts  (claims).  but also causes distortions when  the  structure 
of  export  insurance  contracts  is  biased  towards  long  term  contracts. 
Fortunately,  this  problem  does  not  appear  too  serious  for  our  study. 
In  the  1980's.  75 %  to  90 %  of  all  transactions  on  account  of  the 
Belgian official  insurance agency  were  short  term.  Empirical  evidence 
for  the  other  countries  points  in  the  same  direction.  In  spite  of 
this.  it  remains  true  that  our  estimates  may  be  biased  if  the  time 
pattern  of  recuperations  abruptly  changes  insofar  as  recuperations 
take place a  long  time after claims  have  been paid. 
2An  example  may  clarify  the  problem  involved.  Suppose  the  following 
annual  figures  in millions of  ECU  for  three consecutive years 
year  premiums  claims  recuperations  newly  covered  outstanding 
amounts  insured 
amounts 
x~l  36  216  62  3762  7125 
X  42  170  35  4125  6500 
x+l  32  177  40  3650  5750 
It would  not  be  correct  to  compare  premium  income  of  year  x  {42  M ecu) 
with  the  loss  payments  and  recuperations  of  the  same  year  x  (170  and 
35  M _ecu  respectively).  since  these  figures  do  not  necessarily  relate 
to  the  same  contracts.  As  it turns  out,  insurance  premia are  usually 
paid  in  the  year  the  insurance  contract  is  concluded.  So,  in year  x, 
42 million  ECU  is  paid  to  insure  a  cpntract  of  4125 million  ECU 
(similarly for  year x-1,  x+1). 
In  our  example,  this  means  that  neither  the  170  million  ECU  of  the 
claims  in  year  x  nor  the  35  million  ECU  of  recuperations  of  35  M ecu 
can be  linked dire-ctly  to  the  premiums  paid  in  that year. - 31  -
In  this  context,  Kahane  and  Parat  {1984,  p  714}  argue  that  insurance 
companies  themselves  seldom  match  premia  and  claims  on  an  individual 
contract  basis.  Official  agencies  in particular,  base  many  of  their 
decicions  on  total  amounts  of  claims,  premia and outstanding contracts 
of  the  current  year  and  the  recent  past.  If  so,  our  measurement  of 
ex-ante subsidies  is likely  to be  reasonably accurate. 
c)  A  third  problem  concerns  data  availability  on  newly  insured  and 
outstanding  contracts  during  a  particular  year.  ·  Ideally,  both 
concepts  are  needed  to  compute  ex-ante  subsidies.  Unfortunately, 
yearly  reports  of  the  British,  French  and  German  insurance  agencies 
only  publish  information  on  the  newly  covered  amounts.  Again  this 
does  not  appear  as  a  major  problem  because  most  of  transactions  are 
short  term.  As  a  result,  the  total  value  of  newly  covered contracts 
and  stock of  outstanding contracts are very similar. 
3.3.  OFFICIAL  DEVELOPMENT  ASSISTANCE  AND  SUBSIDIZED  BUYER  CREDITS 
Revenue  increasing  export  support  programs  such  as  Official 
Development  Assistance  (ODA}  and  subsidized  buyer  credits  do  not 
reduce  the  cost  of  the  firms.  They  nevertheless  can contain a  subsidy 
element  which  can  be  estimated  in accordance  with  the  above  mentioned 
methods.  We  first consider Official Development Assistance. 
3.3.1 Official  Development  Assistance  CODA) 
ODA-credits  clearly  entail  a  cost  for  the  government  but  do  not 
necessarily  imply  a  benefit  for  the  firms.  Imagine  a  small  open 
economy  with  two  industries.  The  first is confronted with a  perfectly 
elastic demand  on  the world market and domestic production capacity is 
restricted.  The  second  industry  is  monopolistic  and  there  is  no 
capacity restriction. - 32  -
The  government  grants  ODA  to  a  developing  country  and  stipulates  in 
the  contract  that  this  money  has  to  be  used  to  buy  products  of  equal 
value  in both  domestic  industries.  In  that  case  the  demand  of  both 
industries  increases.  The  final  effects  on  both  industries  are 
nevertheless .different. 
The  first  industry  can  neither  increase  its  production  (capacity 
restriction)  nor  its  price  (perfectly  elastic  demand).  The 
destination  of  the  exported  products  can  change  and  can  be  directed 
towards  the  aided  country  but  total  production and  revenues  are  kept 
constant. 
In  the  second  industry,  the  increased  demand  entails  an  increase  in 
price and  production.  The  changes  in price and  output are determined 
by  industry-specific determinants  such as  the  potential  for  economies 
of  scale.  Total  revenue  of  the  exporting  firm  increases. 
The  question  then  becomes  to  what  extent  Official  Development 
Assistance can be  considered as an export  subsidy and how  this  subsidy 
should be measured.  The  literature is silent on  this  subject. 
We  argue  that Official  Development  Assistance  contains  an  export  sub-
sidy if it increases  the  revenues  of  a  domestic producer.  This  was  not 
the  case  in  the  first  industry  of  our  example  so  that  Official 
Development  Assistance  can  completely  be  considered  as  development 
aid.  On  the  other hand,  the  firms  of  the  second  sector benefited  from 
the ODA-program and  thus  received a  subsidy. 
The  magnitude  of  the  subsidy  can  be  estimated  in accordance  with  the 
earlier  mentioned  'cost  saving'  definition  by  converting  the  rise  in 
firm  revenue  in  an  equivalent  cost  saving  equivalent.  This  cost 
reduction  is  then  measured  by  the  Cost  Difference  or  the  NPV  Method. 
More  specifically,  the  subsidy  is  set  equal  to  the  cost  reductions  a 
firm  would  have  to achieve  in order  to  obtain  the  same  changes  in its 
sales  as  those  which  are  entailed  by  the  ODA-program.  The  intuition 
is  clear.  If  the  government  were  to  subsidize  the  exporting  firm - 33  -
directly  by  the  amount  of  this  cost  reduction.  the  firm  could  lower 
its price and  increase  its sales and  would  be  indifferent  between  the 
direct  subsidy  and  the  Official  Development  Assistance  to  the 
importing country. 
Algebraicaly.  the  idea  is  most  easily  understood  by  using  the  Cost 
Difference Method3.  The  subsidy equivalent becomes 
whereby 
{2.6} 
total  ODA-loans authorized  in  t  and still outstanding  in year 
K 
market  interest rate  in year  K 
fit:  the  interest 
I  I 
rate on an  equivalent  loan  authorized  in  t 
An  equivalent  loan  is a  loan granted  to  the  exporting  firm which,  when 
authorized  in t.  would  have  entailed  the  same  changes  in revenues as  the 
ODA-loan  to  the  importer. 
It is  important  to  realize  that  the  interest rate on an  'equivalent  loan', 
ht,  is greater  than or  equal  to  the ODA-interest  rate.  In general,  only part 
of  the benefit of  the  ODA  loan  to  the  importer  is passed  on  to  the  firm  in 
the  form  of  higher  revenues.  This  is especially relevant  for  ODA-loans 
because  they  contain  an  important  element  of  development  aid.  The 
interest  rates  are  much  lower  than  would  be  necessary  to  make  the 
importer  buy  the goods  of  the exporting country. 
3A  similar expression is obtained with  the  NPV  Method. - 34  -
3.3.2.  Subsidized Buyer Export Credits 
The  measurement  of  the  subsidies,  implicit  in  the buyer export credits 
is  analogous  to  the  case  of  ODA.  Equation  (2.6)  can  be  applied  with 
the  understanding  that ht  reflects  the  interest  rate  on .an  equivalent 
loan  that  would  have  entailed  the  same  revenue  expansion  as  a 
subsidized  buyer  export  credit.  The  differential  between  ht  and  the 
interest  paid  by  the  importer  on  the  buyer  credit  is  usually  smaller 
than with ODA-loans.  Subsidized buyer credits are explicitly aimed at 
supporting  exports  and  attempt  to  lower  the  interest  rate  on  export 
financing  by  the  minimal  amount  necessary  to  obtain  export  contracts 
for  domestic  firms. 
In  practice,  it  is  impossible  to  estimate  the  interest  rates  on 
equivalent  loans.  For  the  measurement  of  the  subsidy  equivalents  we 
therefore  set ht  equal  to  respectively  the  ODA  interest  rate  and  the 
subsidized  buyer  credit  interest  rate.  In  this  way,  we  measure  the 
gains  for  the  importer  and  overestimate  the actual  subsidies  received 
by. the  exporting  firms.  This  bias  involved  is  likely  to  be  minor  for 
subsidized buyer  credits,  but  may  significantly distort  the  subsidies 
implicit  in ODA's. 
IV.  EMPIRICAL  STUDIES 
In  this  section,  we  present  the available  estimates  of  export  subsidy 
equivalents  for  France,  the United  Kingdom,  Belgium and Germany. 
4.1  FRANCE 
In  the  case  of  France,  estimates  of  the  subsidy-equivalents  of  export 
credits  and  export  insurance  are  presented  on  an  aggregate  and  an 
industry basis.  No  regional disaggregation  is available.  Neither did - 35  -
Table  1  :  Outstanding Export Credits  in France,  1969-1984 
Outstanding export credits  Total  Share of buyer credits 
(billion francs)  outstanding  (%) 
credits/ 
Totalac  Medium  Long  exportsbc  Total  Medium  Long 
termc  termc  (%)  termc  termc 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
1969  14.7  6.8  1.2  40.0  3.2 
1970  18.3  7.9  2.0  39.5  4.1 
1971  22.2  9.7  4.6  43.1  6.8 
1972  23.7  11.4  5.6  41.0  10.6 
1973  27.8  12.9  6.7  39.3  11.7 
1974  35.1  14.5  7.1  34.0  18.1  45.7 
1975  48.2  19.7  8.5  42.5  27.7  48.2 
1976  64.2  30.5  9.9  48.9  43.1  56.5 
1977  85.8  49.1  10.8  53.5  60.1  61.1 
1978  97.8  58.1  11.8  57.6  68.8  65.7  65.3 
1979  112. 1  67.0  13.3  56.4  73.6  69.2  70.7 
1980  128.0  78.4  15. 1  53.5  77.1  73.0  72.2 
1981  160.9  90.1  18.0  54.1  78.3  75.5  78.3 
1982  197.5  105.4  20.7  61.4  78.1  77.5  82.6 
1983  231.0  112.0  23.9  63.8  78.3  78.0  84.1 
1984  249.9  117.9  28.6  58.3  78.0  80.3  88.8 
a  Total  credits exclude short-term ones.  They  include exports  in foreign 
currencies. 
b  Total  French exports  to countries outside  the European Community. 
c  :  The  time  series are  totally consistent only since  1977. 
Source  :  Messerlin  {1986,  p.  389). - 36  -
we  obtain  detailed  official  figures  on  French  official  development 
assistance.  According  to  Messer lin  {1986,  p  390},  this  official 
silence  is explained by  the  leading  role of  France  in providing  mixed 
credits. 
A.  EXPORT  CREDITS 
a.1.  Global  Evaluation 
Messerlin  {1986}  and  Melitz  and  Messerlin  {1987a  and  1987b}  provide 
detailed estimates of  the  subsidies  included  in French export credits, 
based  on  data  from  the  French  National  bank  and  the  Conseil  National 
du  Credit.  Here,  ·we  first  review  the  aggregate  evolution  of  export 
credit subsidies. 
Table  1  presents  information about  outstanding  export  credits  in  the 
period  1969-1984  {Messerlin,  1987,  p  389-390}.  We  see  that  the value 
of  outstanding credits  ranges  from  34%  to  63.8% of  total  exports  to 
non-EC  countries  with  a  sharp  increase  after  1975.  These  credits 
include  both  buyer  and  supplier  credits.  Buyer  credits,  which  were 
insignificant  at  the  beginning  of  the  1970's,  became  increasingly 
important  after  the  first  oil  shock  and  have  dominated  the  picture 
since  the  end  of  the  1970s. 
Evidently,  all  outstanding  export  credits  cannot  be  considered  as 
subsidies.  The  mentioned  studies  use  the  Cost  Difference  Method  to 
measure  the benefits of  the  export credits  for  French exporting firms. 
Table  2  presents  two  different  estimates  of  subsidies  implicit  in 
total  ,export  credits.  Column  { 1}  shows  official  figures  by  the  French 
government,  in  bill  ions  of  French  Francs,  for  the  implicit  subsidy 
granted  to  French  industry  through  the  export  credit  system.  These 
figures  were  obtained  by  multiplying  the  outstanding  stock  of  export 
credits  by  official  estimates  of  the  differential  between  the  market 
interest rate and  the  rate of  the export credit agency  involved.  These - 37  -
Table 2  Estimates of  subsidies  imQlicit  in total  French  e~ort credits 
Official estimates  Melitz and Messerlin 
year  Implicit  Rate of  Official  Implicit  Rate of  Interest 
subsidy  subsidi- interest  subsidy  subsidi- rate dif-
{billion  sat  ion  rate dif- (billion  sat  ion  ferential 
Fr.  Francs}  (%)  ferential  Fr Francs)  {%} 
{1}  (2)  {3)  {4}  (5)  {6) 
1970  0.4  0.8  2.2 
1971  0.3  0.6  1.3 
1972  0.3  0.5  1.3 
1973  0.6  0.8  2.2 
1974  1.1  1.1  3.1 
1975  0.9  0.8  1.9 
1976  1.5  1. 1  2.3 
1977  2.4  1.5  2.8 
1978  2.4  1.4  2.5  5.0  2.9  5.8 
1979  3.3  1.7  2.9  5.4  2.8  6.1 
1980  6.6  2.8  5.2  9.9  4.2  7.9 
1981  11.5  3.9  7.1  14.9  5.1  10.5 
1982  13.0  4.0  6.6  16.5  5.1  9.5 
1983  12.6  3.5  5.5  13.7  3.8  6.7 
1984  11.2  2.6  4.5  13. 1  3.0  5.9 
The  rates of  subsidisation in columns  {2)  and  {5)  are obtained by dividing 
the  implicit subsidy by  the  total value of  French exports  to non-EC  countries 
Source  :  Official estimates  :  Messerlin  {1986.  p.  392) 
Estimates  in columns  {4)-(6) are  from  Melitz and Messerlin 
( 1987a.  p.  157) - 38  -
official  interest differentials are  found  in  column  {3).  The  second 
column  shows  the rate of  subidization which equals export subsidies as 
a  percentage of  the value of  exports  to countries outside  the EC. 
As  it  turns  out,  the  official  interest  rate  differentials  in  column 
(3)  are  primarily  based  on  short  term  money  market  rates  and  reflect 
the cost  for  the government  of  export credit subsidies.  The  financing 
conditions  of  the  French  government  are  usually  not  available  to 
importers wishing  to buy French export goods.  For  this reason,  Melitz 
and  Messerlin  use  higher  market  interest  rates  in  computing  the 
reduction  in  financing  costs  for  exporting  firms.  The  obtained 
interest  rate  differentials  are  given  in  the  last  column  of  Table  2 
and are used  to  compute  the  implicit  subsidy and  rate of  subsidization 
in  columns  ( 4)  and  (5).  One  finds  that  the  larger  interest  rate 
differentials  lead  to higher  estimates of  the  subsidy-equivalents. 
Furthermore,  Messerlin  (1986,  p  392)  provides  separate estimates  for 
the  subsidies  implicit  in  medium- and  long-term  export  credits  based 
on  interest differentials  found  in Table  3.  Comparing  the  resulting 
implicit  subsidies  in  Table  3  with  Melitz  and  Messerlin's  total 
estimates  in  Table  2,  one  conludes  that  the  share  of  medium- and 
long-term  subsidies  has  declined  from  more  than  80%  of  total  export 
credit subsidies at  the  end of  the  1970's  to  66%  in  1984. 
On  the  whole,  a  uniform pattern emerges  from  Tables  2  and  3.  First of 
all,  one  finds  that  the  rate  of  subsidization on  total  export  credits 
ranges  from  a  minimum  of  0.5  %  in  1972  (official  estimates)  to  a 
maximum  of 5.1% in  1981  and  1982  (estimates by Melitz and Messerlin). 
This  implies  that  the  role  of  export  credit  subsidies  has  become 
s igni  f ican  t.  Moreover,  these  figures  represent  an  average  rate  of 
subsidization for  the  total  of  non-EC  exports.  The  impact  on specific 
industries  may  be  much  more  pronounced. - 39  -
Table 3  Estimates of  subsidies inmlicit in medium  and  long  term French 
e~ort credits 
year  Interest rate  Implicit  Rate of 
differentials  subsidy  subsidi-
(billion  sat  ion 
Medium  term  Long  term  franc)  (%) 
(1}  (2)  (3)  (4) 
1969  7.7  4.4  0.6  1.6 
1970  8.2  5.2  0.7  1.6 
1971  5.2  5.2  0.7  1.4 
1972  2.7  2.7  0.5  0.8 
1973  2.9  2.9  0.6  0.8 
1974  8.6  3.9  1.5  1.5 
1975  6.5  4.1  1.6  1.4 
1976  9.0  3.1  3.0  2.2 
1977  6.4  3.5  3.5  2.1 
1978  5.9  3.5  3.8  2.2 
1979  6.6  3.3  4.8  2.4 
1980  9.5  6.5  8.4  3.5 
1981  10.3  6.0  10.5  3.5 
1982  7.8  7.2  9.7  3.0 
1983  6.6  6.1  9.0  2.5 
1984  6.2  4.6  8.6  2.1 
Source  Messerlin  (1986,  p.  392) 
(4) - 40  -
Secondly.  there is a  clear evolution over  time.  From  1976 onwards and 
most  markedly  during  the period  1979-1982  a  sharp rise  in  the  rate of 
subsidization  takes  place.  This  is  partially  the  result  of  an 
increase  in  the  outstanding  export  credits as  documented  in Table  1, 
which  reflects a  shift  towards  more  active export  promotion.  But  the 
rise  in  interest  rate  differentials  in  Tables  2  and  3  also  suggest 
that  the  growing  gap  between  market  and  Consensus  interest  rates  was 
responsible  for an  important part of  the  increased subsidization.  The 
narrowing of  this  interest gap,  for  that matter,  explains why  the rate 
of  subsidization declines after 1982. 
These  results  illustrate  some  of  the  features  of  the  OECD  Consensus 
discussed  in Chapter  I.  By  limiting  the  reduction in export  financing 
costs  to  the  difference  between  the  market  and  the  Consensus  interest 
rate,  it automatically  augments  export  subsidies  in periods  of  high 
interest  rates.  Also,  substantial  subsidies  to  exporting  firms  are 
still possible within  the  framework  of  the  OECD  consensus. 
a.2.  Sectoral disaggregation 
Melitz and  Messerlin  (1987a,  p  162)  provide an  industry break-down  of 
French export  credit  subsidies  for  the  years  1981-1984  (see Table  4). 
The  industry classification is comparable  to  the  two-digit  NACE  level. 
The  first  column  of  Table  4  gives  the  industry  share  in  total  export 
credit  subsidies.  The  second  column  shows  the  rate  of  subsidization 
which,  as  before,  measures  subsidies  as  a  percentage  of  eligible 
-·1-''"  ":::,·  Melitz and  Messerlin define  exports  to  Non-OECD  countries as 
eligible  for  subsidies.  except  for  Electrical  Equipment,  and  for 
Aircraft&Ships  for  which  all  exports  to  non-EC  countries  are 
considered.  An  (arbitrary) distinction is made  between benefiting and 
unaffected  industries  depending  on  wheth~r  the  rate  of  subsidization 
exceeds  a  half percent. - 41  -
Table 4  :  French export credit subsidies by  industry  :  1981-1984 
Industries 
A.  BENEFITING  INDUSTR~ 
Nonelectrical  Machinery 
Metal  Products 
Services 
Electrical Equipment 
Automobiles 
Aircraft&Ships 
Construction 
Iron & Steel 
Petroleum Products 
Agro-industry 
Rubber  and Plastics 
Basic chemicals 
B.  UNAFFECfED  INDUSfRIES 
Coal 
Printing and Publishing 
Nonferrous  Metals 
Textiles 
Transport Services 
Construction Materials 
Wood  & Furniture 
Paper 
Other Chemicals 
Glass 
Leather&Shoes 
Agriculture 
Meat  and Dairy Products 
Hotels 
Telecommunications 
Electricity 
Economy  Average 
% share of 
total  subsidy 
(1) 
26.6 
7.8 
5.6 
19.5 
8.0 
12.3 
14.5 
1.  7 
0.6 
1.8 
0.5 
0.6 
0.0 
0.1 
0.1 
0.1 
0.2 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
Subsidies as a 
% of eligible 
export  sa 
(2) 
11.4 
9.9 
9.0 
8.1 
5.1 
4.0 
4.0 
2.5 
2.3 
1.9 
1.5 
0.7 
0.5 
0.4 
0.4 
0.2 
0.1 
0.1 
0.1 
0.1 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
5.4 
a  :  Eligible exports are all exports  to non-OECD  countries.  In  the  case 
of Electric Equipment  and Aircraft&Ships  they  include all exports  to 
non-EC countries 
Source  :·Melitz and Messerlin  (1987b,  p.  84). - 42  -
The first column of Table 4  makes clear that  four  industries  including 
Nonelectrical Machinery,  Electrical Equipment,  Aircraft and Ships,  and 
Construction  attract  nearly  three  quarters  of  total  export  credit 
subsidies  while  a  wide  range  of  industries  receives  virtually  no 
subsidies.  We  conclude  that  export  credit  subsidies  are  heavily 
concentrated on a  few  industries. 
The  most  interesting  information  concerns  the  industry  rates  of 
subsidization.  While  the  economy  average  equals  5.4%.  the  rate  for 
Nonelectrical  Machinery,  Electrical  Equipment,  Metal  Products  and 
Other  Services  is  close  to  10%.  Export  credit  subsidies  to 
Aircraft&Ships.  Construction and  Motor  Vehicles  are  substantial also. 
On  the  other  hand,  sixteen  of  the  twenty-eight  sectors  can  be 
considered  as  unaffected  by  export  credit  subsidies.  It  looks  that 
the  French export credit  system  favors  a  limited number  of  industries 
in  a  substantial  way.  The  aggregate  subsidy  figures  thus  hide  a  lot 
of  interindustry  variation  which  is  relevant  for  assessing  the 
competitive  impact  of  export credits. 
B.  EXPORT  INSURANCE 
b.  1.  Evaluation of  the  total  figures 
The  French  export  insurance  agency  COFACE  insures  export  transactions 
to all destinations.  Based  on  the yearly reports by  the  French agency 
COFACE,  we  computed  export  insurance  subsidies  using  both  the  ex-post 
and ex-ante approach. 
As  explained  in  the  methodological  part  of  this  chapter.  the  ex-post. 
approach assumes  that  export  insurance gives  rise  to  export  subsidies 
when  the  insurance  premia  do  not  fully  cover  subsequent  claims.  One 
way  to  practically  implement  this  principle  is  to  subtract  for  each 
year  total  premia  from  total  claims,  as  is  done  in  the  second  column 
of  Table  5.  It  should  be  remembered  that,  with  this  ex-post T
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methodology,  the  yearly  figures  in  the  first  two  columns  should  not 
beinterpreted  as  subsidies  of  that  particular  year.  Only  the 
accumulation of  losses over  a  sustained period  forms  an  indication of 
export  subsidization.  Also,  administrative  and  other  costs  of  the 
official  export  insurance  agency  are  ignored.  In  the  same  way  as  a 
private insurer,  the official agency must  recover  these costs  from  its 
premia  in  order  to  break  even.  This  implies  that  our  estimates 
provide a  lower  bound  for  the  subsidies actually given. 
Columns  (3}  and  (4)  express  the  difference  between  premia  and  claims 
as  a  %  of  respectively  the  value  of  insured  contracts  and  total 
exports.  In  this  context,  it  should  be  noted  that  ())fACE  provides 
export  insurance  to  all  countries  so  that  total  exports  is  the 
relevant  concept  to  compute  subsidization rates. 
The  last  three  columns  take  into  account  the  recoveries  on  claims 
wnich  leads  to  lower  estimates  of  subsidy-equivalents.  Nevertheless, 
these  recoveries  should  be  interpreted  with  considerable  caution  as 
they  often  consist  of  reimbursements  by  the  French  Treasury  to 
())FACE  irrespective  of  whether  funds  have  actually  been  recovered. 
These  reimbursements  compensate  for  losses  as  a  result  of  the  debt 
consolidations  in  connection  with  the  Club  of  Rome  and  therefore 
represent  subsidies.  For  this  reason,  the  improved  financial 
situation of  ())fACE  in 1984 and  1985  is presumably  ficticious. 
Table 6  uses  the ex-ante approach of  measuring  insurance subsidies.  In 
reality,  official  as  well  as  private  insurance  agencies  can  make 
mistakes.  Optimally,  an  ex ante  approach  is  required  to  compute  the 
subsidy-equivalents of  export  insurance during a  specific year.  This 
approach was  developed earlier  in  this chapter and  compares  the  premia 
to  the  future  claims  that  can  be  expected  on  the  moment  the  export 
insurance  contract  is  signed.  Here  again,  the  time  horizon  of  the 
studies  may  be  too  short  to  judge  the  long-run  profitability  of  the 
official  French  export  insurance  system.  For  this  reason,  the 
estimates of  export  insurance subsidies  should be  treated with care. T
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It is comforting  to see  that  the ex-ante and ex-post measures  reported 
in  Tables  5  and  6  show  a  similar  evolution.  although  the  ex-ante 
procedure  leads  to  lower  estimates of  the  subsidization  involved.  In 
the  period  1978-1987.  premia  did  not  cover  the  costs  of  mFACE' s 
activities  so  that  subsidization  took place.  This  represents  a  clear 
change  w.r.t.  to  the  preceding  period,  when  the  cost  of  export 
insurance was  largely covered by premia and other activities. 
Tables  5  and  6  further  suggest  a  steady  increase  in  export  insurance 
subsidies,  although  there  is  more  year  to  year  variation  than  in  the 
case  of  export  credits.  Nevertheless,  the  amount  of  implicit 
subsidies  in  export  insurance  is  small  when  compared  to  export 
credits.  In  effect.  we  find  that  export  insurance  subsidies  almost 
never  exceed  1%  of  total  exports.  In  comparison  to  export  credits. 
export  insurance  subsidies only play a  minor  role. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  estimates  in  terms  of  the  value  of  insured 
contracts  indicate  that  one  should  not  underestimate  the  possible 
competitive  effects  of  export  insurance  subsidies.  The  difference 
between  claims  and  premi~ as  % of  insured contracts  steadily rises  to 
nearly  2%  in  1982-1984.  and  then  jumps  to  3.4%  in  1986  and  even  7.3% 
in  1987.  The  ex-ante  subsidy  approach yields  estimates  of  more  than 
1%  in  1981-1986  and  more  than  2%  in  1987.  In  view  of  the  large 
increase  in  claims  in  1986-1987,  these  subsidy  rates  will  increase 
even  further  after  1987  because  the  fair  premium  in  the  ex-ante 
subsidy  approach  is  based  on  a  weighted  average  of  past  claims .and 
premia. 
These  figures  suggest  that.  while  only  a  relatively  small  share  of 
total  exports  receive  export  insurance  subsidies,  the  competitive 
impact  of  the  subsidized  exporters  may  be  significant.  Furthermore. 
the  strong  expansion  of  export  insuranc~ subsidies  combined  with  the 
decline  in  export  credit  subsidies  points  to  a  larger  role  of  the 
former  type  of  export aid  in recent years. T
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b.2.  Export  Insurance for  the account of COFACE  and  the French state 
Table  7  makes  a  distinction between  the  own  account  of  COFACE  and  the 
activities  on  behalf  of  the  French  government4.  With  some  variation 
across  the  years.  it  is  seen  that  around  70%  to  75%  of  contracts 
insured  by  COFACE  are  concluded  on  behalf  of  the  French  government. 
Very  interestingly.  we  find  that  premium  income  of  COFACE·s  own 
insurance  contracts  slightly  exceeds  claims  in all  years  considered. 
Likewise.  no  evidence of  ex-ante subsidies is found.  Considering  that 
the  small  surplus  in  premium  income  may  be  needed  to  cover 
administrative  costs.  this  suggests  that  COFACE·s  own  activities  are 
breaking even. 
The  contrast  with  the  government  account  is  remarkable.  Here. 
persistent  and  rapidly  rising  export  subsidization  is  found  in  the 
198o·s.  In  summary.  export  insurance  subsidies  are  entirely 
government-related  in  France  and.  as  a  result  of  the  large  share  of 
government  insurance  contracts.  explains  the  observed  accumulation  of 
losses by COFACE. 
b.3.  Sectoral  breakdown 
A  sectoral  disaggregation  of  export  insurance  subsidies  is  found  in 
Table  8.  based  on  ex-ante  subsidy  estimates  by  Meli tz  and  Messer lin 
( 1987b.  p  82-85).  Data  1 imitations  forced  the  authors  to  aggregate 
Construction and Related Services.  Notice  that several  industries get 
negative  subsidies.  This  may  be  due  to  imperfections  in  Melitz  and 
Messerlin·s  methodology  to  measure  ex  ante  subsidies.  Another 
explanation  is  that  COFACE  insurance  of  longer  term  credits  was 
compulsory  until  1985.  This  may  have  forced  some  industries  to  pay 
more  than  the pure premium. 
4Recoveries  are  not  considered  in  Table  7.  but  do  not  alter  the 
results markedly. - 49  -
Table 8  Percent~e share of  French  Insurance subsidies by  Industry 
1981  1982  1983  1984  81-84 
Construction & Services  62.5  90.2  67.6  59.6  69.9 
Agro-industry  -1.2  -1.6  17.7  24.4  9.8 
Aircraft8Ships  20.4  0.9  3.9  2.8  7.0 
Automobiles  5.4  3.7  4.4  2.0  3.9 
Electrical Equipment  6.6  1.9  1.6  3.2  3.3 
Nonelectrical Machinery  5.1  3.3  2.1  2.4  3.2 
Basic Olemicals  -1.5  -1.9  1.8  2.0  0.1 
Coal  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Leather & Shoes  0.0  -0.1  -0.1  -o.l  -0.1 
Textiles  -0.5  -0.6  0.2  0.4  -0.1 
Wood&Furniture  -0.4  -0.4  -0.3  -0.2  -0.3 
Iron&Steel  -3.0  -2.5  0.7  3.1  -0.4 
Metal  Products  -5.4  -5.3  -3.4  -1.8  -4.0 
Source  :  Melitz and Messerlin  (1987b,  p.  90) 
, - 50  -
Three  features  of  Table  8  stand  out.  With  some  exceptions,  the 
industries  that benefit most  from  export credit subsidies also receive 
the  bulk  of  the  export  insurance  subsidies.  Secondly,  subidies  to 
Construction  and  Related  Services  account  for  the  two-thirds  of  the 
total.  In  part,  this  reflects  the  developments  in  Iran  in  the  late 
1970's.  Note also  that  the agroindustry was  heavily subsidized in 1983 
and  1984,  which reflects problems with Poland during  the  international 
debt  crisis.  On  the  whole,  export  insurance  subsidies  do  not  appear 
to  be  targeted  strategically  towards  specific  industries,  but  arise 
from  largely exogenous  international developments. 
4.2.  TilE  UNITED  KINGOOM 
A.  EXPORT  CREDITS 
a.l. Evaluation of  total  figures 
In this section,  we  present our  estimates of  the  subsidies  implicit  in 
U.K.  export  credits  based  on  the  Cost  Difference  Method.  Export 
credits  include  all  fixed  rate  Sterling  and  foreign  currency  export 
financing  by  the  EGCD.  Our  findings  for  the  years  1978-1987  are 
reported  in Table  9  and  are  consistent  with  evidence  from  Melitz  and 
Messerlin {1987b,  p  95)  for  the  subperiod  1982-1984. 
It  becomes  clear  from  Table  9  that  the  United  Kingdom  granted 
substantially  lower  ·export  credits  than  France.  Indeed,  the  French 
find  a  rate  of  subsidization  ranges  from  2.8  to  5.1  %while  the  rate 
varies  from 0.6  to  1.7% in  the United Kingdom. 
As  in the case of  France,  we  observe a  strong expansion of  outstanding 
U.K.  credits  during  the  1978-1984  period.  Combined  with  a  sharply 
rising interest differential between  the market  and  the  OECD  Consensus 
rate,  this  resulted  in  more  than  a  doubling  of  the  rate  of Table 9 
Year 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
Export credit subsidies 
Outs  tanding 
credits (millions 
of .f) 
(1} 
4950.52 
5599.28 
6393.33 
7458.43 
8902.03 
9B58.94 
9812.77 
9581.90 
8648.97 
7747.96 
- 51  -
in the United Kingdom 
Interest  Implicit  Rate  of 
rate dif- subsidy  subsidi-
ferential  (millions  zation % 
%  of .f) 
{2}  (3)  (4} 
2.6  127.581  0.6 
3.9  218.582  0.9 
5.6  359.322  1.3 
6.7  500.386  1.7 
6.1  546.233  1.7 
3.3  327.063  1.0 
4.4  429.802  1.1 
4.0  385.682  1.0 
2.6  226.400  0.6 
2.1  161.188  0.4 
The rate of  subsidization is defined as  the ratio of  the  implicit subsidy and 
total  exports  to non-EC countries. 
Source  :  EOGD  {1988.  p.  16}  and  own  computations. - 52  -
subsidization.  After  1984  the  pattern  was  reserved.  The  interest 
differential  decreased  to  2.1%  only  in  1987  and  total  outstanding 
credits  came  down  somewhat  as  well.  All  of  this  brought  the  rate of 
subsidization  down  to  levels  comparable  to  the  late  seventies.  This 
is another  illustration of  the  sensitivity of  export credit subsidies 
to  the  interest  rate  evolution.  Without  any  doubt.  the  matrix  rate 
arrangement  of  the  OECD  Consensus  exerces  a  profound  influence  on  the 
scope  for  export credit subsidization. 
a.2.  Industry disaggregation 
The  lower ·British  rates  of  subsidization  are  also  reflected  in  the 
industry  disaggregation  in Table  10,  which  is  derived  from  the  paper 
by  Meli tz  and  Messer lin  {1987b,  p  97).  1  In  1982-1984,  none  of  the 
industries  benefited  from  a  rate  of  subsidization  of  five  percent  of 
more.  As  in  the  case  of  France  though,  most  of  the  export  credit 
subsidies goes  to  a  limited number  of British industries. 
Interestingly,  many  of  the  same  industries are  the  main beneficiaries 
of  export  credits  in France  and  the  United  Kingdom.  This  is  true  for 
Engineering  (compare  to  Nonelectrical  Machinery  in France),  Transport 
Equipment  (comparable  to  Aircraft&Ships),  Construction  and  Related 
Services,  Motor  Vehicles,  Electrical Equipment.  and Metal  products. 
We  conclude  that,  to  an  important  degree,  export  promotion  through 
export  credits  is  targeted  at  the  same  industries  in  the  United 
Kingdom and France. 
B.  EXPORT  INSURANCE 
Export  insurance  in  the  United  Kingdom  is  provided  by  the  EGCD  on 
exports  to  all  destinations. 
credit  insurance  and  overseas 
A  distinction  is  made  between  export 
investment  insurance  business.  The 
value of  insured contracts  in  the overseas  investment  scheme  accounted 
for  less  than  1%  of  total  insurance  in 1978-1988.  Moreover,  this  form 
of  insurance  has  been - 53  -
Table  10  Export credit subsidies  in the United Kingdom  by  industry 
1982-1984 
Industries 
A.  BENEFITING  INDUSTRIES 
Transport Equipment 
Construction and Services 
Engineering 
Electricity and Gas 
Motor vehicles 
Office Machinery 
Metal  Produyts  : 
Electrical Equipment 
B.  UNAFFEcTED  INDUSTRIES 
Instrument Engineering 
Wood  Products 
Petroleum Products 
Other  Manufactured Goods 
Agriculture 
Basic Chemicals 
Textiles 
Other Chemicals 
Paper and Printing 
Footwear and Clothing 
Petroleum Products 
Synthetic Fibres 
Non-metallic Minerals 
Nuclear  Products 
Mineral  Extraction 
Nonferrous Metallic Minerals 
Ferrous Metallic Minerals 
Cokes 
Leather 
Agro-industry 
Water 
Coal 
Ec~nomy Average 
% share of 
total  subsidy 
{1) 
24.0 
40.4 
21.7 
0.0 
7.0 
0.9 
0.1 
5.6 
0.2 
0.0 
0.0 
0.1 
0.1 
0.1 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
subsidies as a 
% of a  eligble 
exports  a 
(2) 
4.2 
3.1 
2.9 
2.7 
2.5 
1.5 
1.0 
0.8 
0.2 
0.1 
0.1 
0.1 
0.1 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
1.9 
a  :  Eligible exports are all exports  to non-QECD  countries.  In  the case of 
Electrical Equipment and Transport equipment  they  include all exports  to 
non-EC countries. 
Source  :  Melitz and Messerlin  (1987b,  p.  97) - 54  -
profitable and  should  therefore  not  be  considered as  a  subsidy.  For 
these  reasons,  we  focus  on export credit  insurance only. 
Table  11  summarizes  the  main  facts  about  export  insurance  in  the 
United  Kingdom.  Information  is  presented  about  the  value  of 
outstanding  contracts,  claims  minus  premia,  and  claims  minus  the  sum 
of  premia and  recoveries&interest.  The  use  of  outstanding  instead of 
insured  contracts  is dictated  by  data availability but  is  not  likely 
to  distort  our  findings  because  short  term  business  up  to  180  days 
accounted  for  75%  of  total  EGCD  insurance.  Again  we  distinguish 
between  a  situation  with  and  without  recoveries&interest.  From  a 
comparison  between  columns  (2)  and  (6).  it  is  seen  that 
recoveries&interests  were  substantial  and  added  up  to  more  than  1.8 
billion  pounds  in  the  period  1978-1987.  In  view  of  the  earlier 
mentioned  problems  with  the  data  on  recoveries,  it is appropriate  to 
consider  these  two  limiting  cases  as  an  upper  and  a  lower  bound  for 
the profitability of  the  EGCD. 
In  addition  to  the  absolute  numbers,  Table  11  also  shows  percentage 
shares  w.r.t.  the  value  of  total  outstanding  contracts  and  w.r.t. 
total  U.K.  exports,  which  is  the  relevant variable as  the  EGCD  insures 
transactions  to  all  countries.  In  Table  12,  we  used  the  earlier 
discussed  ex-ante  methodology  to  compute  subsidies  in  U.K.  export 
insurance.  Again  the  cases  with  and  without  recoveries&interest  were 
treated separately. 
A very comparable picture as  in  the case of  France emerges.  Tables  11 
and  12  indicate  that  rates  of  subsidization as  well  as  the  shares  of 
claims-premia as  a  % of  total  exports are  below  0.8%.  When  one  adds 
recoveries&interest,  the  figures  almost  fall  by  half.  On  the  whole, 
British export  insurance  was  pretty close  to  break-even  in  the  period 
1978-1982.  At  the  same  time,  however,  there  was  a  marked  expansion of 
outstanding contracts which coincided with  the  rise in export credits. T
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This  expansion  dramatically  changed 
export  insurance  after  1982. 
the  subsidization  implicit  in 
Implicit  subsidies  without 
recoveries&interest  rose  from  a  negative  number  in  1982  to  653.5 
million pounds  in  1987  while  the difference  between  claims  and  premia 
reached£ 846.7 million in that year.  Even after  taking  into account 
recoveries&interest.  the  increase  in  export  insurance  subsidies 
remains  impressive.  In  fact.  for  the  last  years  of  our  sample.  the 
total  value  of  export  insurance  subsidies  comes  close  to  or  exceeds 
the  value  of  U.K.  export  credit  subsidies  in Table 9.  irrespective of 
how  insurance  subsidies  are  measured.  When  dividing  the  absolute 
figures  by  total  exports.  a  similar  albeit  less  pronounced  evolution 
is  found. 
There  are  other  signs  that  the  role  of  export  insurance  in  British 
export  promotion  has  increased  considerably.  In  contrast  to  export 
credit  subsidies.  export  insurance  subsidies as  a  percentage  of  total 
export  value are higher  in  the  U.K.  than  in France.  Furthermore.  the 
still  relatively  low  rates  of  subsidization  should  not  lead  to  an 
underestimation  of  the  possible  competitive  distortions  arising  from 
export  insurance.  In  this  respect.  the  information  in  terms  of  the 
value of  outstanding contracts  is revealing.  From  column  (5}  in Table 
12.  one  sees  that  in  1987  a  subsidy  of  2.2%  is given  for  every  ECU  of 
export  contract  insured.  When  recoveries&interest are  not  taken  into 
account.  the  subsidy  amounts  to  4.4%  of  every  ECU  insured.  The 
corresponding  rates  for  the ex-post estimates  in Table  11  are 3.5% and 
5.7%.  This  suggests  that.  while only part of all exports are actually 
insured,  insurance  subsidies  for  this  subset  of  exports  may  be  quite 
substantial. 
4.3 BELGIUM 
In Belgium exports are  supported  in four  different ways.  CREDITEXPORT 
grants  ~xport credits at  favourable  interest  rates  to  which  OOPROMEX 
adds  export  subsidies under well-defined conditions.  Furthermore.  the - 58  -
Treasury  extends  official  development  assistance  and  the  Service  du 
Ducroire/ Nationale  Delcredere  Dienst  (NDD)  organizes  an  export 
insurance  system.  In  this  section  we  present  our  estimates  of  these 
implied subsidy-equivalents. 
A.  EXPORT  CREDITS 
a.1.  Creditexport 
Creditexport  is  an  organisation  in  which  institutions  of  the  Belgian 
public  and  private  financial  sector  participate.  It  operates  for  the 
account  of  a  pool  of  private and public banks  and  aims at stimulating 
exports  by  providing  export  credits  with 
interest  rates  as  favourable  as  possible. 
pursued. 
terms  above  two  years  at 
Break-even  is  said  to  be 
Does  Credi texport  grant  export  subsidies  ? 
Commission,  a  subsidy  is  given  if  capital, 
In  the  view  of  the 
when  supp  l i ed  by  the 
government,  earns  a  lower  than normal  market  return.  Creditexport  is 
not  a  governmental  organisation  and  its actions  cannot  be  considered 
as  pure  subsidization.  Yet,  indirectly,  the  government  takes  part  in 
Credi texport  through  public  financial  institutions.  In  effect.  the 
capital  input  by  the  public  sector  in  Credi texport  amounts  to  44 % 
since  1976.  Moreover,  in spite of  the  fact  that  it does  not  incur any 
losses,  Creditexport  grants  export  loans  below  the  going  market  rate. 
For  these  reasons,  it can be argued  that 44% of  the  interest subsidy, 
granted by Creditexport,  should be considered as a  subsidy. 
In  the  first  three  columns  of  Table  13,  we  present  Feyaerts  (1985) 
estimates  of  G  the  benefits  to  the  firms  derived  from  export  ce 
financing  by  Creditexport.  In  this  table,  the  NPV  method  is  used  for 
the  period  1975-1983.  In computing  these  figures,  Feyaerts uses  the 
debet  interest  rate  on  investment  credits  of  more  then  5  years.  In - 59  -
Table  13  Feyaerts  {1985)  Estimates of  the benefits  to  the  firms 
thanks  to  Credite~ort 1975-1983 
year  G  G  as a  G  as a  s  s  as a  ce  ce  ce  ce  ce 
% of  total  % of non- % of non-
export  EC  EC 
subsidies  exports  exports 
1975  500  25  0.18  220  0.08 
1976  900  38  0.29  369  0.13 
1977  -100  -5  -0.03  -44  -0.01 
1978  900  31  0.24  369  0.11 
1979  800  16  0.19  352  0.09 
1980  1. 200  21  0.24  528  0.11 
1981  1.  200  22  0.23  528  0.10 
1982  ·1.600  21  0.24  704  0.11 
1983  400  5  0.05  176  0.02 
Aver~e  822  19  0.18  362  0.08 
Source  :  Feyaerts  ( 1984)  t  p.  44. the  last  two  co  1  umns • 
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the  part  of  G  ce 
attributed  to  the public capital  input. 
is  computed  that  can  be 
On  average,  Creditexport  accounts  for  19  %  of  Feyaerts  estimates  of 
total  Belgian  export  subsidies  and  0.18%  of  Belgian  non-EC  exports. 
Compared  to  British and  most  notably  French  export  credit  subsidies, 
this  rate  of  subsidization  is  thus  low.  The  rates  of  subsidization 
decrease  even  further  if  only  the  exporting  firm· s  benefits  from 
participation  of  public  institutions  in Creditexport  is  considered  ( 
see  columns  4  and  5).  On  the  whole.  subsidization  by  Credi texport 
appears  limited although  one  should  remember  that Creditexport  is not 
the only organization providing export  support. 
Feyaerts  estimates  vary  considerably  over  time.  For  1977,  Feyaerts 
even  obtains  an  unexplained  negative  value,  which  would  imply  that 
Credi texport  has  hampered  Belgian  exports  in  that  year.  Remark 
further  that  the values  in  the  third column are  less volatile  then  the 
values  in  the  first  two  columns.  This  indicates  that,except  for  1977 
and  1983,  Creditexport  follows  the  evolution in the  export market. 
The  high  values  for  the  years  1980-1982  are  partially  due  to  the 
increased  difference  between  the  Credi texport  interest  rate  and  the 
market  interest  rate.  At  the  same  time  the  volume  of  export  credits 
rises  sharply  which  points  to  more  active export  promotion.  The  sharp 
decrease  in  the  volume  of  granted  export  credits  explains  the  low 
value  for  the  year  1983.  All  of  this  corresponds  closely  to  the  time 
evolution of  export credit subsidies  in France and  the United Kingdom. 
a.2.Copromex 
Copromex  (Comittee  for  the  Export  of  Belgian Equipment  Goods)  is  com-
posed  of  representatives  of  different  ministeries,some  important  pu-
blic  institutions  and  Creditexport.  It  advises  the  minister  of  fo-
reign  trade about  interest subsidies  on export credits with  terms - 61  -
above  2  years.  An  export  subsidy  can  be  granted  if  exports  of  a 
Belgian  firm are  hampered  by  more  favourable  export  credit  conditions 
of  foreign suppliers. 
As  discussed  in  chapter 
international  agreements 
agreement  within  the  OECD. 
I,  subsidies  are  regulated  by  two 
The  Treaty  of  Rome  and  the  "Consensus" 
The  former  forbids  that  subsidies  should 
be  granted  to  goods  exp~rted  to  other  EC-countries.  The  latter  rules 
out  export  subsidies  at  interest  rates  below  the  Consensus  minimum 
rates.  In practice,  Copromex at most  pays  the  difference  between  the 
cost of credit in Belgium {in casu  the Creditexport  interest rate plus 
a  bank provision of 0.45 %)  and  the Consensus  minimum  rates. 
The  Copromex  payments  represent pure subsidies because  firms  save part 
of  the  export  financing  costs.  The  first  two  columns  of  Table  14 
present  two  sets  of  estimates  of  the  size  of  these  subsidies  for  the 
years  1970-1987.  The  first set reflects  the  subsidies  committed  in one 
specific  year  (  i.e.  the  total  amount  of  subsidies  committed  in  that 
year  but  disbursed  in  later years).  These  estimates  are  comparable  to 
the  subsidy  equivalents  obtained  with  the  NPV-method  although  its  is 
not  clear  at  this  stage  whether  a  discount  factor  has  been  applied. 
The  second  set  of  estimates  reflects  the  disbursed  payments  and  is 
based  on  the  Cost  Difference  Method.  The  rates  of  subsidization  for 
these  two  methods  are  given  in  columns  (3)  and  (4).  As  before,  they 
are  defined  as  the  ratio  of  export  subsidies  to  non-EC  exports. 
Comparing  the  rate  of  subsidization  on  committed  subsidies  to  other 
countries,  we  find  that  subsidies  by  Copromex  remain  below  the  French 
and  somewhat  below  the  British figures.  As  in  case  of  France  and  the 
U.K.,  subsidies  rose  sharply  between  1980  and  1983  due  to  the  high 
market  interest  rates  and  the  low  Consensus-rates.  From  1984  on, 
declining  market  interest  rates  and  rising  Consensus  rates  reversed 
the  pat tern  of  the  previous  year.  One  can  expect  future  Copromex 
subsidies  to decrease even  further  because  the countries participating - 62  -
in  the Consensus. agreed  to abolish export  subsidies  to  industrialized 
countries  from  15  July  1988 onwards. 
The  estimates  of  subsidies  implicit  in Belgian  export  credits  by  the 
Cost  Difference  Method  mirror  the  observed  pattern  of  the  NPV 
methodology with a  lag of a  year or  so.  This  lagged adjustment arises 
from  the  fact  that  the  Cost  Difference  Method  measures  the  subsidies 
comprised  in  export  credits  of  the  past  years.  For  this  reason,  the 
sharp  expansion  of  subsidies  starts  in  1980  instead  of  1970  and  is 
reversed  in 1985  instead of  1984. 
Table  14  Copromex  subsidies 
year 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
committed 
subsidies 
{::::  NPV-
Method) 
{1) 
65.3 
65.0 
84.0 
233.3 
597.8 
778.3 
1751.3 
1261.4 
2156.7 
1743.2 
5298.0 
5801.2 
8555.8 
3255.7 
558.9 
1188.3 
1294.0 
191.6 
Source  Copromex 
disbursed 
subsidies 
{::::  Cost 
difference 
Method) 
(2) 
14.1 
52.7 
70.5" 
185.9 
155.1 
246.7 
390.7 
412.1 
845.0 
1048.7 
912.3 
1411.3 
2744.5 
3158.7 
4189.9 
3924.5 
3706.8 
2802.3 
committed  disbursed 
subsidies  subsidies 
as a%  of  as a  % of 
Belgian  Belgian 
non-EC  non-EC 
exports  exports 
(3)  {4) 
0.05  0.01 
0.04  0.04 
0.05  0.04 
0.11  0.09 
0.20  0.05 
0.27  0.09 
0.57  0.13 
0.35  0.12 
0.58  0.23 
0.42  0.25 
1.06  0.18 
1.10  0.27 
1.30  0.42 
0.44  0.43 
0.07  0.50 
0.13  0.44 
0.17  0.48 
0.03  0.38 - 63  -
B.  OFFICIAL  DEVELOPMENT  ASSISTANCE 
b.  1.  Evaluation of  the  total  figures 
Since  1964,  the  ministries  of  finance  and  foreign  trade  provide 
mutually arranged credits from  state  to  state.  These credits are a 
form  of  Official  Development  Assistance  as  defined  in  the  previous 
section.  Therefore,  our  theoretical  approach  for  measuring  subsidies 
implied  in Official  Development  Assistance  can directly be applied  to 
these credits. 
In  practice,  the  credits  are  granted  to  foreign  governments  or  in-
stitutions  whose  activities are guaranteed  by  their government,  their 
central  bank or  a  competent national  development  institution.  The ap-
plying  countries  present  development  projects  and  are  expected  to 
spend  part  of  the  credit  on  purchases  in  Belgium.  The  financing 
conditions  are  favourable.  The  repayment  term  is  usually  20  years 
after  a  grace  period  of  10  years  for  the  interest  and  the  principal. 
The  interest  rate  charged  is  zero  or  2  % depending  on  the  yearly  per 
capita  income  of  the  receiving country. 
In  Tables  15  and  16  we  estimated  the  grant  elements  of  Belgian state 
to  state  credits  during  the  period  1964-1988.  This  grant  e lernen  t 
corresponds  to  the  benefit  for  the  receiving  country  of  obtaining 
favourable  financing  conditions5.  We  showed  before  that  this  concept 
overestimates  the  benefits  for  exporting  Belgian  firms  because  only 
part of  the gains  for  importers are passed on  to  the  firm. 
In Table  15,  the  NPV-method  was  used  with  two  alternative assumptions 
about  the  discount  rate.  The  first  column  is  based  upon  a  simple  10  % 
discount  rate  while  in  the  second  column  the  interest  rate  on 
obligations  of  Belgian  public  financial  institutions  was  used.  All 
figures  are  expressed  in  millions  of  BF.  The  third  column  gives  the 
5Assuming  that  the whole credit is used  to buy domestic goods. - 64  -
Table  15  Grant elements  implied  in Belgian state to state cre-
dits based on  the NPV-method  (1964-1988)  (in millions of 
Bfr.) 
year 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
discount rate 
%  10  PFI  10 year 
32.2 
71.4 
28.3 
88.2 
153.9 
233.1 
220.2 
545.1 
384.5 
652.0 
1075.6 
1029.1 
830.0 
1301.6 
843.5 
2338.1 
2512.8 
1998.0 
2104.0 
2676.5 
2401.7 
1864.0 
2517.2 
719.1 
1962.5 
18.5 
39.3 
13.5 
46.2 
77.4 
180.4 
196.3 
459.0 
295.7 
534.8 
1019.0 
986.0 
814.0 
1275.1 
794.1 
2324.0 
2647.0 
2165.0 
2358.0 
2825.8 
2499.3 
1889.1 
2379.2 
647.3 
1736.3 
% 
difference 
41 
45 
52 
48 
50 
23 
11 
16 
23 
18 
5 
4 
2 
2 
6 
1 
-5 
-8 
-12 
-6 
-4 
-1 
5 
10 
12 - 65  -
Table  16  Grant  elements  implied  in  the Belgian state tot state cre-
dits based on  the cost difference-method  (1964-1988}  (in 
millions of B.F.) 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
4.6 
15.7 
20.5 
34.1 
58.5 
88.2 
113.9 
177.8 
220.5 
293.8 
434.7 
559.2 
656.7 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
809.5 
907.7 
1158.1 
1459.2 
1680.6 
1942.6 
2258.5 
2521.6 
2700.2 
2966.6 
3016.8 
3211.0 - 66  -
difference  between  the  first  two  columns  as  a  percentage of  the value 
of  the  first  column.  We  find  that alternative discount  rates  lead  to 
divergent  estimates  in  the  earlier period but  that  from  1974  onwards 
the difference  seldom exceeds  10%. 
The  figures  in Table  16 are estimated by  means  of  the Cost  Difference 
Method.  A  discount  rate  of  10%  is  used.  The  figures  represent  for 
each  year  the  budgetary  consequences  of  the  credits  granted  in 
previous  years.  In Table  17.  the  figures  in  the  previous  tables are 
related  to  Belgian  exports  to  non-EC  countries  in  order  to  obtain 
rates of  subsidization. 
From  Tables  15-17,  we  conclude  that  the  rates  of  subsidization never 
exceed  0.6%  so  that,  on  average,  subsidies  implicit  in  development 
assistance  should  not  be  exaggerated.  However,  this  does  not  rule  out 
that  exports  to  specific  countries  substantially  benefited  from  the 
government grants. 
Furthermore,  a  steady  increase  of  both  grant  elements  and  subsidy 
rates  is  seen  during  the  period  1964-1978.  In  1974-1984,  the  period 
when  a  strong  expansion  of  export  credits  was  observed  in  the 
countries  of  our  sample,  official  government  grants  also  rose 
sharply.  This  is reflected in an  increase  in subsidy rates.  From  1985 
onwards,  the  NPV  results  indicate  that  the  growth  of  official  grants 
is halted and  even  reversed.  But  the  stock of  outstanding  low  interest 
development  loans  remains  considerable and explains  the continued rise 
in subsidy estimates by  the Cost Difference Method. 
b.2.  Regional  disaggregation 
State  credits  and  grant  elements  are  disaggregated  regionally  in 
Tables  18 and  19. 
Table  18  shows  that  45  countries  received  Belgian  state  to  state 
credits and  that more  than 50% of  these credits were directed  to  five - 67  -
Table  17  Percentage rate of  subsidization in Belgian state  to state 
credits 
year 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
Cost Difference 
Method 
0.01 
0.02 
0.02 
0.03 
0.05 
0.07 
0.08 
0.12 
0.13 
0.14 
0.15 
0.20 
0.22 
0.23 
0.25 
0.29 
0.31 
0.31 
0.31 
0.32 
0.30 
0.31 
0.38 
0.41 
0.41 
NPV  Method 
0.04 
0.07 
0.03 
0.08 
0.13 
0.19 
0.16 
0.37 
0.23 
0.31 
0.37 
0.37 
0.28 
0.37 
0.23 
0.58 
0.53 
0.36 
0.34 
0.38 
0.29 
0.21 
0.33 
0.10 
0.25 Table  18 
- 68  -
Belgian state to state credits. 
(1964-1988) 
current  prices 
1  zaire 
2  india 
3  indonesia 
4  turkey 
5  china 
6  pakistan 
7  bangladesh 
8  philippines 
9  tanzania 
10  cameroon 
11  tunesia 
12  morocco 
13  egypt 
14  peru 
15  burundi 
16  bolivia 
17  cote d'ivoire 
18  congo 
19  colombia 
20  nepal 
21  niger 
22  vietnam 
23  gabon 
24  ethiopia 
25  k.enia 
26  angola 
27  ecuador 
28  thailand 
29  rwanda 
30  seychelles 
31  benin 
32  senegal 
33  cuba 
34  el  salvador 
35  zambie 
36  tiber  ia 
37  jamaica 
38  syria 
39  madagascar 
40  zimbabwe 
41  botswana 
42  greece 
43  lebanon 
44  comoros 
45  mozambique 
(in millions  of  BF) 
5050 
4760 
47 30 
3914 
2993 
1850 
1775 
1289 
1067 
745 
709 
631 
610 
525 
500 
450 
406 
275 
275 
250 
250 
250 
246 
242 
230 
206 
200 
195 
1115 
1110 
115 
100 
100 
90 
90 
85 
77 
75 
75 
65 
52 
25 
25 
12 
\ 
share 
111. ()7 
13.26 
13.17 
10.90 
8.34 
5.15 
4.94 
3.59 
2.97 
2.08 
1. 98 
1. 76 
1. 70 
1.46 
1. 39 
1. 25 
1.13 
0 .. 77 
0. 77 
0. 7C 
0.7::: 
0.7C 
0.69 
0.67 
0.64 
0.57 
0.56 
0.54 
0. 4 c 
0.39 
0.32 
0. 2 s 
0.28 
0. 2 5 
0.25 
0.2~ 
0.21 
0. 21 
o.n 
0. 18 
0. 14 
0.07 
0.07 
o.:D 
o.n 
Regional  disaggregation 
prices of  1988 
1  india 
2  indonesia 
3  turkey 
4  zaire 
5  pakistan 
6  china 
7  bangladesh 
8  philippines 
9  tanzania 
10  tunesia 
11  morocco 
12  cameroon 
13  peru 
14  egypt 
15  bolivia 
16  cote d'ivoire 
17  burundi 
18  colombia 
19  vietnam 
20  k.enia 
21  niger 
22  congo 
23  gabon 
24  angola 
25  rwanda 
26  nepal 
27  ethiopia 
28  thailand 
29  ecuador 
30  seychelles 
31  cuba 
32  benin 
33  senegal 
311  syria 
35  madagascar 
36  liberia 
37  el  salvador 
38  zimbabwe 
39  jamaica 
40  zambia 
41  greece 
42  botswana 
43  lebanon 
44  comoros 
45  mozambique 
9017.5 
8230.3 
6814.3 
6358.2 
3538.3 
3522.4 
2666.0 
2005.6 
1407.0 
1105.6 
946.0 
833.0 
819.1 
817.1 
644.6 
603.0 
573.0 
525.2 
376.6 
346.9 
334.5 
294.5 
293.9 
289.7 
271.1 
263.11 
2113.6 
2113.3 
233.11 
152.0 
150.6 
139.4 
132.4 
108. 1 
l Oil  . 1 
99.2 
91.<1 
91.0 
90.<1 
90.0 
77.0 
52.8 
311.7 
11."/ 
7.3 
\ 
share 
16.38 
14.95 
12.38 
11.55 
6.43 
6.40 
4. 84 
3. 64 
2.56 
2. 01 
1. 72 
1. 51 
1.49 
1.48 
1.17 
1.10 
1.011 
0.95 
0.68 
0.63 
0.61 
0.53 
0.53 
0.53 
0.49 
0.48 
0.44 
0.44 
0.42 
0.28 
0.27 
0.25 
0.24 
0.20 
0. 19 
0. 18 
0. 1-, 
0. 17 
0. 16 
0.16 
0. 14 
0. 10 
0.06 
0.02 
0.01 - 69  -
Table  19  Grant  elements  implied  in  the  Belgian state to state 
credits.  Regional  disaggregation  (1964-1988)  (in millions 
of  BF) 
current  prices 
zaire 
2  indonesia 
3  india 
4  turkey 
5  china 
6  pakistan 
7  bangladesh 
8  philippines 
9  tanzania 
10  tunesia 
11  egypt 
12  cameroon 
13  burundi 
14  morocco 
15  peru 
16  cote d'ivoire 
17  bolivia 
18  congo 
19  colombia 
20  niger 
21  nepal 
22  vietnam 
23  ethiopia 
24  gabon 
25  kenya 
26  angola 
27  thailand 
28  ecuador 
29  seychelles 
30  rwanda 
31  benin 
32  senegal 
33  cuba 
34  zambia 
35 el  salvador 
36  liberia 
37  madagascar 
38  jamaica 
39  syria 
40  zimbabwe 
41  botswana 
42  lebanon 
43  comoros 
44  greece 
45  mozambique 
4147.7 
3751.6 
3670.4 
2875.5 
2501.8 
1414.2 
1391.5 
1041.5 
891.9 
584.9 
509.9 
492.0 
418.0 
404.6 
336.6 
323.4 
313.5 
217.7 
211.7 
209.0 
209.0 
209.0 
202.3 
194.7 
192.2 
172.2 
163.0 
158.3 
110.8 
97.2 
96.1 
83.6 
79.2 
75.2 
75.2 
'/1- 1 
62.7 
61.0 
59.4 
5'1. 8 
41.2 
19.8 
10.0 
9. 3 
~.9 
\ 
shar-e 
H.  70 
13.2 9 
13. ::n 
10.!9 
8.97 
5.Jl 
IL 93 
3.69 
3.16 
2. :n 
1. 61 
L  74 
1. 4 8 
1.0 
l.  i 9 
l.  ~ 5 
0.77 
0. 7 5 
C.74 
0.74 
c. 74 
0. 7 2 
0.69 
0.68 
0.61 
o.:;s 
J.56 
C.39 
0.3~ 
:::.30 
c. 2 8 
G. 2 I 
2.22 
:1.22 
a. 21 
;)_:)3 
:::.83 
0.:::2 
prices of  1988 
1  india 
2  indonesia 
3  zaire 
4  turkey 
5  china 
6  pakistan 
1  bangladesh 
8  philippines 
9  tanzania 
10  tunesia 
11  egypt 
12  ca;neroon 
13  morocco 
14  peru 
15  cote d' ivoire 
16  burundi 
17  bolivia 
18  colombia 
19  vietnam 
20  kenia 
21  niger-
22  angola 
23  congo 
24  gabon 
25  nepal 
26  ethiopia 
27  thailand 
28  ecuador 
29  r~o~anda 
30  seychelles 
31  cuba 
32  be:1in 
33  se;wgal 
34  madagascar 
35  syna 
36  liberia 
31  ci  salvador 
J8  zimbabwe 
39  zambi<1 
40  jamaica 
41  botswand 
42  greece 
43  lebanon 
44  cbmoros 
45  mot.amhique 
6691.5 
6355.0 
5147.2 
4684.7 
2944.3 
2606.1 
2040.0 
1583.6 
1176.1 
902.7 
682.9 
558.9 
530.5 
4 87.4 
479.5 
478.9 
440.3 
4 02.0 
318.0 
290.0 
279.6 
242.1 
233.1 
232.6 
220.2 
203.6 
203.4 
18C8 
152.5 
120.4 
119.2 
116.5 
110.  7 
.87. 1 
85.6 
82.9 
76.4 
76.0 
75.2 
71.5 
111.8 
28.6 
27.5 
9.9 
6.7 
\ 
share 
15.98 
15.17 
12.29 
11.18 
7.03 
6.22 
4.87 
3.78 
2.81 
2.16 
1. 63 
1.33 
1. 27 
1.16 
1.14 
1.14 
l.  05 
0.96 
0.75 
0.69 
0.67 
0.58 
0.56 
0.56 
0.53 
0.49 
0. 4 9 
0.44 
0.36 
0.29 
0. 2! 
0. 28 
0.26 
0.21 
0.70 
C.20 
::J. 18 
0. 18 
0. 18 
0.17 
0.10 
0.07 
0.07 
0.02 
0.01 - 70  -
countries  :  Zaire.  India.  Indonesia.  Turkey  and China.  When  expressed 
in  prices  of  1988.  the  share  of  these  countries  even  exceeds  60 
%.  Among  the  top five.  China is  then replaced by Pakistan and Zaire is 
not  on  the first place any  longer.  This  indicates  that Zaire and China 
received  the major part of  their credits  in recent years. 
Table  19  shows  that  Zaire,  India,  Indonesia.  Turkey  and  China  also 
received  most  of  the  subsidies  implied  in  these  credits.  Their  share 
amounts  to  51  %  when  expressed  in  current  prices  and  62 %  when 
expressed  in prices of  1988. 
This  higher  share  indicates  that  the  destination  of  Belgian  state  to 
state credits has  become  somewhat  less  concentrated during  the  years. 
Nevertheless.  we  find  that  the  most  of  the  aid  goes  to  a  1 imi ted 
number  of  countries  including  Belgium's  former  colony  but  also  Asian 
countries with whom  Belgium has  no  special  relationship. 
C.  EXPORT  INSURANCE 
In  Belgium,  the  National  Delcredere  Dienst  (NDD)  insures  export 
contracts  against  a  wide  variety  of  risks.  In  contrast  to  the 
agencies  of  France,  the  United  Kingdom  and  Germany,  only 
non-EC destinations  are  covered.  The  agency  operates  for  its  own 
account as well as  on account  for  the Belgian state. 
c.l.  An  analysis of  total  figures 
Tables  20  and  21  report  our  findings  for  Belgian  export  insurance 
subidies  for  all  NDD  activities  (own  account  and  account  of  the 
Belgian  state)  using  both  the  ex-post  and  ex-ante  approach.  A 
distinction is made  between  the  case with and  without  recoveries.  It 
should  be  noted  that  recoveries  represent  funds  actually  recovered 
instead  of  reimbursments  by  the  Belgian  government.  Due  to  lack  of 
data for  the period  1973-1980,  interest payments  on consolidations are !
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not  included.  In  addition  to  the  absolute  figures,  we  also  express 
the  subsidy-equivalents as  a  percentage  of  the  total  value  of  exports 
and newly  insured contracts. 
The  rates  of  subsidization  in  both  the  ex-ante  and  ex-post  approach 
are  very  similar  to  those  in  France  and  the  United  Kingdom.  When 
compared  to  the  total  value  of  eligible  exports,  the  Belgian  export 
insurance  agency  is  not  a  major  source  of  export  subsidies.  Even 
without  taking  into  account  recoveries,  rates  of  subsidization  are 
less  than  1%.  Furthermore,  one  should  note  that  the  Service  Du 
Ducroire  only  insures  10%  or  so  of  total  Belgian exports and  does  not 
cover  exports  to  EC  countries.  This  contrasts  markedly  with  the 
situation  in  France  and  the  United  Kingdom.  As  a  consequence,  the 
competitive  impact  on exports  to  EC  countries  is  likely  to  be  smaller. 
Subsidy  rates  per  ECU  of  insured  exports are  similar  to  our  estimates 
for  the  United  Kingdom  and  France.  Without  recoveries,  claims-premia 
reach  a  maximum  of  4. 9  %  of  insured  contracts  in  1987  while  the 
corresponding  rate  for  ex-ante  subsidies  amounted  to  1. 9%.  Taking 
into  account  recoveries.  the  figures  for  1987  decrease  to  4. 3%  and 
1.2%.  This  indicates  that  the  small  group of  exporters  who  rely on  the 
Belgian  insurance  agency,  obtain  cheaper  insurance  than  they  would 
have obtained on  the private market. 
The  evolution  over  time  is  also  comparable  to  France  and  the  United 
Kingdom.  Up  to  1977,  premium  income  covers  or  even  exceeds  paid 
claims  paid.  From  1978  on,  the  official  agency  is  confronted  with 
steadily rising  losses  although  the  magnitude  of  the  implicit  subsidy 
varies  considerably  from  year  to  year.  It  is  doubtful  that  future 
recoveries  on past  claims  will  be  sufficient  to  compensate all  of  the 
insurance  losses  of  the  past  decade,  so  that  some  movement  towards 
increased subsidization is  to  be  expected. T
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c.2.  The  NOD's  own  account versus  the account of  the Belgian state 
Table  22  differentiates  between  the  NOD's  own  and  government-related 
activities.  In  contrast  to  the  French  situation,  the  bulk  of  the 
contracts  are  on  account  of  the  NOD,  although  the  share  of  own 
activities declined  from  86%  in 1973  to 75.9%  in 1987. 
An  interesting  time  pattern  emerges  from  the  comparison  of  ex-post 
subsidy  rates  as  a  percentage  of  newly  insured  contracts.  The 
accumulation  of  losses  by  the  NOD  since  the  end  of  the  1970's  is 
accompanied  by  a  widening  gap  between  the  subsidy  rates  of  the  NOD's 
state-related and  own  activities.  This  is particularly  true  for  the 
period  1984-1987.  when  state-related  losses  rose  sharply.  As  in  the 
case  of  France,  export  insurance  on  account  of  the  government  is 
characterised by more  extensive subsidization. 
c.3.  Regional  disaggregation of Belgian export  insurance subsidies 
A  regional disaggregation of  the export  insurance figures  reveals  some 
interesting  facts  about  Belgian  official  export  insurance.  Table  23 
provides  a  regional  breakdown  of  the  outs  tanding  export  insurance 
contracts  for  the  period  1981-1988.  A  distinction  is  further  made 
between  the NOD's  own and  state-related activities. 
The  NOD's  own activities are primarily  targeted at Asia  (33-42%),  and 
Africa  {nearly  30%)  with  an  increasing  share  of  Belgium's  former 
colonies  since  1986.  Eastern Europe,  and  the  American  continent  each 
account  for  1G-20%  of  outstanding  contracts.  The  share  of  non-EC 
European  countries  is  less  than  10%  but  has  been  rising  in  recent 
years. 
Government-related export  insurance concentrates more  on Africa,  which 
accounts  for nearly half of  the  total value of  export contracts. T
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Likewise,  Eastern Europe  receives  a  larger,  albeit declining share of 
export  insurance  contracts  from  the  Belgian  government  than  from  the 
NDD' s  own  funds.  Conversely.  the  shares  of  Asia  {less  than  20%}. 
South and North America {less  than  10 %}  and Belgium's  former  colonies 
are  lower  when  compared  to  the  NDD  own  activities.  Finally, 
state-tied  export  insurance  to  Western  European  non-EC  countries  has 
expanded considerably  in recent years. 
In Table  24.  regional  ex-post  subsidy  rates  as  a  percentage  of  newly 
insured  contracts are  compared.  Ex-post  subsidies  are  defined  as  to 
include  recoveries  as  well  as  interest  payments  from  consolidations 
and  should  be  treated as  lower  bounds  for  the  subsidy-equivalents  of 
Belgian export  insurance6. 
As  is seen  from  this  table,  subsidy rates vary considerably over  time. 
More  importantly,  some  country  groups  receive  large  subsidies,  while 
other  countries  appear  to  pay  premia  well  above  the  break-even  rate. 
In  effect.  we  find  that  premium  income  paid  on  export  contracts  to 
non-EC  countries  in  Western  Europe  far  exceeds  net  claims.  On  the 
other  hand,  export  trans~ctions  to  Eastern  Europe  and  most  of  all  to 
African  countries.  including  the  former  colonies,  bene£ it  from  both 
state-related and  own  export  insurance  by  the  NDD.  South  and  North 
American  countries  are  subsidized  by  the  NOD's  own  export  insurance. 
Where  state-related  export  insurance  is  concerned,  the  subsidization 
of  the  former  colonies  is  impressive  :  in  the period  1981-1984 claims 
were  more  than  double  the  sum  of  premium  income.  recoveries  .and 
interest  on  consolidations.  The  better  balance  in  the  subsequent 
years  is  largely due  to  repeated consolidations and  debt  rescheduling. 
6Data  are  not  presented  on  a  yearly  basis  because  in  some  years  the 
value  of  newly  insured  export  contracts  to  specific country groups  is 
zero. - 79  -
Those  findings  indicate  that  the  Belgium  official  export  insurance 
agency  uses  the  higher  premium  income  paid  by  some  exporters  to 
subsidize  others.  For  this  reason,  the  impact  of  export  insurance 
subsidies  on  the  export  performance  on  specific  markets  may  be 
profound,  even  if  the  aggregate  rates  of  subsidization  are  not  all 
that  large. 
4.4 GERMANY 
A.  EXPORT  CREDITS 
Export  credits are  granted  by  {i}  the  Kreditanstalt  flir  Wiederaufbau 
{KFW),  a  corporation  under  public  law,  and  (ii)  the 
AusfuhrKredit-Gesselschaft  {AKA),  a  private  company  set  up  as  a 
syndicate  of  55  commercial  banks,  comparable  to  Creditexport  in 
Belgium. 
a.l.  Kreditanstalt  flir  Wiederaufbau  (KFW} 
The  export  financing by  the  KFW  can be divided  in four  categories 
1.  Loans  to developing countries are given at  the  OECD  consensus  rates 
or  more  often  at  the  'Commercial  Interest  Reference  Rates'  {CIRR), 
because  the  German  market  rate usually  lies  below  the  Consensus  rates 
(see  Chapter  I).  The  CIRR  is based  on  German  market  interest  rates. 
Our  definition of  subsidies  is based  on  the  advantage  exporting  firms 
derive  from  borrowing  at  a  more  favorable  condition  than  the  market 
interest  rate.  If  the  CIRR  truly  reflect  market  interest  rates,  we 
would  conclude  that  the  KFW's  export  financing  does  not  contain  any 
subsidies. - 80  -
Nevertheless.  the  situation  is  more  complex.  First  of  all.  a 
substantial  part  of  the  export  financing  consists  of  buyer  credits, 
which  reduce  financing  costs  of  importing  countries  in  the  third 
world.  It  is  likely  that  for  these  importers  borrowing  at  German 
market  interest  rates  represents  a  source  of  cheap  financing  not 
available  to  them  on  the  private market.  Unfortunately,  our data are 
not  sufficiently  disaggregated  to  identify  the  alternative  market 
conditions  for  each  individual  export  financing  contract.  Such 
information  is  essential  to  avoid  major  distortions  in  subsidy 
estimates. 
Secondly,  part  of  the  loans  to  developing  countries  are  financed  by 
the  public  budget  in  the  framework  of  the  European  Recovery  Program 
(ERP).  The  ERP  provides  a  revolving credit of  DM  500 million as  well 
as  a  yearly allocation  that  is  reimbursed  to  the  government  when  the 
loans  are  amortised.  In  the  definition of  the  EC.  the  use  of  public 
funds  would  point  to  subsidization.  Unfortunately,  the  yearly 
accounts  of  the  KFW  do  not allow us  to  separate  the part of  the  export 
financing  that  is  financed  by  public  funds  from  the  amount  that  is 
fincanced  by market  funds  in  the  form  of  loans  taken up  by  the  KFW  on 
domestic and  foreign capital markets. 
B 
2.  A  second  form  of  export  financing  concerns  commercial v  Loans 
financed  by  KFW  Market  funds.  Those  loans  are  granted  at  market 
interest  rates  to  non~eveloping countries.  Here,  one  suspects  that 
the  implied  subsidies  are  relatively  small  because  exporters  or 
importers  would  have  been  able  to  attract  export  financing  on  the 
private market at comparable  rates. 
3.  Loans  in  connection  with  the  financing  of  Aircraft  and  Ships 
represent  a  third  form  of  export  credit  financing.  Here  again.  we 
lack  the necessary  information  to estimate  the  implied subsidies. 
4.  Finally  the  KFW  also provides grants under  the Shipyard Assistance 
Program.  This  program  aims  at  facilitating  the  purchase  of  ships  by 
foreign buyers and presumably contains a  large subsidy element. T
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Table  25  provides  a  summary  of  the  KFW' s  export  financing.  The 
figures  indicate  total  loans  and  grants  as  they  are  reported  in  the 
KFW's  annual  accounts.  For  reasons  mentioned  above,  we  lack  the 
information  to  compute  subsidy-equivalents.  In  spite  of  this.  the 
total  figures  reveal  an  evolution  comparable  to  what  we  found  in  the 
other  three  countries.  A  strong  expansion  of  export  credits  in  the 
period  1979-1984  is  followed  by  a  levelling off  and  even  a  reduction 
in the period  1985-1987.  The  fact  that  those  subperiods coincide with 
increasing respectively decreasing market  interest rates suggests  that 
the  evolution  in  implied  subsidy-equivalents  would  be  even  more 
marked. 
Table  25  further  reveals  that  export credits  in  the  form  of  loans  for 
capital  goods  and  related  services  are  primarily  responsible  for  the 
pattern  in  the  total  figures  described  above.  There  are  reasons  to 
believe  that  export  credits  were  used  to  maintain  exports  of  these 
products  and  services  during  the  slump  in  international  trade  in  the 
early  1980's.  Conversely,  no  clear  pattern  is  observed  in  loans  to 
the aircraft  industry and grants  to  the  shipbuilding  industry. 
Finally.  it  is  interesting  to  note  that  export  credits  are  directed 
towards  industries which are also among  the  main  beneficiaries  of  the 
French and British export credit system. 
In Table  26  a  regional  disaggregation  of  the  KFW  loans  is given.  We 
find  that,  in  the  period  1978-1987,  between  64%  and  98%  of  total 
export  credit  loans  relate  to  exports  to  developing  countries,  which 
make  it probable  that  subsidization  took  place.  A  comparison  among 
country  groups  learns  that  the  share  of  developing  countries  on  the 
American  continent  is  gradually  declining.  As  a  consequence,  Asian 
developing  countries  have  become  the  primary  targets  of  the  German 
export credit program. T
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a.2.  AusfuhrKredit-Gesselschaft  (AKA) 
As  mentioned earlier,  AKA  is a  syndicate of  commercial  banks  aimed at 
financing export credits.  The  government  is not  involved directly nor 
indirectly  through  public  financial  institutions.  The  absence  of 
publicly controlled financial  institutions differentiates AKA  from  its 
Belgian counterpart Creditexport. 
This  difference  is  essential  in  determining  wh~ther  AKA  provides 
export  credit  subsidies.  AKA  makes  a  distinction between Funds  A,  B. 
and  C.  The  resources  for  Funds  A  and  C  come  from  member  states  at 
market  interest  rates  and  cannot  be  considered  as  a  subsidy.  The 
loans  related  to  Fund  B  are  obtained  by  rediscounting  by  the 
Bundesbank  at  1.5%  above  the  Bundesbank  interest  rate,  but  usually 
below  market  rates.  This  rediscounting  faci 1 i ty  is  1 imi ted  to  DM  5 
billion and  is generallly used  to  finance  buyer  credits  up  to  70%  of 
the contract value.  In  1988,  Fund  B  financed  DM  814 million of  export 
credits,  which  is  a  relatively  small  amount  in  comparison  to  KFW 
export credits. 
Fund  A  and  Fund  B  loans  can be  combined.  In  that  case,  the  composite 
interest  rate must  adhere  to  the  interest rate provisions  of  the  OECD 
consensus,  since government  supported  funds are  involved.  If  the  rate 
is below Consensus  rates,  the  exporter has  to  pay  the  difference  to  a 
non-profit  organization  named  by  AKA  upon  expiration  of  the  export 
credit.  We  have  no  information  of  how  this  principle  is  applied  in 
practice. 
B.  OFFICIAL  DEVELOPMENT  ASSISTANCE 
German  official  development  assistance  is  given  by  {i}  the  German 
government,  {ii}  loans and grants by  the  KFW. T
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The  Federal  Republic  of  Germany  provides  official  development 
assistance  in  the  form  of  loans  and grants.  Part  of  this aid is on a 
multilateral  basis  (for  instance  contributions  to  international 
institutions}  and  is  not  likely  to  lead  to  any  export  subsidization. 
Yet,  most  of  the  development  assistance  is  contracted  on  a  bilateral 
basis  and  takes  the  form  of  grants  and  long-term  loans.  The  average 
maturity  of  the  loans  was  36.2  years  in  1987  with  a  grace  period  of 
approximately  5  years.  The  interest  rate  paid  on  the  loans  is  very 
low e.g.  2.67%  in 1986 and  2.78%  in 1987. 
The  other  type  of  German  official  development  aid  is made  up  by  loans 
and grants  by  the  KFW  at  favorable  conditions  which are  financed  from 
general  budget  funds.  This  form  of  export  support  is  aimed  at 
developing  countries  and  is most  often  tied  to  a  specific development 
project. 
Table  27  presents  empirical  evidence  on  German  official  development 
assistance.  Total  aid  for  1980-1986  adds  up  to  57.6  billion  DM 
between  1980-1986,  which  is  more  than  double  the  amount  of  export 
credits  given  in  this  period.  Direct  bilateral  aid  by  the  German 
governments  accounts  for  64.3 % of  total aid.  There  is no  noticeable 
expansion  in  the  period  considered,  which  suggests  that  official 
development  may  have declined  in real  terms. 
A  sectoral  disaggregation  of  project-tied  commitments  by  the  KFW  is 
found  in  Table  28  for  1985  and  1986.  The  data  indicate  a  clear 
orientation  towards  typical  development  projects  such as  Agriculture. 
Transport and Communications,  Social  infrastructure and Energy.  It is 
hard  to  evaluate  the  benefits  German  companies  derive  from  this  type 
of  development projects. T
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C.  EXPORT  INSURANCE 
In  Germany,  export  insurance  is  granted  by  Hermes  to  exports  of  all 
destinations.  The  reports  by  Hermes  provide  a  consistent data set on 
transactions  for  the German government  only.  Tables  29 and 30 present 
the  subsidy  estimates  in  respectively  the  ex-post  and  ex-ante 
approach.  A  picture comparable  to  the  other  countries  emerges.  When 
related  to  the value of  exports,  export  insurance subsidies are small. 
As  a  percentage  of  insured contracts,  we  find  that  subidies  excluding 
recoveries  increase  markedly  in  the  1980's  to  reach a  maximum  of  6.5% 
{3.7%)  in  1987  in  the  ex-post  (ex-ante)  approach.  Including 
recoveries  the  rates  of  subsidization  are  lower  but,  as  mentioned 
before,  the  data  on  debt  consolidations are  harder  to  interprete.  A 
striking  feature  of  the  German  case  is  the  strong buildup  of deficits 
in  the  last  three years  of  the  sample. 
V.  <DNCLUSION 
In  this  chapter,  we  estimated  the  subsidies  implicit  in  export 
financing  programs.  We  provided  estimates  for  export  credits,  export 
insurance  and  Official  Development  Assistance  in  France,  Belgium, 
Germany and  the United  Kingdom. 
An  important  part  of  this  chapter  is  taken  up  by  methodological 
issues.  In an  effort  to  adopt  a  consistent  definition  for  all  forms 
of  export  financing,  c!.  subsidy  was  defined  as  the  benefit  for  the 
exporting  firm.  This  benefit  can  arise  from  both  an  increase  in 
revenue  or  a  reduction  in costs.  In particular,  buyer  export  credits 
and  Official  Development  Assistance  raise  revenue  while  export 
insurance  subsidies and  supplier export credits reduce costs. T
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The  benefit  for  the  exporting  firm  can be  estimated by using  the Cost 
Difference  or  Net  Present  Value  methods  found  in  the  literature. 
These methods are generally used  to measure cost reductions.  They are 
therefore  reasonably  well  sui ted  to  compute  subsidy-equivalents  in 
supplier  credits  and  export  insurance.  although  for  the  latter  some 
additional  choices  had  to  be  made.  For  revenue  increasing  subsidies 
the available  methods  are  less adequate  because  they  measure  the gain 
for  the  importer  rather  than  the benefit  for  the  firm.  As  is usually 
the  case  in  this kind  of  studies.  one  should  therefore  interprete  the 
obtained  estimates  with  the  necessary  caution.  This  is particularly 
true  for  cross-country  comparisons  where  institutional  and  accounting 
factors  further  complicate  the  comparison  between  export  financing 
schemes. 
Turning  to  the  empirical  results.  we  conclude  that.  on  the  whole. 
export  credits  have  been  the  most  important  source  of  export 
subsidization.  This  is particularly  true  for  France where  the average 
rate  of  subsidization  went  up  to  4-5%  in  the  early  1980's  and  where 
subsidies  in  some  industries amounted  to  10%  of  the  value  of  eligible 
exports.  Export  credit  subsidies  in  Belgium  and  the  United  Kingdom 
were  much  lower  with  rates  of  subsidization  well  below  2%  and  often 
less  than  1%. 
A  clear  time  pattern  is  found  in  export 
countries.  In  the  late  seventies  and 
credit  subsidies  of  all 
early  eighties.  a  sharp 
expansion  of  outstanding  credits  and  implicit  subsidies  is  observed. 
To  some  extent.  this  expansion  forms  a  deliberate  at  tempt  to  offset 
the negative  consequences  on exports  of  the  stagnation  in world  trade. 
An  even  more  important  explanation  is  perhaps  the  sharp  rise  in 
interest  rates  which  led  to  a  substantial  differential  between  market 
and  OECD  Consensus  rates.  Falling  interest  rates  combined  with  a 
recovery  of  most  industrial  economies  explain  the  marked  reduction  in 
export credit subsidization in the mid  1980's.  All  of  this highlights 
the  sensitivity  of  export  credit  subsidies  to  changes  in  interest 
rates.  world  trade and  the  institutional set-up of  the  OECD  COnsensus. - 92  -
The  subsidies  implicit in export  insurance are not all  that  large when 
related  to  total  export values.  Rates  of  subsidization are generally 
well  below  1%.  The  United  Kingdom.  Belgium  and  France  provide  more 
insurance  subsidies  than  Germany  although  the  German  figures  comprise 
only state-related export  insurance. 
In  spite of  the  low  rates  of  subsidization.  there are  several  reasons 
for  not  discarding  possible  competitive  effects  of  export  insurance 
subsidies  thoughtlessly.  The  estimation  of  insurance  subsidies  does 
not  take  into  account  administrative  and  other  costs  of  the  official 
insurance  agency  and  therefore  underestimates  the  implicit  subsidy. 
More  importantly.  our  results  indicate  that  the  subsidy given per  ECU 
of  insured contract  is considerably higher  than  the  subsidy per  ECU  of 
exports.  This  suggests  that  the  export  contracts  that  are  actually 
insured  may  benefit  substantially  from  official  insurance  subsidies. 
In addition.  the  rates of  insurance  subsidization have  started  to  rise 
rapidly  in  the  early  eighties  and  there  is  no  evidence  that  this 
pattern  will  be  reversed  soon.  Unlike  the  sixties  and  seventies. 
official  insurance  agencies  now  accumulate  sustained  losses  because 
premia  have  not  been  adjusted  to  the  riskier  international 
environment.  It  is  not  very  likely  that  future  recoveries  will  be 
sufficient  to  compensate  past  losses.  If  this  trend  continues.  the 
role  of  export  insurance  subsidies  may  become  significantly  more 
important  in  the  coming  years.  This  conclusion applies  equally  well 
to all countries considered  in  this  study. 
Another  reason  to cautiously evaluate  the  competitive  impact  of  export 
financing  schemes.  comes  from  the  industry  disaggregation  for  France 
and  the  United  Kingdom.  It  was  found  that  most  of  the  export  credit 
and  insurance  subsidies  are  directed  towards  a  limited  number  of 
industries.  This  concentration  leads  to  high  rates  of  subsidization 
in industries  such as Construction and Services,  Transport Equipment. 
Electrical  Equipment.  Nonelectrical  Machinery  and  Automobiles.  Very 
often.  the  same  industries  receive  the  bulk  of  export  credits  and 
insurance  alike.  It  is  also  remarkable  that  the  United  Kingdom  and - 93  -
France  seem  to  target  their  export  credit  subsidies  at  many  of  the 
same  industries. 
The  impact  of  export  financing  subsidies  may  also  vary  considerably 
across  export  markets.  In  this  respect.  we  found  that  the  Belgian 
export  insurance  system  implies  substantial' subsidies  to  Africa,  the 
former  colonies  and.  to  a  lesser  extent,  to  Eastern Europe.  Part  of 
these  subsidies  were  paid  in  the  form  of  higher  insurance  premia  on 
exports  to- non-EC countries  in Western Europe. 
In assessing  the  competitive distortions arising from  export  insurance 
subsidies,  the distinction between state-related and  other activities 
was  found  to  be  important.  In  the  last  decade  or  so.  Belgian  and 
French  export  subsidization  rates  have  been  significantly  higher  for 
contracts  insured on account  of  the  respective governments. 
Finally,  export  insurance  may  have  a  direct  impact  on  intra-EC  trade. 
Unlike  export  credits,  official  insurance  in Germany,  France,  and  the 
United  Kingdom  is  provided  on  exports  to  EC  and  non-EC  countries 
alike.  Unfortunately.  we  lack  the  data  to  compute  separate  insurance 
subsidy  rates  on  exports  to  EC  markets.  In Belgium,  export  insurance 
is  1 imi ted  to  non-EC  markets  so  that  the  competitive  distortions  on 
the  Community  market  are  expected  to  be  smaller.  The  exclusion  of 
intra-EC exports  is also reflected  in a  significantly smaller  share of 
total exports  insured by  the Belgian official  insurance agency.  o 
For  Belgium,  we  were  able  to  obtain  regionally  disaggregated  data  on 
state  to  state  credits  which  are  a  form  of  export-related  Official 
Development  Assistance.  When  related  to  eligible  exports,  we  find 
low  subsidization  rates  of  less  than  0.  6%.  As  this  represents  the 
gain for  the  importing country.  the benefit  for  the  exporting firm  may 
be  lower  still.  The  time  pattern  of  state  to  state grants  is  very 
comparable  to  the  evolution of  export  credits  with  a  strong  expansion 
in  the  early  80's  and  a  reversal  of  the  trend  afterwards.  Most 
interesting  is  the  regional  concentration of  the  subsidies  in  a  small 
number  of  countries  including  Zaire,  China,  Indonesia,  Turkey  and - 94  -
India.  This  suggests again that  the actual  support  for  Belgian firms, 
exporting  to  these  countries,  is more  extensive  than  suggested by  the 
average  subsidization rates. 
Total  German  official  development  assistance  exceeds  the  funds 
involved  in export  credit  financing.  In contrast  to  the  time  pattern 
of  export credits and  export  insurance  in  the  1980's,  official German 
development  aid  stagnated  in  nominal  terms  and  therefore  declined  in 
real  terms.  The  available  sectorally  disaggregated  information  did 
not allow us  to evaluate  the benefits of  German  development assistance 
for  German exporting firms. 
Where  does  all  this  leave  us  for  the  study  of  the  distortionary 
effects of  export  financing  schemes  ?  We  view export  financing as  one 
among  many  determinants  of  export  performance  whose  overall  impact  is 
hard  to  assess.  The  competitive  position  of  certain  industries  as 
well  as  exports  to  specific  countries  may  well  have  benefited 
substantially  from  the  existing  export  support  programs.  In  this 
respect,  not  only  the  magnitude  of  the  subsidy  but  also  factors  as 
market  structure,  dernand.conditions  and  comparative  advantage  play an 
important  role.  In  order  to  analyze  those  determinants  into  more 
detai  1,  the  first  part  of  next  chapter  develops  a  theoretical  model 
for  the export  financing  subsidies considered  in  this  study. - 95  -
Chapter III 
TilE OOMPETITIVE  EFFECfS OF  EXPORT  FINANCING  SUBSIDIES 
I.  INTRODUCfiON 
In this chapter we  analyze  the  impact  of  export  financing  subsidies on 
competition  between France,  Belgium,  Germany  and  the  United  Kingdom. 
The  chapter  is divided  in  two  parts.  In  a  first part presented here, 
the  theoretical  aspects  of  the  relation between  export  financing  and 
competitiviness  is  discussed.  We  will  show  that  several  factors, 
related  to  market  structure as  well  as  to  cost  and  demand  conditions 
are  essential  to  understand  the  transmission  from  subsidization  to 
export  performance.  A  clear  understanding  of  these  determinants  will 
help us  in the  second part of  this chapter  to  interprete  the empirical 
evidence on  the competitive effects of export  financing  subsidies. 
This  theoretical  part  starts  off  with  a  model  of  international 
oligopoly  which  incorporates  the  different  forms  of  export  financing 
considered  in Chapter  II.  This  model  is  then  explicitly  solved  for 
export production and  export prices  by  competing  countries  on  a  third 
market. 
Based  on  this model,  Section III  shows  that export  financing  subsidies 
by  a  government  agency  stimulate  exports  of  the  subsidized  firms  at 
the  expense  of  firms  in countries  that  do  not  provide  subsidies.  The 
price paid by  the  importer  falls.  The  market  share  of  the  subsidized 
firms  expands  unless  the  other  exporting  countries  decide  to  provide 
favorable  export  financing conditions  too. - 96  -
Section III also isolates several determinants  of  the effectiviness of 
export  financing  subsidies  in stimulating exports.  Not  surprisingly. 
the  size  of  the  subsidy  is  important.  Essential  is  also  that  the 
country has  a  comparative  advantage  in  the  subsidized  industries.  In 
addition.  the  price  elasticity  of  market  demand,  the  degree  of 
competition  in  the  industry,  and  characteristics  of  sectoral  and 
regional  product  differentiation  play  an  important  role.  We  relate 
these  aspects  to  some  empirical  evidence  about  import  demand 
elasticities and concentration ratios.  0 
Section  IV  expands  the  model  to  incorporate  spi 11-over  effects  of 
export  financing  subsidies across  export  markets.  Economies  of  scale 
or  learning effects  in production,  research and  development.  sales  or 
distribution  make  it  plausible  that  export  financing  subsidies  on 
exports  to  say  non-EC  markets  improve  export  performance  on  the  EC 
market.  This  point  is  relevant  because  estimates  for  economies  of 
scale  suggest  that  several  of  the  industries  receiving  export 
financing  subsidies  are  characterized  by  significant  economies  of 
scale. 
In  Section  V,  we  present  some  tentative  empirical  findings  on  the 
relation  between  export  financing  programs  and  export  performance  on 
third markets  for  Belgium,  France,  Germany  and  the  United  Kingdom. 
Section  V  summarizes  the  results  and  discusses  the  main  implications 
for  EC  competition policy. 
II.  A  MODEL  OF  INTERNATIONAL  OLIGOPOLY 
2. 1  Assumptions 
In  this  section,  we  use  a  partial  equilibrium,  conjectural  variation 
model  of  international  oligopoly  based  on  Dixit  {1988,  p  57-61}  to 
analyze  the  consequences  of  export  subsidies.  The  analysis  focusses - 97  -
on  a  typical  EC  country,  denoted  as  the  domestic  country.  Only  one 
oligopolized  industry  with  n  domestic  firms  is  considered.  Although 
domestic  firms  may  be  selling  their  products  in different  countries, 
complete  market  segmentation  and  constant  marginal  costs  is  assumed. 
These  assumptions  will  be  relaxed  later  but,  for  now.  allow  us  to 
focus  on each market  separately. 
In  what  follows.  competition  on  one  representative  third  market  is 
considered.  A  third  market  is  a  non-OECD  market  in  the  case  of 
official  development  assistance  or  export  credits,  but  can  be  any 
market  when  export  insurance  is  considered.  In  this  third  market,  n 
domestic  firms  compete  with nf  foreign  firms,  part of  which  come  from 
other  EC  countries.  The  domestic  and  the  foreign  good  are  imperfect 
substitutes  in  consumption.  It  should  be  clear  that  "domestic"  and 
"foreign"  refer  to  the  country  of  origin of  the  exporting  firms  and 
not  to  the  importing country. 
We  consider  a  symmetric  equilibrium  where  each  home  (foreign}  firm 
exports  x  (y}  and  earns  profit  1r  (1rf}  on  the  third  market.  Total 
consumption on  the  third market  is  the  sum  of  total domestic exports  X 
= nx and  total  foreign exports  Y = nfy. 
2.2.  Export  financing subsidies.  costs and market  demand 
The  domestic  government  provides  export  subsidies  either  directly  or 
indirectly  through private agencies.  As  in Chapter  II.  a  distinction 
is made  between  cost  reducing  and  revenue  increasing  export  financing 
subsidies. 
Export  insurance  subsidies  and  supplier  export  credits  reduce  export 
financing  costs  for  the  firm.  We  showed  in  Chapter  II  that  the 
domestic exporting firm's profits,  Tr,  can be written as  : - 98  -
where  Pc  is  the  contract  price,  C  =  domestic  average  cost  without 
export  financing  and  9  measures  the  domestic  firm's  export  financing 
cost  per  ECU  of  export  contract.  A  higher  export  insurance  or 
supplier  credit  subsidy  leads  to  a  smaller  9  and  hence  lowers  total 
costs and  raises profits  for  the domestic exporting firm. 
The  second  type  of  subsidies  comprises  development  assistance  and 
buyer  export  credits.  As  discussed  in  Chapter  II.  these  export 
subsidies  improve  the  financing  costs  for  the  importer  and  therefore 
lower  the  price  for  the  importer  below  the  contract  price  Pc. 
specifically.  we  write 
(1) 
More 
In  this  equation.  P  is  the  importer's  price  for  export  goods  from  the 
domestic country.  This price amounts  to  the contract price Pc  reduced 
by  the  favorable  export  financing  conditions  in  the  form  of  buyer 
credits  or  development  assistance.  The  parameter  -r5  measures  the 
importer's price  reduction  factor  due  to  export  financing  which.  from 
here  on.  is referred  to as  the  import price  factor. 
Buyer  credits  and  development  assistance  make  goods  cheaper  for  the 
importer  and  stimulate  demand  for  the  exporting  firms'  products.  This 
effect  is  formalized  in an  import  demand  function  which  reflects  the 
importer's  willingness  to  pay  for  imports.  Assuming  a  linear 
specification.  we  write  the demand  function  for  export  products  of  the 
domestic country as  : 
X  =  ~ - b P  + k pf  (2a) 
where  pf  =price of  the  foreign product  in  the  importing country. - 99  -
All  parameters  in  equation  (2a.)  are  positive.  The  coefficient  ~ 
relates domestic exports  to changes  in the price paid by  the  importer. 
More  favorable payment  conditions  for  the  importer decrease  P  and  lead 
to higher demand  for  domestic exports. 
Furthermore,  the parameter k reflects  the assumption  that domestic and 
foreign  goods  are  substitutes.  In  effect,  a  lower  foreign  price 
shifts  the  importer's  demand  away  from  domestically  produced  exports. 
For  this  reason,  buyer  credits  or  development  assistance  from  the 
foreign  to  the  importing  country have  a  negative  impact  on  demand  for 
exports  from  the domestic country. 
Similarly,  we  write market  demand  for  the  foreign export product as 
y  =  ~f  - k p  +  ~f  pf  (2b) 
Equations  (2a)  and  (2b)  can  be  inverted  to  obtain  inverse  demand 
functions,  which  represent  the  demand  constraint  for  the  exporting 
firms  on  the  third market  considered here  : 
P  = a  - b  X - k  Y 
pf  = af  - k  X  - bfy 
(3) 
(4) 
Equation  (3)  gives  the  price  the  importer  is  willing  to  pay  for  the 
domestic  product  as  a  function  of  total  exports  by  the  domestic  and 
the  foreign  country.  Equation  (4)  presents  the  same  information  for 
the  foreign  export  product. 
here. 
Two  important  points  should  be  noted 
First,  inverse  market  demand  for  domestic  and  foreign  firms  is 
downward  sloping  :  higher  domestic  (foreign)  production  leads  to  a 
lower  price  for  the  domestic  (foreign)  product.  The  slope  of  the 
inverse  demand  curves  is  given  by  b  for  domestic  and  bf  for  foreign 
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Secondly,  domestic  and  foreign  products  are  substitutes.  Because  an 
increase  in  foreign  production  results  in  a  lower  price  of  foreign 
products,  consumers  buy  more  of  the  foreign  good  and  reduce  their 
spending  on  exports  from  the  home  country.  Likewise,  an expansion of 
domestic production reduces  demand  for  the  foreign product. 
The  degree  of  substitutability  is  reflected  in  the  parameter  k.  A 
large k  indicates  limited product differentiation between  the domestic 
and  the  foreign  good.  In  the  extreme  case  of  homogeneous  products. 
the  consumers  do  not  differentiate  between  the  goods.  which  would 
imply  b  =  bf  =  k  and~=  b  bf- k
2  =  0.  In all other cases,  ~) 0. 
2.3 Profit maximization and  equilibrium 
Domestic  firms  maximize  profits.  With  the  assumption  of  market 
segmentation and  constant  marginal  costs,  this  amounts  to  maximizing 
the profit on each market  separately  : 
~ = [Pc(l-9)  - CJ  x =  [P(l-9}  - C]  x  (5) 
-rs 
subject  to  the  inverse  demand  equation  (3). 
Using  the  superscript  f  for  foreign variables,  foreign  firms  maximize 
profits  : 
(6) 
subject  to  equation  (4). 
For  the  third  market  considered  here,  the  profit-maximizing 
first-order condition for  any domestic  firm  becomes - 101  -
P-XV=  C  --- (7) 
"Ys  1-8 
This  is  the  familiar  condition  that  marginal  revenue  should  be  equal 
to marginal  cost.  Marginal  revenue  is  found at  the  left hand  side of 
the  equation  and  is  higher  for  a  smaller  import  price  factor  -r8 
buyer  credits  and  development  assistance  raise  marginal  revenue  by 
stimulating  demand  for  domestic  exports.  Export  insurance  and 
supplier  credit  subsidies  lead  to  a  smaller  e  and  therefore  lower 
marginal  costs at  the  right hand side of  equation (7). 
Furthermore,  V  is  the  domestic  aggregate  conjectural  variation 
parameter  : 
where  the  superscripts  d  and  f  refer  to  the  foreign  and  the  domestic 
country.  In  this  expression,  vdd  (vdf)  denotes  the  amount  by  which 
each  domestic  firm  believes  that  each  other  domestic  (each  foreign) 
firm  will  respond  to  a  unit  increase  in  the  output  of  the  domestic 
firm. 
The  domestic  aggregate  conjectural  variation parameter  V  reflects  the 
domestic  exporting  firms'  conjectures  of  how  much  the  import  price of 
the  domestic  product  will  fall  when  they  increase  their  production 
marginally.  A  smaller  V  indicates  that  domestic  firms  do  not  feel 
they  have  a  large  impact  on  the  price  of  their  product .  In  the 
extreme  case  of  V  =  0,  domestic  firms  act  as  perfect  competitors. 
Conversely,  large  values  for  V  reveals  a  significant  degree  of 
p~rceived market  power  by domestic  firms. 
There  is  a  first-order  condition  for  each  market  to  which  domestic 
firms are exporting.  For  foreign  firms  we  obtain an analogous  set of - 102  -
first-order  conditions. 
obtain: 
For  the  third  market  cons ide  red  here.  we 
pf  _  y  yr  =  cr 
-rs  1-9f 
The  superscript  f  refers  to  the 
aggregate  conjectural  variation 
[bf {1+{nf-1)vff}+nvfd]/nf  and has an 
foreign  country. 
parameter  yf  is 
(8) 
The  foreign 
equal  to 
interpretation analogous  to  V. 
The  first-order  conditions  (7)  and  {8)  can be  solved  for  domestic  and 
foreign exports  to  the  third market  considered here  : 
X  {bf +Vf)  c  ....,.s  +  k  cr  ....,.r 
=  z  - s 
-- {9) 
n  1-9  n  1-9r 
y  zf  k  c  'Ys  - {b+V)  cr  'Yf 
=  +  s 
-- {10) 
n  1-9  n  1-ef 
where  0  = (b  +  V)  {bf  +  Vf)- k
2  ~ 0  ~  0,  and  z  and  zf  are constants. 
From  (9)  and  {10),  the  evolution  of  market  shares  is  derived  easily. 
In effect,  the  market  share  of  domestic  exporting  firms  is defined as 
X/(X+Y). 
The  equilibrium  import  prices  on  the  third  market  of  exports  by  the 
domestic and  foreign country are  : 
p  =  m +  +  kV 
n 
{11) - 103  -
pf  =  mf  +  kVf  c  "Ys  +  (~ +bfV)  cr 
"Yf 
(12)  s  --- n  1-9  n  1-ef 
Here again.  m and  mf  are constants. 
I I I.  THE  EFFECfS  OF  EXPORT  FINANCING  SUBSIDIES ON  EXPORTS 
TO  NON-EC  MARKETS 
From  equations  (9)-(  12)  the  effects  of  export  financing  on  export 
quantities,  prices and  market  shares  can be  derived.  Three  important 
effects of  export  subsidies can be distinguished. 
First,  subsidized export  financing  leads  to an export  expansion by  the 
subsidized  firms.  Consider  export  financing  subsidies granted by  the 
government  of  the domestic country.  As  a  result of  the  subsidies,  the 
importer  pays  a  lower  price  for  goods  and  services  from  the 
subsidizing  exporting  country.  The  importer  buys  more  products  from 
the domestic country.  Domestic  firms  experience an expansion of  their 
market  share. 
The  model  allows  us  to  mathematically  specify  the  relation  between 
export  financing  subsidies  by  the  domestic  government  and  export 
performance  of  domestic  firms.  Consider  an  increase  in  development 
assistance or buyer  credits which  reduces  the  import price of  domestic 
exports  by  1  percent  {d  ~s  =- 1%).  Equation  (9)  indicates  that  this 
would  raise  total  domestic  exports  to  the  third  market  by  (bf+Vf)  C 
0 
1  percent.  Similarly,  a  subsidy  that  reduces  the  cost  of  export 
1-8 
insurance  by  1%  (de=- 1%)  stimulates  exports  by  (bf+Vf)  C  ~s 
n  ....,..(  1--e-)--.y 2 
percent.  It  is  important  to  see  that  the  ratio  (bf+Vf)  C  matters  in 
n 
the  transmission  from  export  financing  to  exports  for  both  cost - 104  -
reducing  and  revenue  increasing  subsidies.  This  symmetry  indicates 
that  the  same  factors  determine  the  success  of  export  subsidies  in 
diverting market  share  towards  domestic  exporting  firms.  This  is not 
surprising because  those  determinants  are  re~ated  to  market  structure 
as  well  as  to  demand  and  cost  conditions,  which  are  relevant  to  the 
firm  irrespective of  the  form  of  the  subsidy. 
A  second  effect  concerns  the  effects  of  export  financing  on 
nonsubsidized firms.  We  find  that export  financing  reduces quantities 
exported  and  prices  charged  by  nonsubsidized  firms.  Again  consider 
subsidized official export  financing by  the domestic government,  which 
lowers  the  import  price  of  domestic  exports.  To  the  degree  that 
foreign  and  domestic  products  are  substitutes  in  demand,  the  importer 
replaces  exports  of  foreign  firms  by  goods  produced  in  the  domestic 
country. 
market 
Foreign  firms  are  confronted  with  a  decline  in  demand  and 
share.  They  lower  their  price  to  regain  some  of  the  lost 
market  share. 
This  effect  can  be  seen  from  equations  ( 10)  and  ( 12).  Subsidized 
export  financing  by  the  .domestic  country,  which  causes  a  decline  in 
the  ratio  ~s  by  1%,  reduces  foreign  exports  by  k  C  percent  and  the 
1-e  n 
import price of  the  foreign product  by  kVf  C  percent.  The  contraction 
n 
in  foreign  exports  raises  the  market  share  of  domestic  exporting 
firms. 
A  third  and  final  effect  has  to  do  with  the  degree  of  countervaiLing 
export  financing  subsidies by governments  of  competing countries. 
The gains  in market  share due  to  subsidized export  financing  depend  on 
the  subsidy  policies  of  other  countries.  In  equations  (9)  and  (11), 
we  find  that  an  increase  in  subsidies  by  the  foreign  country,  w~ich 
,f 
lowers  s  by  1  percent,  causes  a  decline  in domestic exports  by 
1-er 
k  cf  percent  while  the  price  of  domestic  exports  would  fall  by  kV  cf 
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percent.  In  this  way.  foreign  subsidies  may  neutralize  and  even 
reverse  the  export  expansion  from  subsidies  by  the  domestic 
government.  The  ultimate  impact  on  market  shares  depends  on  the 
magnitude and effectiviness of  export  subsidies by  the  foreign and  the 
domestic  country.  Insofar as  advantageous  export  financing  is common 
practice  in  most  EC  countries.  it  is  possible  that  even  large 
subsidies  do  not achieve major  changes  in market  shares. 
This  has  important  consequences  for  the  study  of  the  competitive 
effects  of  export  subsidies.  Indeed,  export  promotion  may  sti  11 
distort  competition,  even  if  one  does  not  observe  any  significant 
changes  in market  shares  or  export prices.  As  we  found  that  the bulk 
of  export  financing  subsidies by  France and  the  U.K  are directed  to  a 
comparable  group  of  industries.  this  scenario  should  be  taken 
seriously.  In  such  situation,  it  is  advisable  to  act  against 
subsidization even  if no  clear proof  of  competitive distortions can be 
established.  This  would  protect  countries  that are  not  subsidizing. 
It would  also benefit  the  subsidizing countries  that are  drawn  into  a 
costly subsidization program  that does not produce any clear benefits. 
but  from  which  they  do  not  want  to  retreat  out  of  fear  that 
competitors will  continue  to  subsidize. 
From  the  mathematical  analysis  of  the  three  effects  considered above, 
it becomes  clear  that  the  link between export  financing  subsidies and 
market  shares  is determined  by  the  magnitude  of  the  parameters  of  the 
model.  In what  follows,  we  analyze  this relationship  in closer detail 
by discussing  the  economic  interpretation of  the various coefficients. 
Insofar as possible,  we  also provide  some  empirical  estimates of  their 
magnitude.  The  chosen approach highlights  several  industry and  market 
characteristics  that  are  of  interest  for  assessing  the  competitive 
distortions arising  from  subsidized export  financing. - 106  -
3.1 The  size of  the  subsidy 
It  is  evident  that  the  effectiveness  of  an  export  subsidy  in 
stimulating exports  depends  on  the  size  of  the  subsidy.  Information 
on  the  subsidy-equivalents of  export  financing subsidies as well as on 
their  sectoral  and  regional  disaggregation  were  presented  in  Chapter 
II. 
3.2 Cbmparative advantage 
Export  credits  are  only  efficient  in  diverting  market  share  if  they 
are  aimed  at  industries  and  markets  in  which  the  subsidizing  country 
has a  comparative advantage.  In equation (9),  we  find  that  exporters 
from  the  domestic  country  only  succesfully  penetrate  the  market  if 
their  production  cost  does  not  lie  significantly  above  their 
competitors'  cost  level  (  X= 0  for  high values  of  C  and  low values  of 
cf).  Said  differently,  export  subsidies  do  not  improve  export 
performance  when  the  cost  disadvantage  with  respect  to  foreign 
competition is  too  large.  Conversely,  cheap export  financing  does  not 
enhance  market  share  significantly  in  industries  and  markets  where 
domestic exporting  firms  have  a  very strong competitive advantage.  In 
such  cases,  domestic  firms  would  have  dominated  the  market  without 
subsidies  so  that export  subsidization mainly benefits  the  importer  in 
the  form  of  lower  prices.  We  conclude  that  export  subsidies  have  the 
largest  impact  on  the  domestic  market  share  when  cost  differences 
between domestic and  foreign  firms  are not  too  large. 
This  reasoning  would  suggest  that  export  financing  may  have  distorted 
competition  between  France,  Germany,  Belgium  and  the  U.K.  on  third 
markets.  As  factor  endowments,  technology,  and  factor  prices  are 
comparable  in  those  four  countries,  one  expects production costs  to  be 
similar  in  many  industries.  Export  financing  subsidies  can  then 
provide  a  cost  advantage  which  may  be  decisive  in  obtaining  export 
contracts.  This  would  particularly  be  relevant  for  industries  where - 107  -
European  economies  maintain  a  comparative  advantage  vis-a-vis  (some 
of)  their  non-EC  competitors.  As  examples  one  could  mention 
industries  such  as  Nonelectrical  Machinery,  Electrical  Equipment, 
Aircraft,  Autos,  and  Construction  and  Services  which,  based  on  the 
sectoral  data  for  France  and  the  U.K.,  benefited  significantly  from 
subsidized export  financing.  For  other  subsidized  industries  such as 
Iron  and  Steel,  Metals  and  Ships  the  picture  is  less  clear. 
Subsidized  export  financing  may  have  helped  to  divert  contracts  from 
the  one  EC  country  to  the  other  but  the  ultimate  impact  on  export 
performance  is  limited  by  the  fact  that  EC  countries  are  faced  with 
more  cost-efficient non-EC competitors. 
Evidently.  the  comparative  advantage  Jlla.Y  also  stem  from  transport 
costs.  tariffs  and  nontariff  barriers.  In  this  respect,  export 
insurance  subsidies  may  be  particularly  harmful  in  d.istorting 
competition  between  EC  member  states.  As  mentioned  in  previous 
chapters,  official  export  insurance  agencies  are  allowed  to  insure 
exports  to  other  EC  countries.  Any  insurance  subsidy.  which  augments 
the  market  share  of  an  EC  country  on  another  EC  market,  is  therefore 
likely  to hurt other  EC  producers  to  some  extent. 
3.3 Elasticity of  market  demand 
A  price  elastic  market  demand  reinforces  the  export  expansion  of 
domestic  firms  resulting  from  subsidized  export  financing.  while 
limiting  the  price  reductions  to  the  importer.  As  mentioned  before, 
development  assistance  or  buyer  credits  by  the  domestic  country 
decrease  the  import  price  of  domestic  products  directly.  Subsidized 
export  insurance also  leads  to  lower prices as exporting  firms  pass  on 
a  part  of  the  cost  reduction  to  the  buyer.  Elastic  market  demand 
means  that  even  small  price  reductions  entail  a  substantial  expansion 
of  demand.  This  explains  the  effectiveness  of  export  subsidies  in - 108  -
promoting  exports  in  markets  and  industries  where  market  demand  is 
sensitive to price changes. 
Figure  1  illustrates  the  relationship  between  domestic  export 
financing  subidies.  domestic  exports  and  the  elasticity  of  market 
demand  in  the  case  of  cost  reducing  subsidies.  We  assume  that  the 
demand  curve D represents  total  demand  for  domestically produced goods 
on  the  third  market.  The  curve  MC  measures  marginal  cost  of 
0 
producing  total  domestic  exports  and  is  obtained  by  summing  the 
marginal  cost  curves  of  all  individual  domestic  firms.  The  market 
equilibrium  before  subsidization  is  at  the  intersection  of  the 
marginal  cost  curve  MC 
0 
and  the  marginal  revenue  function  MR  . 
0 
Exports  by  the  domestic  country  to  the  third  market  equal  OX  .  The 
0 
importer pays  a  price OP  at point  A  on  demand  curve D. 
0 
The  domestic government  decides  to provide  subsidized export  insurance 
to  domestic  exporters.  This  shifts  the  marginal  cost  curve  from  MC 
to  MC  . 
1 
0 
If  the  demand  and  marginal  revenue  curve  remain  the  same. 
domestic  exports  expand  from  OX  to  OX  and  the  import  price  falls 
0  1 
from  OP  to  OP·  (point  B  on  demand  curve  D).  Now  assume  that  market 
0  1 
demand  is  more  elastic.  In  Figure  1.  we  consider  the  extreme  case 
where  the  market  demand  and  marginal  revenue  curves  are  perfectly 
elastic  at  price  OP  for  export  levels  exceeding  OX  . 
0  0 
In  this 
situation.  cheaper  export  financing  results  in  a  new  equilibrium 
point  at  C  on  the  demand  curve  De.  The  export  expansion  X  X  is 
1  2 
larger  than  with  the  less  elastic  market  demand  curve  but  the  price 
remains  fixed at OP  . 
0 
The  previous  argument  can also  be  shown  mathematically.  In  equation 
(3).  the  coefficient  b  = - d~dP equals  the  inverse  of  the  slope  of Import  Price 
0 
Figure  1 
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the  market  demand  function.  More  elastic  market  demand  implies  a 
smaller  b.  Now  the  ratio  {bf+Vf)  C,  which determines  the  strength of 
n 
the  relation between export  financing and exports,  can be  rewritten as 
A  smaller b  raises  the value of 'this expression and 
(b+V)(bf+Vf)-k
2 
therefore enhances  the production effects of  domestic export  subsidies 
on export performance  of  domestic  firms. 
In addition,  an elastic market  demand strengthens  the negative effects 
of  domestic  export  subsidies  on  foreign  exports.  As  mentioned 
earlier,  even  small  domestic  subsidies  achieve  a  substantial  export 
expansion  of  price  elastic  goods  by  domestic  firms.  The  importer's 
willingness  to  pay  for  foreign  products  falls  accordingly.  In  terms 
of  Figure  1,  foreign  export  firms  would  be  confronted  with an  inward 
shift  of  the  demand  curve  for  their  products.  Mathematically,  the 
negative  impact  between  domestic  export  subsidies  and  foreign  exports 
was  seen  to  depend  on  the  value  of  k  C  = 
n 
k  C  and  is 
(b+V){bf+Vf)-k
2 
larger  in  the case of  a  small  b  (a price elastic market  demand). 
On  the  other  hand.  a  price  elastic market  demand  also  reinforces  the 
effectiveness of  retaliatory subsidies  by  the  foreign  government.  By 
lowering  the  import  price  of  foreign  export  products,  the  foreign 
government  recaptures an  important  part  of  the  lost  market  share.  In 
our  mathematical  model,  the  link  between  foreign  subsidies  and 
domestic  exports  is  determined  by  ~  cf  and  is  stronger  for  small 
0 
values  of  b.  This  implies  that.  with  elastic  market  demand, 
retaliatory  subsidies  are  effective  in  offsetting  the  market  gains 
achieved  by  one  country's  subsidies.  We  conclude  that distortions  of 
competition  between  EC  countries  are  likely  to  be  pronounced  for 
industries  with  price  elastic  demand  prdvided  that  subsidies  are  not 
merely offsetting subsidization by  competing countries. - 111  -
Table  1  Elasticities of  import demand 
Industries 
Rubber products 
Wearing apparel 
Metal  products.  excl.  machinery 
Transport equipment 
Furniture and fixtures.  excl.  metal 
Printing and publishing 
Pottery.  china.  & earthenware 
Industrial chemicals 
Other chemical products 
Plastic products.  n.e.c. 
Footwear 
Other manufacturing  industries 
Other non-metallic mineral  products 
Beverages 
Glass products 
Leather products 
Iron &  steel basic industries 
Non-ferrous metals basic industries 
Textiles 
Tobacco 
Food  products 
Prof.,  photog.  goods.  etc. 
Machinery,  excl.  electrical 
Electrical machinery 
·Petroleum Refineries 
Misc.  prod.  of petr.  & coal 
Wood  products.  excl.  furniture 
Paper and paper products 
Source  Stern.  R.M.  et.al.  {1976). 
ISIC  Import de-
Code  mand  elas-
ticity 
355  -5.26 
322  -3.92 
381  -3.59 
384  -3.28 
332  -3.00 
342  -2.85 
361 
351 
351  -2.53 
356 
324  -2.39 
390  -2.06 
369  -2.00 
313  -1.64 
362  -1.60 
323  -1.58 
371  -1.42 
372  -1.38 
321  -1.14 
314  -1.13 
311/312  -1.13 
385  -1.08 
382  -1.02 
383  -1.00 
353 
354  -0.96 
351  -0.69 
341  -0.55 - 112  -
Table  1  presents  some  estimates of  import  demand elasticities based on 
the  well-known  summary  of  empirical  studies  by  Stern  et  al. (1976). 
Evidently.  those  estimates  should be  interpreted with caution because 
they  are  not  recent  and  do  not  necessarily  apply  to  the  importing 
countries  considered  in  this  study.  The  industry  disaggregation  is 
based on  the  !SIC code and  is comparable but not equal  to  the sectoral 
breakdown  in Chapter  II. 
No  uniform  picture  emerges  from  Table  1.  Of  the  indus tries  that 
received  most  of  the  export  credit  and  export  insurance  subsidies. 
Transport  Equipment  and  Metal  products  are  found  to  have  high  import 
demand  elasticities.  For  those  products  export  financing  subsidies 
may  be  an  effective  way  to  shift  demand  towards  domestic  exporting 
firms.  although  the  fact  that  countries  appear  to  subsidize  the  same 
industries  mitigates  this  effect.  Other  subsidized  industries 
including  Nonelectrical  Machinery  and  Electrical  Machinery  are 
characterized by  inelastic  import  demand.  It follows  that  the  impact 
of  export  financing  subsidies  of  comparable  magnitude  on  export 
perfomance  may  vary considerably across  industries. 
3.4 The  degree of  competition and strategic behavior 
Another  determinant  concerns  the  firms'  perception  of  how  their 
actions  influence  market  behavior.  In  general.  the  impact  of  export 
financing  subsidies on market  shares and  intra-EC competition on  third 
markets  is stronger  in a  more  competitive market  structure. 
First,  we  consider  the  impact  of  subsidized  export  financing  by  the 
domestic  country  on  exports  of  domestic  firms.  In  a  competitive 
industry  with  many  firms,  an  individual  firm  typically  believes  that 
its  export  decisions  has  only  a  limited  impact  on  total  exports  and 
the  market  price.  Take  the  extreme  case  where  domestic  firms  see 
their  demand  curve as horizontal at price  P  in Figure  1.  Firms  have 
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a  strong incentive  to export more  when  subsidized because  they believe 
they  will  get  the  same  price  as  before.  Starting  from  point  A. 
domestic  firms  would  expand  their  exports  by  X  X  .  Let  D  be  the 
0  2 
actual  market  demand  curve  for  domestic  exports. 
exports of  OX  .  the price would fall  to  OP  . 
2  2 
To  absorb  total 
The  decline  in  prices  and  the  expansion  of  exports  would  be  more 
restrained in an oligopolistic market  structure.  Oligopolists attempt 
to  anticipate  how  prices  will  respond  to  their  own  strategy,  taking 
into  account  the  expected  reactions  of  their  competitors.  They 
realize  that  part  of  the  profit  gains  from  increasing  exports  in 
response  to  export  subsidies  is  compensated  by  a  decline  in  prices. 
Assume  that  their  conjectures  about  the  evolution  of  demand  are 
consistent with  the actual  market  demand  curve  D.  Then point  B  would 
be  reached  with a  smaller  export  expansion X  X  and  a  higher price  P 
0  1  1 
than  in  the  case of  more  competitive market  structures. 
The  relation  between  market  structure  and  the  competitive  effects  of 
export  financing  is  also  seen  fr·om  equation  {9).  As  explained 
earlier.  the  domestic  conjectural  variations  parameter  measures  how 
much  a  domestic  firm  perceives  the  price  to  fall  in  response  to  a 
marginal  increase  in  exports.  A  low  V  implies  competitive  market 
behavior  and  raises  {bf +Vf)  C  As  a  consequence,  domestic 
{b+V) {bf +Vf )-k
2 
exports  to  third  markets  expand  more  in  more  competitive  market 
structures.  Note  that  V  is  negatively  related  to  the  number  of 
domestic  firms  in  the  industry.  This  implies  that  export  subsidies 
distort  competition  between  EC  countries  less  in  industries  with  a 
high degree  of  concentration. 
A  look  at  equations  {9)  and  {10)  learns  that  a  low  value  of  V  also 
reinforces  tl1e  foreign export  contraction as a  consequence  of domestic 
subsidies  as  weLL  as  the  decLine  in  domestic  exports  resuLting  from 
foreign  export  financing.  The  larger  price  reduction  of  domestic - 114  -
Table  2  Concentration ratio's in World  and Belgian Production"{-1982) 
Industry  NACE  World Con- Belgian 
Code  centration  Concen-
Ratio  tration 
Ratio 
Tobacco  429  0.76  0.86 
Instrument Engineering  37  0.65  0.57 
Office Machinery  33  0.57  0.61 
Rubber  Products  481/482  0.57  0.75 
Aircraft Construction  364  0.41  0.95 
Automobiles  351  0.39  0.69 
Petroleum  14  0.31  0.86 
Textiles,  Leather and Confection  43-45  0.28  0.30 
Electrical Engineering  34  0.27  0.72 
Industrial Olemicals  256  0.24  0.53 
Paper and  Wood  46/47  0.24  0.42 
Mechanical  Engineering  32  0.19  0.52 
Metal  Products  31  0.17  0.35 
Source  Kesteloot and Veugelers,  1989 - 115  -
exports  in  a  more  competitive  market 
decline  of  demand  for  foreign  exports. 
translates  into  a  stronger 
On  the  other  hand,  foreign 
export  subsidies are  more  effective  in  recapturing  lost market  shares 
in a  more  competitive  industry,  because  the  price  of  foreign  exports 
falls  more  in  response.  We  conclude  that  export  subsidies  by  one 
government  affect  market  shares  more  in  a  competitive  setting, 
provided  that  they  are  not  countervailed  by  subsidies  from  other 
governments. 
One  measure  to  capture  some  aspects  of  the  degree  of  competition  is 
the  concentration  ratio.  The  concentration  ratio  in  column  { 1)  of 
Table  2  measures  for  a  set of  industries  the  combined  market  share  of 
the  four  largest world producers.  The  second  column presents  the  same 
information  on  the  Belgian  level.  A  higher  concentration ratio often 
points  to  the absence of  severe competition. 
Once  more,  no  clear message  is derived  from Table  2.  In effect,  there 
exists  no  systematic  difference  between  the  concentration  in 
subsidized and non-subsidized industries.  Among  subsidized  industries 
there  are  pronounced  differences  also.  Concentration  ratios  in 
Electrical Engineering,  Mechanical  Engineering,  and Metal  Products are 
rather  low,  which would  suggest  that subsidization is rather effective 
in diverting market  shares.  The  opposite  is  true  in other  subsidized 
industries  including  Instrument  Engineering,  Office  Machinery, 
Automobiles,  and  Aircraft  Construction  where  we  find  high 
concentration  ratios.  As  in  the  case  with  demand  elaticities,  we 
conclude  that a  case-by-case approach is needed  to evaluate  the  impact 
of  export  financing  subsidies  on market  shares. 
3.5 The  degree of  product and  regional  differentiation 
In  assessing  the  competitive  effects  of  export  financing  subsidies, 
the  coefficient  k  plays  an  important  role.  As  seen  from  equations 
(9)-{10),  a  higher  value  for  k  implies  that  domestic  export  subsidies - 116  -
effectively  stimulate  domestic  exports  at  the  expense  of  foreign 
exporters.  At  the  same  time.  it  rein£  orces  the  effectiveness  of 
foreign subsidies  to counteract domestic export subsidization.7 
As  mentioned  earlier.  k  measures  the  degree  of  substitutability  in 
demand  for  foreign and domestic exports.  When  product differentiation 
is  not  pronounced,  importers  switch  easily  from  exports  of  the 
domestic  country  to  similar  exports  goods  from  foreign  competitors. 
Hence,  changes  in  the  relative price  of  foreign  and  domestic  exports, 
induced  by  subsidized  export  financing.  affect  competitors'  market 
share profoundly,  independent  of  the direct effects  on  the  subsidized 
firms.  In  short,  one  expects  more  severe  distortions  of  competition 
in industries and markets with  ~omogeneous products. 
In  the  con  text  of  this  study.  the  assumption  of  product 
differentiation  has  an  interesting  geographical  interpretation.  Due 
to  colonial  ties  or  historical  reasons.  specific  countries  have  a 
privileged  position  on  some  markets.  This  allows  them  to 
differentiate  their  products  from  similar  goods  supplied  by  their 
foreign  competitors  (a  small  k).  As  a  consequence,  export  financing 
distorts competition  less  in  those  markets  than  in markets  with  equal 
access  for all  firms.  On  the  other hand,  subsidies  may  be  effective 
in a  dynamic  framework  in deterring entry  from potential  competitors. 
The  regional  disaggregation  for  Belgian  official  development 
assistance and  export  insurance  in Chapter  II  provides  an  interesting 
example.  We  found  that  Belgium  devotes  a  significant part  of  its aid 
7From  equations  (9)  and  (10).  one derives  that an  increase  in domestic 
export  financing,  which  decreases  ~ 5 /(1-9)  by  1%  leads  to  a  reduction 
in  foreign  exports  by  kC/0  % and  an  increase  in domestic  exports  by 
(bf +Vf )/0  %.  An  equivalent  increase  in  foreign  subsidies  leads  to 
contraction  of  domestic  exports  by  kCf /0  %.  The  parameter  n  is  a 
negative  function  of  k.  A  high  degree  of  substitutability  between 
domestic  and  foreign  exports.  as  measured  by  a  large  value  of  k, 
raises  the value of all  three multipliers. - 117  -
to  its  former  colonies  and  most  of  all  to  Za.Yre.  In  view  of  this 
relationship  between  the  two  countries.  there  is  reason  to  believe 
that.  even  with  lower  subsidies.  many  of  the  export  contracts  would 
still  have  gone  to  Belgian  firms.  Nevertheless.  the  continued 
subsidization may  be  needed  to  maintain  the  special  relationship.  It 
was  pointed  out  in  Chapter  II  that  Indonesia.  China.  Turkey  and 
Pakistan  are  also  among  the  main  beneficiaries  of  Belgian  state  to 
state  credits.  As  Belgium  does  not  benefit  from  any  specific 
advantage  on  these  markets.  the  impact  of  development  assistance  on 
Belgian export performance  is likely  to be  more pronounced. 
IV.  EXPORT  FINANCING  AND  MARKET  INTERDEPENDENCY 
So  far  we  have assumed market  segmentation and constant marginal  costs 
in our  model.  In  this  way.  the effects of  export  financing  subsidies 
to a  specific market are confined  to  that market.  Hence,  promotion of 
exports  to  non-EC  countries  by  EC  member  states  does  not  affect 
intra-EC  competition  on  the  internal  EC  market.  In  this  section.  we 
show  that  the model  is easily extended  to  incorporate  linkages  between 
export  markets.  Such  linkages  make  export  performance  on  one  market 
dependent  on  export  subsidies  aimed  at  expanding  exports  elsewhere 
(Krugman.  1984) . 
The  source  of  the  market  interdependency  considered  here  concerns 
economies  of  scale  (EOS).  which  can  take  various  forms.  In  some 
industries.  the  average  fixed  cost  of  investments  in  plant  and 
equipment  falls  significantly  when  total  production  is  expanded 
(technical  EOS}.  In  other  industries.  research  and  development  or 
marketing and distribution costs are more easily recovered  when  output 
levels are sufficiently high.  A  third  important  form  of  EOS  concerns 
J 
learning  through experience.  In services.  construction and  some  other 
activities.  the  cost  efficiency  of  production  improves  drastically 
when  firms  become  more  experienced  in carrying  out  projects.  In all 
cases.  export  financing subsidies may  help firms  to bring down  average - 118  -
costs  by  expanding  exports.  This  gives  them  a  cost  advantage 
vis-a-vis  their  foreign competitors.  This  advantage applies  to  their 
entire production range  irrespective of  the market of destination. 
To  integrate  EOS  in  the  mathematical  model,  we  have  to  change  the 
set-up slightly.  We  suppose  that average costs are declining  in total 
firm output. 
in  market  i. 
Denote  x  as  the sales of  a  representative domestic  firm 
i 
m 
Let  the  firm  sell  a  total  production  of  .L x.  in  m 
1 =  1  1 
different  markets.  With  EOS,  average  costs  are  declining  for  a 
relevant  range  of  production  levels.  Mathematically,  average  cost  C 
m  . 
is  no  longer  a  constant  but  a  function C  (.L x
1
) 
1 =  1 
with a c  =  a c  = 
a xi  a xj 
C  ~  0  for  all  i  and  j. 
X 
The  first-order  conditions  for  a  profit 
maximum  for  domestic  exporting  firms  on  a  particular  market  i  are 
similar  to equation  (7).  In effect, 
pi_ xi  vi  = 
"Yi  s 
(7a) 
All  variables  are  defined  as  before  but  the  subscript  i  refers  to 
market  i.  In a  profit maximum,  the marginal  cost of  production at  the 
right  hand  side  of  the  equation  is  equal  to  marginal  revenue  at  the 
left hand  side.  This  is  true  for  every  market  in  which  the  domestic 
firm  operates  there  exists  a  total  of  m  first-order  conditions. 
Analogous  conditions  for  foreign  firms  can be derived.  ·· 
Equation  (7a)  makes  clear  how  export  subsidies  interact  with  EOS. 
Export  financing  subsidies  stimulate  exports  and  thus  increase 
production.  Average  costs  fall  which  amounts  to  an  decrease  in  the 
value  of  C.  In  its  turn,  this  reduction  in  average  costs  reinforces 
the export expansion of  domestic  firms. - 119  -
Moreover,  export  financing  subsidies  achieve  the  strongest  export 
expansion  in  industries  with  significant  EOS.  In  equation  (7a),  we 
find  that  the  marginal  cost  of  producing  goods  for  any  market  i  is 
decreased  by  the  negative  coefficient  C  .  This  coefficient  measures 
X 
the  impact  of  a  small  increase  in output  on  the  firm's  average  cost. 
When  there  is  a  large  potential  for  EOS  in  the  domestic  industry,  C 
X 
is  large  in absolute value  so  that expanding production by  subsidizing 
exports achieves  considerable savings  in marginal  and average costs. 
Table  3  presents  some  empirical  evidence  on  EOS  by  industry  {European 
Economy,  1988,  p  109).  More  specifically,  data on  the  cost gradient 
at  half  the  minimum  efficient  scale  are  provided.  This  indicator 
measures  the  percentage  increase  in  average  costs  that  would  result 
from  reducing output  from  the cost minimizing production  level  to  only 
half  this  optimal  level.  A  large  number  indicates  that  important  EOS 
exist  in  the  industry.  Of  course,  such  data  are  only  estimates  and 
should be  treated with  the  necessary caution.  In addition,  the  level 
of  aggregation  in Table  3  hides  a  lot of  interesting variation across 
product  groups,  which  is described  further  in  the  column  of  remarks. 
For  this  reason,  a  range  for  the cost gradient  is most  often given and 
the  type  of  EOS  is specified in more detail. 
A  comparison  of  Table  3  with  the  sectoral  subsidy  equivalents  in 
Chapter  II  suggests  that  there  are  significant  EOS  in  many  of  the 
subsidized  industries,  including  Nonelectrical  Machinery,  Electric 
Equipment,  Aircraft,  Metals  and  Motor  Vehicles. 
This  finding  deserves  further  emphasis  because  it  becomes  possible 
that  export  financing  subsidies  to  non-EC  markets  may  have  distorted 
competition on  the  internal  EC  market.  In effect,  with  EOS  the  export 
performance  on  a  specific  market  is  not  only  strenghtened  by  export 
financing  subsidies  to  that  market.  Any  subsidy  which  expands 
production  of  domestic  firms  lower  average  costs.  Mathematically, T
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this  is  seen  by  noting  that  C  and  C  depend  on  total  output  of  the 
X 
m 
firm  L x,  which  depends  on  the  export  subsidization  policy  in  all 
i =  1  i 
markets. 
Such  spill-over  effects  of  export  subsidies  should  direct  the 
attention of  policy-makers  to  the  total  amount  of  subsidies granted  to 
an  industry  instead  of  only  focussing  on  the  exports  m·1.rkets  to  which 
the  subsidies are allocated. 
V.  EMPIRICAL  EVIDENCE  ON  TilE  OJMPETITIVE  EFFECfS  OF  EXPORT  FINANCING 
In  this  section,  we  present  some  tentative  empirical  findings  on  the 
relationship  between  export  financing  and  export  performance.  First. 
we  relate  export  performance  on  an  industry  basis  to  the  sectoral 
disaggregation  of  export  credits  and  export  insurance  provided  in 
Chapter  II.  Subsequently,  we  concentrate  on  the  regional 
disaggregation  of  Belgian  official  development  assistance  and  export 
insurance and analyze whether  export  performance  on  subsidized  markets 
has  changed markedly. 
5. 1  Export  financing  subsidies and  industry export  performance 
In  Chapter  II,  we  showed  that  export  insurance  and/or  export  credit 
subsidies  in  France  and  the  United  Kingdom  were  directed  towards  a 
limited  set  of  usually  the  same  industries.  France  provided  more 
export  credit  subsidies  than  any  of  the  other  countries  considered, 
while  the  subsidization  through  export  insurance  was  more  equally 
distributed.  Rates  of  export credit  subsidization  rose  sharply at  the 
end  of  the  seventies  and  declined  again  from  1982  onwards.  Export 
insurance  subsidies have  been steadily  increasing  in  the  last decade. - 122  -
Table 4  Exoort  financiDg and  sectoral disaggregation of  non-EC exports 
{industry  shar~s as a  % of  total  non-EC exports) 
1.  FRANCE 
NACE 
<X> DE 
Mechanical  Engineering  32 
Instrument Engineering  37 
Metal  Products  31 
Electrical Equipment  34 
Motor  Vehicles  35 
Other Transport Equipment  36 
Iron and Steel  22 
Petroleum Products  14 
Food.  Beverages and Tob(Jcco  41 
Rubber  and Plastics  48 
Chemicals  25 
2.  UNITED  KINGDOM 
Other Transport Equipment 
Mechanical  Engineering 
Motor  Vehicles 
Office Machinery 
Metal  Products 
Electrical  Equipment 
36 
32 
35 
33 
31 
34 
1977 
18.0 
1.2 
1.0 
11.0 
4.8 
9.2 
11.0 
2.4 
4.6 
2.7 
11.0 
7.7 
19.9 
3.6 
0.2 
0.3 
11.8 
1979 
13.5 
2.5 
3.3 
9.4 
6.6 
16.1 
8.6 
2.7 
6.9 
4.3 
15.7 
10.4 
16.6 
3.6 
0.9 
1.5 
8.0 
a  The  data for  sectors  22,  32 and  34  refer  to  1984. 
Source  Computations  based  on data provided  by  INCAP 
1981 
12.9 
2.3 
3.5 
8.6 
7.0 
16.9 
8.7 
2.8 
4.9 
4.8 
14.2 
9.9 
16.3 
3.2 
1.0 
1.4 
8.3 
1983 
12.4 
1. 7 
1.4 
9.7 
3.0 
7.4 
7.3 
3.0 
3.8 
2.7 
10.0 
5.5 
12.8 
1. 7 
0.4 
0.2 
8.7 
1985a 
10.5 
1.9 
1.4 
9.4 
2.8 
7.5 
7.4 
2.4 
5.1 
3.3 
12.0 
10.0 
13.0 
1.6 
0.4 
0.2 
8.6 10) 
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To  assess  the  sectoral  impact  of  export  financing  subsidies  on  third 
markets,  Table  4  presents  an  industry  breakdown  of  non-EC  exports  in 
France and  the United Kingdom  for  the period  1977-1985.  The  selected 
industries  correspond  to  those  that  were  found  in  Chapter  II  to 
benefit  most  from  export  financing  subsidies,  although  different 
industry classification systems  rule out a  perfect correspondence.  As 
in Chapter  II,  industries are  ranked according  to  the  rate  of  export 
subsidization. 
An  interesting picture  emerges  in  the  case  of  France.  In  the  period 
1977-1981,  we  observe  a  significant  increase  in  the  share  in  total 
non-EC  exports  of  several  of  the  subsidized  industries  including 
Instrument  engineering,  Metal  Products,  Motor  Vehicles,  and  Other · 
Transport  Equipment.  The  data  for  1983  and  1985  shows  this  trend  to 
be  reversed  in  subsequent  years.  This  observed  pattern  in  export 
shares  is  consistent  with  ·the  sharp  rise  in  export  credit 
subsidization between  1977 and  1982  followed  by  a  decrease afterwards. 
This  suggests  that  export  credits  may  have  oriented  French  non-EC 
exports  towards  the  subsidized  industries  in  the  1977-1981  period but 
that  this  shift  was  not  maintained  when  export  subsidization  was 
reduced. 
The  evidence  for  the  United  Kingdom  is mixed.  An  temporary  expansion 
of  export  shares  in  1977-1981  is  seen  in  Motor  Vehicles,  Office 
Machinery,  and  Metal  Products  but  the  changes  are not  as  marked  as  in 
the  case  of  France.  The  export  share  of  Other  Transport  Equipment 
falls between  1981  and  1983 but  jumps  up again  in  1985.  On  the whole, 
a  clear  correlation  between  export  financing  and  export  orientation 
seems  harder  to detect.  This  should  not  come  as  a  surprise  since  the 
rates of British export credit subsidization are well  below  the  French 
figures. 
In  view  of  this  evidence,  the  crucial  question  then  becomes  whether 
the  sectoral  shift  in  French  export  orientation also  resulted  in any 
competitive  distort  ions  be  tween  EC  member  states  on  third  rnarke ts. 
For  this  purpose,  we  gathered  data  on  the  percentage  sectoral  shares - 124  -
Table 5  Sectoral  e~ort ~erformance on  third markets and  e~ort financing 
(%  share  in combined non-EC exports· for an  industry by France, 
Belgium.  Germany  and  the U.K.) 
NACE  1977  1979  1981  1983  1985a 
OODE 
1.  FRANCE 
Mechanical Engineering  32  17.9  18.4  18.4  18.8  17.1 
Instrument Engineering  37  30.0  38.5  36.7  35.9  39.1 
Metal  Products  31  10.0  32.7  35.1  14.2  13.7 
Electrical Equipment  34  21.2  24.2  23.6  24.3  24.0 
Motor  Vehicles  35  20.4  25.2  25.2  33.5  30.7 
Other Transport Equipment  36  25.8  31.1  31.4  37.5  29.5 
Iron and Steel  22  20.7  23.6  25.2  23.1  23.6 
Petroleum Products  14  26.0  35.3  32.7  32.3  27.2 
Food,  Beverages and Tobacco  41  22.4  25.2  25.7  23.7  24.7 
Rubber  and Plastics  48  9.9  12.1  22.4  8.6  9.2 
Chemicals  25  21.0  24.5  24.2  23.7  22.2 
2.  UNITED  KINGDOM 
Other Transport Equipment  36  23.2  20.6  19.7  29.3  41.6 
Mechanical  Engineering  32  21.5  23.2  25.0  20.4  21.9 
Motor  Vehicles  35  16.3  14.2  12.4  19.9  18.3 
Office Machinery  33  6.7  9.5  10.4  14.3  14.1 
Metal  Products  31  13.6  19.2  18.1  10.7  9.6 
Electrical Equipment  34  24.5  21.2  24.4  22.9  22.5 
a  The  data for  sectors 22.  32 and  34 refer  to  1984. 
Source  :  Computations based  on data provided by  INCAP - 125  -
of  French and British industries  in combined non-EC exports by France, 
Belgium,  Germany and  the United Kingdom.  Table 5  indicates  that,  with 
the  exception of  Mechanical  Engineering,  and  Rubber  and  Plastics,  the 
French relative position in the  subsidized  industries  improved between 
1977  and  1985  with  respect  to  the  three  other  countries.  This 
evolution  is  consistent  with  the  fact  that  French  export  credit 
subsidies  were  well  above  those  in  the  other  countries  during  this 
period. 
Furthermore,  we  find  that  in  Metal  Products,  Petroleum  Products, 
Rubber  and  Plastics  and  Chemicals  a  gain  in  relative market  share  in 
the  period  1977-1981  is  followed  by  a  weakening position  in  the  years 
1981-1985.  In  those  industries,  the  reduction  in  export  financing 
subsidization may  have  eroded  the French competitive advantage. 
No  uniform  picture  emerges  from  the  British data.  Some  industries, 
including  Other  Transport  Equipment  and  Office  Machinery,  performed 
better  on  third  markets  in  1985  than  in  1977,  while  the  relative 
position  of  Motor  Vehicles  and  Metal  Products  remained  relatively 
constant  or  weakened.  British  relative  export  position  in  the 
subsidized  industries  also  shows  more  pronounced  year  to  year 
fluctations  which  should caution against any premature conclusions. 
On  the  whole,  the  sectoral  analysis  of  Table  5  suggests  that  export 
financing  may  have  bolstered  export  performance  of  certain  French 
industries on  non-EC markets.  Evidently,  many  other  factors  influence 
sectoral  export  orientation  and  market  shares.  Also.  the  period 
considered  is  short  and  the  number  of  subsidized  industries  is  small 
so  that  one  risks  to  derive  biased  conclusions  from  too  small  a 
sample.  To  explicitly  isolate  the  specific  role  of  export  financing 
subsidies,  further  research would clearly be  required. - 126  -
5.2  Export  financing  subsidies  and  regional  breakdown  of  Belgian 
export performance 
In  this  section.  we  examine  the  relationship between  export  subsidies 
and  export  performance  for  Belgium.  Before  we  proceed.  it is  useful 
to shortly review  the main  trends  in Belgian export subsidization. 
We  found  that  the  rate of  subsidization in export credits  increased in 
the  period  1974-'84.  and  especially during  the  years  1980-'83.  From 
1984 onwards,  the rate of  subsidization started to decline. 
A  comparable  evolution  was  also  found  for  state  to  state  credits 
provided  by  the  Belgian Government.  An  important  share  of  this  form 
of  state aid  was  granted  to  a  limited  number  of  countries  including 
Zaire,  China.  Indonesia,  India and Turkey.  In recent years,  Zaire and 
China have been  the main beneficiaries. 
Where  Belgian  export  insurance  is  concerned.  premium  income  exceeded 
claims  before  1977.  From  the  end  of  the  seventies  onwards.  losses  of 
the  Belgian  insurance  agency  increased  steadily  with  a  marked 
acceleration  in  the  mid-1980's.  As  a  consequence,  subsidization 
implicit  in  official  export  insurance·  augmented  considerably. 
Especially African countries,  including Belgium's  former  colonies,  as 
well  as  Eastern Europe  benefited  substantially  from  this  expansion of 
export  insurance subsidies. 
One  then  wonders  whether  exports  to  the  mentioned  countries  became 
relatively  more  important  in  total  Belgian  non-EC  exports  as  export 
subsidies  increased. 
To  answer  this question.  we  compare  the  evolution of  export  shares  of 
those  countries  in  total  Belgian  non-EC  exports  to  the  pattern  of 
export subsidization described above  (see Table 6). T
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On  the whole.  we  find  that  the export shares of  the countries  involved 
remained  relatively  constant  during  the  period  1974-'87.  A  closer 
look at  the  individual  countries  export  shares  confirms  this  lack  of 
correlation between export performance and export  subsidization.  Only 
for  the period  1981-'83.  during  which  export  credit  subsidies  heavily 
increased.  we  observe an  increase  in  the export  shares of  China.  India 
and Eastern Europe.  We  conclude  that Belgian export  financing has  not 
achieved  a  noticeable  shift  of  export  orientation  towards  the  more 
subsidized countries. 
In  Table  7.  we  analyze  whether  the  export  performance  of  Belgian 
companies  in  subsidized  markets  has  improved  significantly  in  the 
period  1974-'87. 
For  this  purpose,  we  computed  the  percentage  share  of  Belgian exports 
in  the  total  imports  of  the  countries  which  benefited  most  from 
Belgian  export  financing  subsidies.  Again,  Belgian  export  shares  on 
most  of  the  subsidized  markets  remain  relatively  constant  during  the 
period  1974-'87  with  the  exception  perhaps  of  China.  The  Belgian 
import  penetration  of  the  Chinese  market  rises  sharply  in  1978  and 
shoots  up again in 1982-'83. 
Evidently.  the  absence  of  any  marked  change  in  market  share  does  not 
necessarily  mean  that  export  subsidies  were  ineffective.  Subsidized 
export  financing  may  have  prevented  a  weakening  of  the  position  of 
Belgian companies  on  some  export markets.  The  former  colony Zaire may 
provide an  interesting example  in this  respect.  As  is seen  from Table 
7,  Belgian firms  account  for  15.0  to 22.5% of  total  imports  by Zaire. 
The  observed substantial  subsidization in  the  form  of  export  insurance 
and  official  development  assistance  may  very  well  have  been  effective 
in protecting  this sizeable market  share. T
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VI.  OONQUSION 
In  this  chapter,  we  addressed  the  link  between  export  financing 
subsidies  and  competitive  distortions.  In  a  theoretical  part  we 
modelled  the  impact  of  export  financing  subsidies  on  exports  and 
import  prices.  It  was  found  that  both  cost  reducing  and  revenue 
increasing  export  financing  subsidies  by  a  EC  country  expand  exports 
of  its  firms  to  third  markets  at  the  expense  of  exporting  firms  in 
non-subsidizing  countries.  The  importer  pays  a  lower  price.  We 
conclude  that  export  support  programs  distort  competition  between  EC 
countries and  that  the distortion is linked  to  the size of  the  subsidy 
as  measured  in Chapter  II.  Nevertheless  the  relation between  export 
support and export performance  is complex. 
Summarizing.  we  can  derive  four  principles  for  policy-makers  seeking 
to  establish  whether  export  financing  subsidies  have  distorted 
intra-EC competition on non-EC and EC  markets. 
A  first  lesson  is  that  observed  changes  in  exports  and  import  price 
depend  on  the  response  by. other countries.  Export  financing  subsidies 
in EC  countries  that are directed  to  a  comparable  group  of  industries 
affect  the  competitive environment  but do  not necessarily alter market 
shares or  import prices. 
A  second  principle  is  that  industry-specific  conditions  matter.  We 
found  that  subsidies  stimulate  exports  most  when  1)  subsidies  .are 
substantial.  2)  the  cost  difference  between  competitors  is  not  too 
large.  3)  market  demand  is price elastic.  4)  competition within  the 
industry  is  intense  5)  product  differentiation  is  limited  and  6) 
there exist economies  of  scale in  the  industry. 
Applying  those  conditions  to  the  industr.ies  that  receive  the  bulk  of 
the  export  financing  subsidies  in  the  United  Kingdom  and  France. 
yields mixed  results.  Only  the Metal  Products  sector satisfies most - 131  -
of  the  above  requirements.  For  other  subidized  industries  a  more 
detailed  approach  based  on  industry-specific  characteristics  is 
necessary. 
In spite of  this,  we  found  some  evidence  for  a  relatton between export 
financing  subsidization  and  sectoral  export  performance  on  third 
markets  in  the  case  of  France.  During  the period of  intensive export 
credit subsidization  from  1977-1982,  a  shift of  French non-EC  exports 
towards  the  industries  that  benefited  most  from  the  subsidies  was 
noted.  This  trend  was  reversed  when  export  credit  subsidization  was 
reduced  in  the  subsequent  years.  No  such  pattern  was  found  in  the 
United  Kingdom,  which  is consistent with  the  fact  that British export 
credit subsidies were  below French  levels  in  the period considered. 
In  addition.  the  export  performance  of  most  subsidized  French 
industries  on  third  markets  improved  during  the  years  of  extensive 
export  credit  subsidization  when  compared  to  the  other  countries  of 
this  study.  From  the  viewpoint  of  this  study.  this  finding  is 
particularly relevant  for  the  industries  that benefit most  from  French 
export  credit  subsidies  including  Instrument  engineering.  Metal 
Products,  Electrical Equipment and Motor  Vehicles.  This  suggests  that 
export  financing  subsidies  might  have  helped  to  boost  exports  of 
French  firms  at  the  expense  of  their  Belgian,  British  and  German 
competitors.  In  this  context.  it is also  interesting  that  several  of 
the  subsidized  French  industries  lost  at  least  part  of  the  obtained 
gains  in  market  share  when  subsidies  decreased.  Evidently,  an 
analysis  of  this  sort  is  by  no  means  conclusive  but  should 
nevertheless  put  competition  policy  makers  on 
potential  competitive  distortions  of  sectoral 
subsidies. 
guard  against  the 
export  financing 
As  a  third  factor  in  the  relation  between  subsidization  and 
competitive  distortions,  policy-makers  should  analyze  the  features  of 
the  importing  country.  Export  subsidization  is  most  efficient  in 
diverting  market  share  in  "contestable  markets"  where  no  privileged 
access  is granted  to  exporting  firms  of  a  particular country.  On  the - 132  -
other  hand,  maintaining  the  privileged  relation  may  require  a 
continued  stream  of  subsidies.  In  the  Belgian  example.  official 
development  assistance  and  export  insurance  helps  to  maintain  a 
priviliged  access  in  the  former  colonies.  Conversely.  the  direct 
impact  of  subsidies  on  export  performance  is  likely  to  be  felt  more 
directly  on  the  more  competitive  Asian  markets.  Likewise.  export 
insurance  subsidies  to  other  EC  countries  are  likely  to  affect 
intra-EC  competition  directly  because  of  the  protection  given  by 
transport cost.  tariffs and non-tariff barriers  to EC  firms. 
In  the  empirical  part  of  this  cbapter.  no  clear  correlation  was 
established between  the  regional  breakdown of Belgian export  subsidies 
and  export  performance.  In  the  last  decade  or  so.  Belgian  export 
orientation  did  not  shift  gradually  to  these  non-EC  markets  which 
primarily  benefited  from  export  insurance  subsidies  and  official 
development  assistance.  Nor  did  import  penetration  by  Belgian  firms 
alter  markedly  in  these  countries.  As  mentioned  before  however. 
export  financing  subsidies  may  have  prevented  an  erosion  of  the 
Belgian  position  in  these  markets.  which  would  be  an  interesting 
hypothesis  for  further  research. 
This  brings  us  to  a  fourth  and  last  point.  In  spite  of  the  role  of 
regional  and  market-specific  factors.  the  total  amount  of  subsidies 
granted  provides  important  information about  the  scope  for  successful 
export  promotion.  Indeed.  it  was  found  that  there  are  substantial 
economies  of  scale  in  many  of  the  subsidized  industries.  To  the 
extent  that  export  support  programs  lower  average  costs.  export 
performance  on  all  export  markets  is  improved.  Such  spill-over 
effects  form  a  concern  for  EC  competition  pol icy.  Indeed.  official 
support  for  exports  to  non-EC countries  infringes  on Article 92 of  the 
EC  Treaty  when  it also  improves  export  performance  on  the  internal 
market. - 133  -
APPPENDIX 
A.  Importers evaluation of  repayment  terms 
Algebraicaly  ~.  can be written as 
Jm 
'Y.  =  JID 
T.  1/T.  +  {1-[{t-1} * 1/T.]} * r. 
LJ  J  ..  J  J 
t=1  {1+i  }t 
m 
As  can be  seen~.  depends  on T.,  the  paymen~  term.  r.,  the  interest 
JID  J  J 
rate paid by  the  importers  and  i  ,  the discount  rate of  the  importer. 
m 
A  rise  in  T.  or  i  wi 11  lower  ~.  while  a  rise  in  r.  achieves  the 
J  m  Jm  J 
opposite  effect.  The  discount  rate  i  can  differ  between  different 
m 
importers  but  will  be  the  same  for  one  importer  when  comparing  the 
offers of different suppliers. 
Table  A.1.  provides  some  intuition  for  this  mathematical  definition. 
The  left hand  side  of  the  table  illustrates  the  role  of  the  interest 
rate  paid  by  the  importer.  Suppose  that  an  importer  with  a  time 
preference of  10% {i  =  0.1}  evaluates a  payment  term of  10 years  {T  = 
10}.  His  preference  is reflected by  ~ .. 
Jm 
If  the  interest rate equals 
zero,  ~- becomes  0.614.  The  importer  obtains  an  interest  free  loan 
JID 
and  therefore  accept  the  payment  scheme  {~<1}.  With  an  interest  rate 
of 5%  ~- becomes  0.807,  so  that  the  importer  is still interested  in 
Jm 
the  loan provided by  the government agency  if another country does  not 
offer a  better deal. 'At  a  10% interest rate.  ~.  becomes  equal  to  one 
JID 
the  importer  is  indifferent  between  paying  cash  or  accepting  the 
loan.  Interest rates above  10 %are rejected by  the exporter. If  the  contract  price 
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P  is  1.000,  c 
this  implies  that  P  becomes  m 
respectively  614,  807,  1000  and  1.193.  The  importer  will  accept  the 
first  two  payment  conditions,  be  indifferent  about  the  third,  and 
reject  the  fourth.  In  the  last case,  he prefers paying cash. 
The  last  two  columns  of  table  A.1.  illustrate  the  importance  of  the 
subjective discount  rate.  It is  seen  that  the  same  payment  conditions 
are  evaluated  differently  by  importers  with  different  time 
preferences.  A payment  term of  10 years with an interest rate of  10% 
will  be  accepted  by  importers  with  a  discount  rate  higher  than  10% 
and  refused  by  those  with  a  discount  rate  lower  than  10  %.  Importers 
with  a  time  preference  of  10% will  be  i~different between  accepting 
and  refusing  the  payment  condition. 
Table A.1.:  1  values 
T  =  10 
i  =  0.1  r  =  0.1 
r  ,.  i  I 
0  0.614  0.15  0.834 
.0.05  0.807  0.1  1 
0.1  1  0.05  1.228 
0.15  1.193  0  1.55 
~  Export  subsidies  in  the case of  a  fixed  rate  loan 
If  the  exporter  would  have  obtained  a  fixed  rate  loan,  the  total 
subsidy for  year  K becomes 
K 
2:  U (r  - r  ) 
t=T  t  t  t 
whereby ut 
rt 
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total credits authorized in  t  and still outstanding inK 
market  interest rate in  t 
rt  officially  supported interest  rate on  loans  autho-
rized in  t 
T  year during  which  the oldest  still outstanding  loans were 
authorized 
The  difference  between  this  expression  and  expression  {2.1)  lies  in 
the  definition  of  the  market  interest  rate.  the  rate  that  would  have 
been charged  in absence of  export support. 
Let  us  reconsider  our  earlier  example  and  assume  that  the  adjustable 
interest  rates paid by  the  exporters are  respectively 6.  5.5 and  7  %. 
The  subsidy  for  1988 amounts  then  to 
1.000{0.11-0.06)  +  2.000(0.1-0.055)  +  3.000{0.125-0.07)  = 305  ECU - 137  -
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